In re: McKenzie

* The Honorable Jane A. Restani, Judge, United States Court of
International Trade, sitting by designation.
** Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the Court has determined that this
opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under
the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
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No. 99-20082
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In The Matter of HARVEN MICHAEL MCKENZIE,
Debtor.
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HARVEN MICHAEL MCKENZIE,
Appellant,
VERSUS
KUKUI, Inc., and W. STEVE SMITH, Trustee,
Appellees.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Texas
(H-97-CV-3311)
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February 9, 2000
Before POLITZ, DAVIS, Circuit Judges, and RESTANI,* Judge.
PER CURIAM:**
In this appeal, we consider Harven Michael McKenzie’s
challenges to the district court’s denial of his discharge in

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1 11 U.S.C. § 727 provides, in relevant part, that “[t]he court
shall grant the debtor a discharge unless . . . the debtor has
concealed, destroyed, mutilated, falsified, or failed to keep or
preserve any recorded information . . . unless such act or failure
to act was justified under all of the circumstances in the case.”
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bankruptcy, pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 727.1 McKenzie argues that the
bankruptcy court, and thus the district court, lacked jurisdiction
to consider the Trustee’s objection to his discharge because the
Trustee failed to file an objection within the statutory time
period. McKenzie also contends that KUKUI, Inc., a creditor of the
bankruptcy estate, released all claims against the agents and
employees of GlobeGasBV, McKenzie’s alleged employer.
We find that, under the circumstances, the bankruptcy court
properly exercised jurisdiction over the Trustee’s section 727
objection. Section 105 of the Bankruptcy Code provides the court
with vast equitable powers to “issue any order, process, or
judgment that is necessary or appropriate to carry out the
provisions of this title . . . or to prevent an abuse of process.”
11 U.S.C. § 105. This section certainly provides the district
court with the power to exercise jurisdiction over an objection
where an objecting party has relied on the court’s scheduling
orders, even where those orders contain incorrect deadlines. See
In re Themy, 6 F.3d 688, 690 (10th Cir. 1993)(“although the burden
of protecting one’s rights is ordinarily placed on the creditor .
. . when the court’s act affirmatively misleads the creditor as to
a deadline, the court bears responsibility for correcting its
error. A creditor should be entitled to rely on the court’s

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orders.”); In re Anwiler, 958 F.2d 925, 929 (9th Cir.
1992)(“Allowing a court to correct its mistakes is not inconsistent
with the purpose of the Bankruptcy Rules 4004 and 4007. . . . The
intent behind the rules is not circumvented by allowing an untimely
complaint to stand when a party relied on a court document sent
before the deadline had expired.”); Cf. Neeley v. Murchison, 815
F.2d 345, 347 n.5 (5th Cir. 1987)(holding that a creditor must
adhere to the sixty-day deadline regardless of whether he received
formal notice but noting that “today’s case is not one in which the
clerk gave an affirmative but erroneous notice of a bar date upon
which the creditor might reasonable have relied”).
Furthermore, we find that the district court did not err,
either legally or factually, in holding that KUKUI’s settlement
agreement with GlobeGas did not release KUKUI’s claims against
McKenzie.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court
is AFFIRMED.

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