(caption unavailable)

*Local Rule 47.5 provides: "The publication of opinions that
have no precedential value and merely decide particular cases on
the basis of well-settled principles of law imposes needless
expense on the public and burdens on the legal profession."
Pursuant to that Rule, the court has determined that this opinion
should not be published.
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
_____________________
No. 94-50456
Summary Calendar
_____________________
FIDENCIO MAGALLANES,
Petitioner-Appellant,
versus
WAYNE SCOTT, Director, TDC,
ET AL.,
Respondents-Appellees.
_________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court for the
Western District of Texas
(SA-93-CA-338)
_________________________________________________________________
(December 22, 1994)
Before KING, JOLLY, and DeMOSS, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Magallanes argues on appeal that the district court erred in
determining that his nolo contendere plea was knowing and voluntary
and that he received effective assistance of counsel.
I
Magallanes first contends that he did not knowingly and
voluntarily enter his plea because of his alleged medication-
induced mental impairments. He argues that he was incompetent at

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the time he entered his plea because he was experiencing symptoms
of "methadone postwithdrawal syndrome" such as difficulty
concentrating and making decisions. After holding an evidentiary
hearing, the magistrate judge found that Magallanes' own testimony
and documentary evidence established that at the time he entered
his nolo plea he had been on a regimen of methadone maintenance for
over two months. She found that the same evidence also established
that, "while some degree of mental or psychological impairment is
common during the first week or two of a methadone maintenance
program, after two months in such a program, no physical, mental,
or psychological impairment is to be expected." Magallanes' own
evidence showed that "when the dose is properly adjusted there is
no physical, mental, or psychological impairment that can be
detected or measured" from methadone maintenance. The evidence
also showed only that a methadone maintenance patient may
"experience impairment during the first 1-2 weeks of treatment when
the dose might be started too high or raised too rapidly."
Furthermore, Magallanes could not suffer the effects of methadone
postwithdrawal syndrome until after the methadone was withdrawn,
which did not occur until approximately two weeks after Magallanes'
plea.
During the plea colloquy, Magallanes' attorney specifically
informed the court that he was satisfied that Magallanes was
competent to enter a plea. During the evidentiary hearing,
Magallanes' attorney again testified that he had no trouble

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communicating with his client in the time leading up to trial and
that nothing in Magallanes' behavior caused him to question
Magallanes' competence. The magistrate judge stated that
"[i]nsofar as the testimony of the petitioner and his former state
court defense counsel differs on these matters, the court finds
petitioner's testimony to be incredible." See Collins, 918 F.2d at
1202 (holding that it is appropriate to credit the testimony of
defense counsel over that of a habeas petitioner, especially when
the court has had a first-hand opportunity to view the demeanor of
both witnesses). Magallanes does not show that the magistrate
judge's findings were clearly erroneous. In the light of the
medical evidence, and the responses Magallanes' attorney gave
during the plea colloquy and during the evidentiary hearing,
Magallanes has not made a substantial showing that his ability to
understand the significance and consequences of his plea was
impaired.
Similarly, his contention that his plea was involuntary
because it was effectively coerced is also without merit.
Magallanes contends that because his attorney advised him that he
had very little chance of prevailing should he go to trial and
because his attorney failed to locate and interview particular
defense witnesses, his attorney in essence coerced Magallanes into
pleading nolo contendere. Magallanes made no showing to support
this allegation. On the contrary, during the plea colloquy,
Magallanes told the judge that he was satisfied with his attorney

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and with the advice he had received. He stated to the court that
he made the final decision to plead no contest. A defendant's
solemn declarations in court carry a strong presumption of truth.
Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 74, 97 S.Ct. 1621, 52 L.Ed.2d
136 (1977).
At the evidentiary hearing, his attorney testified that he
initially believed that if Magallanes had any potential defense to
the murder charge it would have to be based on a self-defense
theory. He testified that as he continued trial preparation it
became increasingly evident that the chances of successfully
mounting a such a defense were extremely remote and that he so
informed Magallanes.
Magallanes also argues that if his attorney had located
particular witnesses, especially an alleged eyewitness who could
corroborate a self-defense theory, he would not have pleaded
guilty. Magallanes' attorney testified that he attempted
repeatedly to locate and interview Magallanes' alleged "star
witness," Jimmy Herrera. In Herrera's affidavit, attached as an
exhibit to Magallanes' state habeas petition, Herrera corroborates
Magallanes' attorney, admitting that he made himself unavailable at
the time of Magallanes' trial.
In sum, the record does not support Magallanes' contention
that his plea was effectively coerced by the action or inaction of
his attorney.

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1Because Magallanes did not brief the issue of the district
court's denying his motion for continuance, it is waived. Fed. R.
App. P. 28(a)(4); see Atwood v. Union Carbide Corp., 847 F.2d 278,
280 (5th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1079 (1989).
-5-
II
Next, Magallanes also argues that he received ineffective
assistance of counsel. He contends that his attorney was
ineffective because he had failed adequately to investigate a self-
defense theory, had not met with him on as many occasions as
Magallanes believed were necessary, had not "introduced"
information concerning the victim's propensity for violence and, as
discussed above, had effectively coerced him into pleading no
contest. A valid guilty plea, however, waives ineffective-
assistance-of-counsel claims that do not go to the voluntariness of
the plea. Smith v. Estelle, 711 F.2d 677, 682 (5th Cir. 1983),
cert. denied, 466 U.S. 906 (1984). Therefore, with the exception
of the coerced-plea claim, Magallanes' ineffectiveness claims are
waived. As we have earlier discussed, this claim has no merit.
III
For the reasons stated herein, the judgment of the district
court dismissing Magallanes' habeas petition is
A F F I R M E D.1

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