(caption unavailable)

*Local Rule 47.5 provides: "The publication of opinions that
have no precedential value and merely decide particular cases on
the basis of well-settled principles of law imposes needless
expense on the public and burdens on the legal profession."
Pursuant to that Rule, the Court has determined that this opinion
should not be published.
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
For the Fifth Circuit
No. 92-2367
Summary Calendar
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
VERSUS
MIRYAM BALCAZAR and
JOSE ANTONIO CRUZ,
Defendants-Appellants.
Appeal from the United States District Court
For the Southern District of Texas
CR H 89 0012 01 & 02
May 27, 1993
Before HIGGINBOTHAM, SMITH, and DeMOSS, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*

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BACKGROUND
On January 18, 1989, Miryam Balcazar, Jose Antonio Cruz, and
Jose Alvaro Gallo were indicted for conspiracy to possess with
intent to distribute in excess of five kilograms of cocaine,
possession with intent to distribute in excess of five kilograms of
cocaine, and money laundering.
The facts surrounding Gallo's arrest and that supported his
conviction were described in his prior appeal as follows:
Gallo was arrested on January 12, 19[89], following
the Drug Enforcement Administration's (DEA) surveillance
of Miryam Balcazar and Jose Antonio Cruz. On January 12,
1990, DEA agents observed the activities of Cruz and
Balcazar until they met at a skating rink in Kingwood,
Texas. At the skating rink, Cruz parked his car, a silver
Honda, next to Balcazar's blue Oldsmobile. The DEA agents
then observed Balcazar and Cruz conversing outside the
cars. When Balcazar and Cruz left the skating rink
parking lot, DEA agent Turner followed Cruz to a gas
station where Cruz made a telephone call. About two
minutes later Gallo entered the gas station, driving a
brown Mazda RX7, and parked near Cruz's car. After a
short meeting at the gas station, Cruz and Gallo drove to
a nearby auto shop. At the auto shop, Cruz and Gallo
parked their cars within five to eight feet of each
other. They then exited their cars and after a brief
conversation, Cruz removed a brown box from the back of
his car and placed it in the rear of Gallo's car. After
this transfer, both Cruz and Gallo exited the parking lot
and headed in opposite directions on the freeway. Agent
Turner followed Gallo and attempted to read the car's
rear license plate to determine its ownership. The
license plate was covered with mud and was unreadable,
therefore, Turner sought assistance from the Harris
County Sheriff's Office and the Houston Police Department
(HPD).
Houston police officer, J. R. Knott, received a
dispatch from the DEA requesting a marked patrol car to
check the license plate on a car that was currently being
followed by a Harris County deputy sheriff. Officer Knott
observed a Harris County Sheriff's car, with its
emergency lights flashing, following a brown Mazda at a
high rate of speed. Knott observed that the Mazda
continued for several blocks without responding to the

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Sheriff's unit. Knott then pulled alongside the Mazda and
signaled for the driver, whom he identified as Gallo, to
pull over. After Knott had stopped Gallo he discovered
that Gallo's driver's license was suspended. Knott placed
Gallo under arrest for driving with a suspended driver's
license.
After deciding to impound Gallo's car, Knott
inventoried the contents of the car pursuant to HPD
procedure. The only item in the car was a closed
cardboard box, which was in the rear hatchback area of
the car. Knott listed one cardboard box on his inventory
slip. Generally, the HPD automobile inventory procedure
requires an officer to list items found inside the
vehicle. If, however, there are circumstances that
indicate that valuable or dangerous items may be hidden
in a container inside the car, then these containers may
also be inventoried. Officer Knott testified that he had
listed "one cardboard box" on the wrecker slip when
someone suggested that he look inside the closed box.
Knott decided to look in the box to determine if it
contained something of value. When Knott opened the box
he saw that it contained thin packets wrapped in aluminum
foil. Knott did not inventory the contents of the box and
did not investigate the contents of the aluminum-foil
packets. After Knott completed his inventory of the car,
the officers at the scene decided to drive the car to the
police substation rather than have it towed to a storage
lot. At the police substation, DEA agents searched the
box and discovered $ 299,985 in United States currency
wrapped in the aluminum-foil packets. Balcazar's
fingerprints were later discovered on the aluminum-foil
wrappings on the currency. Gallo told DEA agents that he
did not know how the box got inside the car, and that
someone else had put the box in the car.
United States v. Gallo, 927 F.2d 815, 817-18 (5th Cir. 1991)
On January 12, 1989--later during the same day DEA agents were
watching Gallo, Balcazar, and Cruz--another group consisting of
U.S. Customs Agents, IRS Agents, and Houston police officers was
watching a residence at 2911 Park Garden in Kingwood. Henry L.
Lewis, a Houston police officer, saw Cruz get into his car at that
location, drive to a convenience store a few blocks away, and make
a phone call. From there, Cruz drove to the skating rink parking

