(caption unavailable)

* Local Rule 47.5.1 provides: "The publication of opinions that have no
precedential value and merely decide particular cases on the basis of well-
settled principles of law imposes needless expense on the public and burdens
on the legal profession." Pursuant to that rule, the court has determined
that this opinion should not be published.
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
_______________
No. 92-3580
No. 93-3233
Summary Calendar
_______________
DAVID W. WILLIAMS,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
VERSUS
BRIDGESTONE/FIRESTONE, INC.,
LONG TERM DISABILITY BENEFITS PLAN,
Defendant-Appellee.
_________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Louisiana
CA 91 489 B M1
_________________________
August 18, 1993
Before GARWOOD, SMITH, and DeMOSS, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
David Williams filed suit under section 502(a)(1)(B) of the
Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 ("ERISA"),
29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B), complaining of the denial of long term
disability benefits by the pension board of his employer's long

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term disability benefits plan )) a denial stemming from the deter-
mination that Williams was not disabled under the terms of the
plan. In a comprehensive ten-page order entered on May 27, 1992,
the district court granted the defendant's motion for summary
judgment and, in so doing, determined that the plan administrator
did not abuse his discretion in denying benefits. The court
noted that "the plaintiff did not submit any evidence to oppose
defendant's motion for summary judgment" and sustained the pen-
sion board's finding that Williams could perform sedentary work
with some limitations and thus was not totally disabled.
The court entered final judgment on the basis of its opin-
ion. Several months later, Williams filed a motion under FED. R.
CIV. P. 60(b)(2), seeking to have the judgment vacated in order to
introduce a recently-obtained doctor's report. The court opined
that Williams did not meet the standard of rule 60(b)(2), which
requires that the newly discovered evidence be evidence that
"could not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial
under [FED. R. CIV. P.] 59(b)." The court found that Williams was
aware of the existence of the subject report before summary judg-
ment was entered, yet "neither moved for a continuance nor op-
posed the plan's motion for summary judgment."
We perceive no error and affirm both the summary judgment
and the denial of relief under rule 60(b)(2). We do so essen-
tially for the reasons set forth in the opinion entered on May
27, 1992, granting summary judgment, and the order entered
March 4, 1993, denying the rule 60(b)(2) motion.

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AFFIRMED.

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