Jackson v. Casterline

*Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that
this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except
under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
_____________________
No. 99-30919
_____________________
WALTER THOMAS JACKSON,
Petitioner-Appellant,
versus
CARL CASTERLINE,
Respondent-Appellee.
_________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court for the
Western District of Louisiana
USDC No. 98-CV-1934
_________________________________________________________________
July 14, 2000
Before JOLLY, SMITH, and BARKSDALE, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Walter T. Jackson was transferred from state custody, where he
was awaiting trial on state charges, to federal custody pursuant to
a writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum. In the United States
District Court for the Western District of Louisiana, he was
sentenced to 78 months imprisonment, to be followed by 36 months of
supervised release, for the crime of assisting offenders in order
to hinder and prevent their apprehension by disposing of evidence

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in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 3. The sentencing court did not
specify whether this federal sentence was to be served
consecutively to or concurrently with Jackson’s pending sentencing
in state court on charges of robbery and of receiving stolen
property. He was returned to state custody and an Alabama state
court subsequently sentenced Jackson to fifteen years’ imprisonment
for receiving stolen property and two years for robbery, to run
concurrently. The state judge ordered that the state sentence be
served concurrently with Jackson’s federal sentence.
Imprisoned in a state penitentiary in 1992, Jackson was
paroled in 1997. He was then transferred to federal custody to
begin serving his federal sentence. Jackson petitioned the Bureau
of Prisons to designate, nunc pro tunc, the Alabama state facility
as a BOP-authorized facility so that the time he served in state
custody could be credited toward service of his federal sentence.
Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3584(a)-(b), this petition was rejected, on
grounds that such a designation would not be consistent either with
the intent of the federal sentencing court or the goals of the
criminal justice system. Jackson then filed this writ under 28
U.S.C. § 2241 seeking review of this administrative denial.
Upon de novo review, see Royal v. Tombone, 141 F.3d 596, 599
(5th Cir. 1998), we conclude that the district court did not err in
rejecting Jackson’s petition. Neither the federal sentence nor the

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1See United States v. Wilson, 503 U.S. 329, 331-32
(1992)(holding that the Attorney General, through the Bureau of
Prisons, determines if credit will be awarded to prisoners for time
spent in custody prior to the commencement of their federal
sentences). “Credit [on a federal sentence] for state
incarceration is given pursuant to 18 U.S.C. [3585(b)] only when it
was exclusively the product of such action by federal law-
enforcement officials as to justify treating the state jail as the
practical equivalent of a federal one.” United States v. Dovalina,
711 F.2d 737, 740 (5th Cir. 1983)(internal quotation and citation
omitted).
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sentencing proceedings provided evidence that the sentencing court
intended that Jackson’s federal sentence be served concurrently
with Jackson’s pending state sentence. Because Jackson’s PSR
identified the pending state charges, we can assume that the
district court likely was aware of Jackson’s pending state
proceeding. Indeed, the federal sentence imposed was at the top of
the guideline range, and the sentencing judge discussed the
possibility of an upward departure because Jackson’s criminal
history category did not reflect adequately the seriousness of
Jackson’s past criminal behavior.
Given the absence of intent that his federal sentence should
run concurrently (and evidence to the contrary), the BOP Regional
Director was well within his discretion to deny Jackson’s request
for a nunc pro tunc designation. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3584(a),
3585(a)-(b);1 18 U.S.C. § 3621(b); BOP Program Statement 5160.03
¶¶ 5-7. The BOP’s conclusion that Jackson’s request would be
inconsistent with the intent of the federal sentencing court or the

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2Because of inadequate briefing, Jackson has abandoned his
equal protecting argument. Even pro se litigants must brief
arguments in order to preserve them. See Yohey v. Collins, 985
F.2d 222, 225 (5th Cir. 1993). Jackson merely quotes a Supreme
Court case regarding the standard for reviewing equal protection
claims. We therefore conclude that he has abandoned this claim.
See Brinkmann v. Dallas County Deputy Sheriff Abner, 813 F.2d 744,
748 (5th Cir. 1987).
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goals of the criminal justice system appears well-founded in the
record. The state court’s intent that Jackson’s state sentence be
served concurrent to his federal sentence is of no effect in this
appeal. See, e.g., Jake v. Herschberger, 173 F.3d 1059, 1065-66
(7th Cir. 1999).
Finally, Jackson argues that the BOP should have awarded him
credit towards his federal sentence for time spent in state custody
even though that time was counted towards his state sentence.
Because he received credit on his state sentence for the time
served before his federal sentence commenced, the BOP was
prohibited from awarding Jackson this credit. See 18 U.S.C.
§ 3585(b) (“A defendant shall be given credit toward the service of
a term of imprisonment for any time he has spent in official
detention prior to the date the sentence commences . . . that has
not been credited against another sentence.”). Due to this
statutory preclusion, the district court did not err in rejecting
Jackson’s § 2241 petition.2
The judgment of the district court is

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A F F I R M E D.

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