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lot, where Officer Lewis observed Cruz park next to Balcazar's car.
Cruz took a box from the trunk of his car and placed it in the back
of Balcazar's car. Balcazar then handed Cruz a soft-sided bag that
he put in the trunk of his car. The cars exited the scene in
differing directions, and Officer Lewis followed Balcazar.
Balcazar first drove slowly for about two miles down a dead-
end street, then turned around and drove out of the cul-de-sac.
She then drove into the Kingwood subdivision and began to weave
through it, making several turns onto side streets. Based on his
experience, Officer Lewis believed that Balcazar was making a "heat
run," driving evasively to see if anyone was following her.
Balcazar then pulled up to an elementary school and entered a queue
of vehicles waiting to pick up schoolchildren. Balcazar remained
stationary for about ten minutes; no one entered her car.
Balcazar then drove to another elementary school. She pulled
up to a school-crossing crosswalk where the crossing guard had
stopped traffic for the schoolchildren to cross. Some children
were halfway across the street when Balcazar accelerated through
the crosswalk. At that time, Lewis and the other agents decided to
stop Balcazar. She was stopped because the manner in which she was
driving was perceived as a threat to the public, and because her
evasive driving tactics elevated the belief of the officers that
Balcazar had engaged in a narcotics transaction with Cruz.
Prior to the January 12, 1989 surveillance and arrest of
Balcazar, IRS Special Agent Karnick had received information that
Balcazar might be involved in money laundering. Agent Karnick

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arrived at the scene while Balcazar was being detained, informed
her of her rights, and asked her if she understood those rights.
Agent Karnick then told Balcazar that she had been observed passing
a package and receiving a box and that it was his belief that
either drugs or money was in the box. Balcazar told Agent Karnick
that money was in the box, that she received it from someone named
Lewis Carillo, and that she was delivering it for a friend to
someone in Houston named Carlos.
When Balcazar's car was stopped, the box was in plain view in
the back of the car. A drug-sniffing dog was brought to the scene,
and it alerted to the box. Agent Karnick took possession of the
box and later opened it pursuant to a search warrant. The box
contained $300,000 wrapped in aluminum foil.
At the time of Balcazar's arrest, the IRS and Customs Agents
were unaware that the earlier arrest of Gallo resulted in the
recovery of money from the conspiracy. The agents were aware that
there had been a stop earlier in the day, that the DEA was
involved, and that the individual stopped was carrying money. They
were unaware that the earlier arrest related to Balcazar or Cruz.
U.S. Customs Special Agent Kane followed Cruz from the skating
rink, the site of the exchange between Balcazar and Cruz, to the
residence at 2911 Park Gardens Drive. Cruz stayed in the residence
for about an hour and then drove to a travel agency on Kingwood
Drive. Officer Eric Williams entered the travel agency and
overheard Cruz requesting tickets to Colombia for himself and his
girlfriend. Officer Williams exited the travel agency after ten

