Caryn M. Voskuil v. Environmental Health Center-Dallas, Inc.;

* District Judge of the Western District of Louisiana,
sitting by designation.
** Pursuant to 5TH Cir. R. 47.5, the court has determined
that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent
except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R.
47.5.4.
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
No. 99-10886
CARYN M. VOSKUIL,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
ENVIRONMENTAL HEALTH CENTER-DALLAS, INC.; ET AL.,
Defendants,
ENVIRONMENTAL HEALTH CENTER-DALLAS, INC.,
Defendant-Appellee.
_______________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Texas
3:96-CV-683-L
_______________________________
June 19, 2000
Before JONES and BENAVIDES, Circuit Judges, and WALTER*, District
Judge.
PER CURIAM:**
Appellant Caryn M. Voskuil (“Voskuil”) appeals the dismissal
with prejudice of her Title VII sexual harassment suit. The
dispute which culminated in the dismissal arose when appellee
Environmental Health Center-Dallas (“EHC-D”) requested—and

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Voskuil refused to produce—the records of Voskuil’s treatment for
depression with Dr. Margie McKeon, a psychologist, and Dr. Jerome
Statman, a psychiatrist. Both parties agreed that the records
were privileged material, but EHC-D maintained that Voskuil had
waived the privilege based on her request for damages for
emotional distress and injury that extended to suicidal thoughts
and believing that her life was not worth living. On July 2,
1998, the magistrate judge agreed with EHC-D and ordered Voskuil
to produce the documents. The district court overruled Voskuil’s
objections to the magistrate judge’s ruling and subsequently
denied her motion for reconsideration.
After Voskuil refused to comply with the magistrate judge’s
order, the district court held a contempt hearing on April 23,
1999. At the hearing, Voskuil’s counsel conceded that she had
flouted the court’s order; Voskuil indicated that she endorsed
her counsel’s conduct. Upon questioning by the court, however,
Voskuil agreed that she would produce the medical records if
their disclosure was reasonably limited.
In its June 11, 1999 ruling on the contempt motion, the
district court imposed monetary sanctions and ordered Voskuil to
produce the medical records. However, the district court also
established certain limitations on who could obtain access to the
records and for what purposes the records could be used.
Finally, the district court warned that if Voskuil neglected to
comply with its mandate, it would dismiss her case with

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prejudice.
On June 30, 1999, after Voskuil once again failed to produce
the documents by the court-imposed deadline, the district court
dismissed Voskuil’s case with prejudice after finding that such
action was the only effective sanction under the circumstances.
We hold that the district court did not abuse its discretion
in so doing. Though Voskuil now argues that the magistrate judge
allowed no limitations on the disclosure of this sensitive
material, the record reveals that Voskuil never requested any
such reasonable limitations on the disclosure of the records
before the magistrate judge. The issue of reasonable limitations
did arise at the contempt hearing when the district court
suggested it. Having agreed to release the medical records with
the protection of the limitations set forth in the district
court’s June 11, 1999 order, and having been warned that
continued failure to produce the records would lead to a
dismissal with prejudice, Voskuil cannot now complain that the
sanction was an abuse of discretion. She twice intentionally
disregarded court orders, misrepresented her future course of
conduct to the district court, failed to pay the monetary
sanctions that were a lesser punishment for her contempt, and
knew the consequences of her actions would be the demise of her
suit. In this context, we cannot say that the district court
abused its discretion in dismissing the case with prejudice.
AFFIRMED

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