(caption unavailable)

*Local Rule 47.5 provides: "The publication of opinions
that have no precedential value and merely decide particular
cases on the basis of well-settled principles of law imposes
needless expense on the public and burdens on the legal
profession." Pursuant to that Rule, the Court has determined
that this opinion should not be published.
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
No. 92-3140
RICHARD MURLA Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
MOBIL OIL CORPORATION, Defendant-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Louisiana
CA 90 4877 "L"
June 28, 1993
Before GARZA, REYNALDO G., HIGGINBOTHAM, and DeMOSS, Circuit
Judges.
PER CURIAM*:
Plaintiff Richard Murla appeals from a summary judgment in
favor of Mobil Oil Corporation, arguing that the district court
erred in holding that his claims against Mobil were barred by the
"two-contract" doctrine. While the question is very close, we
agree with Murla that Louisiana courts have not yet recognized the
particular application of this doctrine urged by Mobil. We

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therefore reverse the district court's judgment and remand for
further proceedings.
I.
On August 16, 1988, Tenneco Oil Company hired Bechtel, Inc. to
work on its Chalmette, Louisiana refinery. In December 1988,
Tenneco sold the refinery and assigned its contracts to Mobil,
including the Bechtel contract. Bechtel subcontracted with Ebasco
Constructors to perform some of the heavy crude construction work
in May 1989. Two months later, Bechtel assigned Mobil "all rights,
interests and obligations" it possessed under its subcontract with
Ebasco. Murla, an employee of Ebasco, was injured while working at
the Mobil refinery on November 14, 1989.
Murla sued Mobil in Louisiana state court under theories of
negligence and strict liability. Mobil removed the case to the
U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana, and then
moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the motion,
concluding that Mobil was protected from tort liability under
Louisiana's workers' compensation scheme. Murla has appealed.
II.
Louisiana law provides that an injured employee has no remedy
beyond workers' compensation against either "his employer or any
principal." LSA-R.S. 23:1032 (emphasis added). A "principal" is
"any person who undertakes to execute any work [1] which is part of
his trade, business or occupation in which he was engaged at the
time of the injury, or [2] which he had contracted to perform and
contracts with any person for the execution thereof." Id.;

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23:1061. Mobil maintains that it is a "principal" under either [1]
the three-tier framework established in Berry v. Holston Well
Service, 488 So.2d 934 (La. 1986), or [2] the two-contract theory
found persuasive by the district court. Murla challenges the
district court's application of the two-contract theory to the
facts of this case.
Defendants are responsible for workers'
compensation and
immune from tort liability if it is established that:
1) defendant entered into a contract with a third party;
2) pursuant to the contract, work must be performed;
3) in order for defendant to fulfill its contractual obligation to
perform the work, defendant entered into a subcontract for all or
part of the work performed.
Beddingfield v. Standard Construction Co., 560 So.2d 490, 491-92
(La. App. 1st Cir. 1990); Duncan v. Balcor Property Management,
Inc., 615 So.2d 985, 989 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1993). Murla maintains
that this defense is not available to Mobil, for only those
defendants who personally entered into the relevant two contracts
may rely on it. Mobil concedes that it was Bechtel that signed the
agreements, but argues that it received through assignment whatever
rights and obligations possessed by Bechtel.
We have been unable to locate any Louisiana decisions that
speak directly to the special circumstances of this case. We are
persuaded, however, that Murla's argument finds greater support in
existing state precedent, and therefore cannot affirm the district
court's reliance on the two-contract doctrine. Because analysis

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under the alternative Berry test requires additional facts, we must
reverse the district court's judgment. We remand the case to the
district court for additional proceddings, including a
consideration of whether Mobil is Murla's statutory employer under
Berry.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.

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