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minutes, and Cruz exited about twenty minutes later. Cruz sat in
his car in the travel agency parking lot and then left looking
around the parking lot. Officer Williams followed Cruz from the
parking lot through a residential area where the speed limit was 30
to 35 miles per hour. Cruz was driving at 50 to 60 miles per hour.
Special Agent Robert Rutt also followed Cruz and saw him
exceed the speed limit and cut off a tractor-trailer rig. Cruz was
watching the rear-view mirror more than the road ahead of him.
Because Cruz was apparently aware of the surveillance and because
there was a possibility that he would elude further surveillance,
the decision was made to stop him. Balcazar had already been
arrested, and Agent Karnick had received information from the DEA
regarding the earlier transfer of money.
Cruz was stopped; neither Agent Rutt nor Officer Williams saw
a blue bag in the car. Cruz was advised of his rights, and Officer
Williams asked him where the tickets were. Cruz responded that
they were still at the travel agency.
Based on information gathered from the morning and afternoon
investigations, search warrants were obtained for the residences at
2911 Park Gardens (Cruz's residence), 2047 Little Cedar (Balcazar's
residence), and for the box in Balcazar's car. At 2911 Park
Gardens, agents recovered about fifty kilograms of cocaine from the
garage of the house. Twenty-five pounds and twelve ounces of the
cocaine was found in the blue bag that Cruz had carried earlier in
the day.

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At 2047 Little Cedar, agents recovered $1,240,810 in currency.
Part of the currency was wrapped in aluminum foil and placed inside
a brown leather carrying bag. Other currency, also wrapped in
foil, was stored inside a brown suitcase and a cardboard box. A
money-counting machine, used for sorting and counting large numbers
of bills, was also found in the house.
On June 28, 1989, the district court found the defendants
guilty on all counts. Gallo filed a timely notice of appeal of his
conviction, urging the warrantless stop and search of his car was
illegal and that the evidence against him was insufficient. This
Court affirmed the conviction. Gallo, 927 F.2d at 817.
Balcazar and Cruz did not file timely notices of appeal;
however, the district court granted them leave to file an out-of-
time appeal. They argue on appeal: (1) that the district court
erred by not granting motions to suppress evidence obtained through
the warrantless search of the box found in the car driven by Gallo;
(2) that the Government lacked probable cause to stop and arrest
Balcazar and Cruz; (3) that there was insufficient evidence to
sustain Balcazar's drug-related convictions; and (4) that the
evidence is insufficient to sustain the convictions of Balcazar and
Cruz for money laundering, because the transactions did not affect
interstate commerce.
OPINION
Balcazar and Cruz argue that the district court erred by not
granting motions to suppress evidence obtained through the
warrantless search of the box found in the car driven by Gallo.

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Neither Balcazar nor Cruz may challenge the search of the box
in Gallo's car or the legality of Gallo's arrest. Fourth Amendment
rights are personal and may not be vicariously asserted. United
States v. Mendoza-Burciaga, 981 F.2d 192, 196 (5th Cir. 1992).
Only Gallo had standing to challenge the search of the box in his
car or the existence of probable cause for his arrest.
Balcazar and Cruz next argue that the Government lacked
probable cause to stop and arrest them; therefore, the district
court erred by not granting their motion to suppress evidence.
They are incorrect.
The standard of review for denial of a motion to suppress
based on live testimony at a suppression hearing requires
acceptance of the trial court's factual findings unless clearly
erroneous. United States v. Piaget, 915 F.2d 138, 139 (5th Cir.
1990). Furthermore, this Court must view the evidence in the light
most favorable to the party who prevailed below, in this case, the
Government. Id. at 140. However, the ultimate determination of
the reasonableness of a search is a conclusion of law and is
reviewed de novo. United States v. Harrison, 918 F.2d 469, 473
(5th Cir. 1990) (investigatory stop).
"Probable cause exists when the facts and circumstances known
to the arresting officer are sufficient to cause a person of
reasonable caution to believe that an offense has been or is being
committed and the arrested person is the guilty person." United
States v. Ramirez, 963 F.2d 693, 698 (5th Cir. 1992). The relevant
inquiry is "the degree of suspicion that attaches to particular

