Gott v. Apfel

*Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the Court has determined that
this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except
under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
_____________________
No. 99-50550
Summary Calendar
_____________________
DOUGLAS M. GOTT,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
KENNETH S. APFEL, COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,
Defendant-Appellee.
_________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Texas
(SA-97-CV-1414-EP)
_________________________________________________________________
February 1, 2000
Before SMITH, BARKSDALE, and PARKER, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Douglas M. Gott appeals the affirmance of the Commissioner’s
denial of his application for disability insurance benefits under
42 U.S.C. § 405. He contends that the administrative law judge
(ALJ) erred by not having a medical expert present, by misstating
the evidence, by failing to give proper weight to the opinions of
treating sources, in his credibility assessment, and in assessing
his residual functional capacity (RFC); and that the decision of
the Commissioner was not supported by substantial evidence and was
based on erroneous legal standards.

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“To prove disability resulting from pain, an individual must
establish a medically determinable impairment that is capable of
producing disabling pain. Once a medical impairment is
established, the subjective complaints of pain must be considered
along with the medical evidence in determining the individual’s
work capacity.” Ripley v. Chater, 67 F.3d 552, 556 (5th Cir.
1995); see also Harper v. Sullivan, 887 F.2d 92, 96 (5th Cir.
1989). On the basis of the medical evidence, the ALJ found that,
although Gott’s injuries and pain were severe, he was not barred
from performing many types of light-duty work and a full range of
sedentary work. Gott has failed to demonstrate error in this
finding. The substantial medical and other evidence supports the
Commissioner’s conclusion that Gott’s impairments did not
significantly circumscribe his ability to do light-duty to
sedentary work from the time of his injury in 1986 to the end of
his insured status on March 31, 1993.
Gott also contends that the record is incomplete because he
sought to add new evidence through a summary-judgment motion. This
evidence consisted of 1997 physical examination results. Remand to
the Commissioner for consideration of additional evidence may be
done “upon a showing that there is new evidence which is material
and that there is good cause for the failure to incorporate such
evidence into the record in a prior proceeding”. 42 U.S.C. §
405(g); Latham v. Shalala, 36 F.3d 482, 483 (5th Cir. 1994).
Materiality incorporates a time element, requiring the new evidence
to relate to the time for which benefits were denied. Latham, 36

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F.3d at 483. Remand cannot be based on new evidence of a
subsequent deterioration of what was previously correctly held to
be a nondisabling condition. Johnson v. Heckler, 767 F.2d 180, 183
(5th Cir. 1985). Gott has not shown that the 1997 evidence of new
back injuries relates back to the time of his insured status, which
ended in March 1993. The district court did not err in denying
Gott’s motion for summary judgment.
AFFIRMED

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