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types of non-criminal acts." United States v. Mendoza, 722 F.2d
96, 101 (5th Cir. 1983). Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 244 (n.
13), 103 S. Ct. 2317, 76 L. Ed. 2d 527 (1983). A probable cause
determination must be viewed in the light of the observations,
knowledge, and training of the law-enforcement officers. United
States v. Muniz-Melachor, 894 F.2d 1430, 1438 (5th Cir. 1990).
"[I]f the arresting officer has no personal knowledge of any of the
facts establishing probable cause, he may make an arrest in
carrying out directions from another officer who does have probable
cause." Charles v. Smith, 894 F.2d 718, 724 (5th Cir. 1990).
The factors that led to the arrests of Balcazar and Cruz are
as follows: (1) The Government had received information that
Balcazar was involved in money and drug transactions; (2) the
agents who arrested Cruz had information of the earlier arrests of
Gallo and Balcazar and Cruz's transactions with Balcazar and Gallo;
(3) both Balcazar and Cruz engaged in counter-surveillance action
including the use of pay phones and elusive driving; (4) at the
time of the arrests, agents believed that a money or drug
transaction had transpired earlier in the day between Balcazar,
Cruz, and Gallo. The use of pay telephones and counter-
surveillance techniques can provide corroboration for an
informant's tip regarding narcotics trafficking. United States v.
Abadie, 879 F.2d 1260, 1263-64 (5th Cir. 1989). The type of
transfer in this case, combined with the knowledge that Balcazar
was reported to be involved in drug distribution or money
laundering, supports a finding of probable cause. Piaget, 915 F.2d

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at 139-140. The district court properly denied the motion to
suppress. Piaget, 915 F.2d at 140.
Balcazar argues that there was insufficient evidence to
sustain her drug-related convictions. She is incorrect.
A conviction at a bench trial will be sustained if there is
substantial evidence to support it. United States v. Jennings, 726
F.2d 189, 190 (5th Cir. 1984). The standard of review is whether
any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements
beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319,
99 S. Ct. 2781, 61 L. Ed. 2d 560 (1979). The standard of review is
the same, whether the evidence is direct or circumstantial. United
States v. Bryant, 770 F.2d 1283, 1288 (5th Cir. 1985), cert.
denied, 475 U.S. 1030 (1986).
In order to sustain a conspiracy conviction under 21 U.S.C.
§ 846, the Government must prove "(1) the existence of an agreement
between two or more persons to violate the narcotics laws, (2) that
each alleged conspirator knew of the conspiracy and intended to
join it, and (3) that each alleged conspirator did participate in
the conspiracy." United States v. Stone, 960 F.2d 426, 430 (5th
Cir. 1992). Each of the elements may be inferred from
circumstantial evidence and "`[c]ircumstances altogether
inconclusive, if separately considered, may, by their joint
operation . . . be sufficient to constitute conclusive proof.'"
United States v. Salazar, 958 F.2d 1285, 1291 (5th Cir. 1992)
(quoting United States v. Roberts, 913 F.2d 211, 218 (5th Cir.
1990) (citation omitted), cert denied, 111 S. Ct. 2264 (1991)).

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In order to sustain a conviction for possession of a
controlled substance with intent to distribute under 21 U.S.C.
§ 841(a)(1), the Government must prove that the defendant had "(1)
knowing (2) possession of the illicit substance (3) with intent to
distribute it." United States v. Martinez-Mercado, 888 F.2d 1484,
1491 (5th Cir. 1989).
"To have aided and abetted a crime within the meaning of 18
U.S.C. § 2, a defendant must have (1) associated with the criminal
venture, (2) participated in the venture, and (3) sought by action
to make the venture succeed." Stone, 960 F.2d at 433 (citation
omitted).
The circumstantial evidence, when viewed cumulatively, was
sufficient to establish Balcazar's actual possession of the cocaine
recovered from the blue bag at Cruz's residence and her knowledge
that it was cocaine. Officer Lewis testified that the blue bag
recovered from Cruz's residence was the same blue bag that he had
seen Balcazar deliver to Cruz in exchange for the box containing
nearly $300,000. Cruz returned to his residence immediately after
receiving the bag and no longer carried it when he left the
residence about an hour later. Because the bag contained cocaine
when the search warrant was executed and was observed to be full at
the time of transfer, a rational trier of fact could reasonably
conclude that the bag was full of cocaine when Balcazar delivered
it to Cruz.
Balcazar's knowledge of the cocaine may be inferred from her
exercise of control over the container in which it was concealed.

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See Gallo, 927 F.2d at 821. The records contains evidence of
Balcazar's exercise of control over the blue bag, her attempts to
evade pursuing surveillance officers, and her false explanation
concerning the identity of the party from who she had received the
box of currency in exchange for the bag. Balcazar's attempt to
avoid surveillance and her false statements were circumstances from
which the factfinder could infer guilty knowledge.
Balcazar also possessed $1,240,810 in cash and a money-
counting machine in her home. That evidence, and her receipt of
$300,000 in cash from Cruz in exchange for the bag, also supports
the reasonable inference that she knew the bag contained narcotics.
See United States v. Munoz-Romo, 947 F.2d 170, 178 (5th Cir. 1991).
There was sufficient evidence that Balcazar knew she was
participating in a conspiracy to possess cocaine with the intent to
distribute and that she knowingly aided and abetted in the
possession of cocaine with the intent to distribute it; therefore,
her conviction should be affirmed.
Balcazar and Cruz argue that there was insufficient evidence
to sustain their convictions for money laundering because their
transactions did not affect interstate commerce as required by 18
U.S.C. § 1956. They are incorrect.
Balcazar and Cruz were convicted of aiding and abetting money
laundering in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1), which prohibits
knowing involvement in a financial transaction that uses the
proceeds of some form of unlawful activity. The term "transaction"
includes the "transfer, delivery or other disposition" of these

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proceeds. 18 U.S.C. § 1956(c)(3). "Financial transaction" means the
"movement of funds by wire or other means ... which in any way or
degree affects interstate of foreign commerce." 18 U.S.C. §
1956(c)(4).
Balcazar was arrested while transporting $ 300,000 in her car.
To establish that Balcazar knew that the money in her car was the
proceeds of narcotics trafficking, the Government introduced
evidence that Balcazar received the box containing the money from
Cruz, a suspected narcotics trafficker who had been under DEA
surveillance for several months. After searching Balcazar's house,
the DEA discovered $ 1,240,810 and a money-counting machine.
Cruz was arrested after his transactions with Gallo and
Balcazar. These transactions involved the transfer of $599,985.
Gallo, 927 F.2d at 818. Twenty-five pounds and twelve ounces of
the cocaine was found in the blue bag that Cruz had received from
Balcazar in exchange for the box containing $300,000. Based on the
concert of action among Gallo, Cruz, and Balcazar, the district
court could reasonably infer that Balcazar and Cruz knew that they
were transporting the proceeds of unlawful activity. 18 U.S.C. §
1956(a)(1).
Balcazar and Cruz assert that the Government failed to
establish that the transfer of currency in his car had any
discernible impact on interstate commerce. Section 1956 applies to
conduct that "in any way or degree affects interstate or foreign
commerce." 18 U.S.C. § 1956(c)(4). The legislative history of the
Act indicates that this phrase was derived from the Hobbs Act, 18

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U.S.C. § 1951, "and is intended to reflect the full exercise of
Congress's power under the Commerce Clause." S. Rep. No. 433, 99th
Cong. 2d Sess. 13 (1986). We take note in this instance of 21
U.S.C. § 801, and Congressional findings and declarations, on the
issue of whether Balcazar and Cruz's transportation of the proceeds
of drug trafficking affected interstate commerce. Section 801
states that:
(3) A major portion of the traffic in controlled
substances flows through interstate and foreign commerce.
Incidents of the traffic which are not an integral part
of the interstate or foreign flow, such as manufacture,
local distribution, and possession, nonetheless have a
substantial and direct effect upon interstate commerce
because --
(A) after manufacture, many controlled substances are
transported in interstate commerce,
(B) controlled substances distributed locally usually
have been transported in interstate commerce immediately
before their distribution, and
(C) controlled substances possessed commonly flow through
interstate commerce immediately prior to such possession.
(4) Local distribution and possession of controlled
substances contribute to swelling the interstate traffic
in such substances.
21 U.S.C. §§ 801(3)(A), (B), & (C), and 801(4). The Congressional
intent of this chapter is clear; drug trafficking affects
interstate commerce. The proceeds of drug trafficking have a
similar effect. Therefore, we conclude that Balcazar and Cruz's
transportation of the proceeds of drug trafficking affected
interstate commerce and that there was sufficient evidence to
sustain their money-laundering convictions. See also, Gallo at 823.
AFFIRMED.

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