McDonald v. Entergy Operations, et al

United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
F I L E D
January 25, 2006
Charles R. Fulbruge III
Clerk
In the
United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit
_______________
m 05-60501
Summary Calendar
_______________
CHARLEAN MCDONALD,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
VERSUS
ENTERGY OPERATIONS, INC., ET AL.,
Defendants,
ENTERGY OPERATIONS, INC.; UNUMPROVIDENT CORPORATION; HEATHER FRIANT,
Defendants-Appellees.
____________________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Mississippi
m 5:03-CV-241
____________________________________

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Before SMITH, GARZA, and PRADO,
Circuit Judges.
JERRY E. SMITH, Circuit Judge:*
Charlean McDonald, proceeding pro se, ap-
peals the summary judgment dismissal of her
employment discrimination claims against
Entergy Operations, Inc. (“Entergy”), and her
ERISA claims against UnumProvident Corpo-
ration (“UnumProvident”) and Heather Friant,
an employee of UnumProvident. Finding no
genuine issue of material fact, we affirm.
I.
Charlean McDonald, a black woman, was
hired by Entergy in 1981 and worked there
continuously, primarily in clerical positions,
until January 2002. In 2001, McDonald sued,
asserting that Entergy had discriminated
against her on account of race by failing to
promote her, by paying her a disparate wage,
and by generally creating adverse working
conditions. That suit was dismissed on sum-
mary judgment, which was affirmed in Mc-
Donald v. Entergy Operations, Inc., 75 Fed.
Appx. 279 (5th Cir. 2003) (“McDonald I”).
In January 2002, McDonald was involved
in an automobile accident; she consulted multi-
ple doctors for the treatment of resulting back
and neck pain. In July 2002 she submitted a
claim for long-term disability benefits to Unum
Life Insurance Company of America
(“Unum”), a subsidiary of UnumProvident re-
sponsible for administering benefits under the
Entergy Corporation Companies’ Benefits Plus
Long Term Disability Plan (“the Plan”).
Although Unum initially approved McDon-
ald’s claim in September 2002, it requested
that she have her physician complete forms, to
be submitted to Unum, describing the extent of
her injuries and her current functional abilities.
None of the physicians McDonald had con-
sulted agreed to fill out the required forms,
because each thought McDonald was not dis-
abled. Based on the medical opinions and the
information it received from Entergy regarding
the physical requirements of McDonald’s job,
Unum in April 2003 determined there was
insufficient evidence to support McDonald’s
claim of total disability and discontinued her
benefits.
In the meantime, in December 2002 Mc-
Donald had filed another claim of discrimina-
tion against Entergy with the Equal Employ-
ment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”), as-
serting that Entergy had subjected her to terms
and conditions of employment different from
those of her co-workers in retaliation for her
filing the discrimination suit in McDonald I.1
In January 2003 the EEOC dismissed McDon-
ald’s claim and issued her a right to sue letter.
In April 2003 McDonald sued Entergy2
alleging violations of title VII, 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e et seq., and 42 U.S.C. § 1981 for re-
* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has
determined that this opinion should not be pub-
lished and is not precedent except under the limited
circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
1 McDonald stated that the terms and conditions
of employment included the monitoring of her
telephone calls by the company attorney, charging
her absence from work as vacation time rather than
short-term disability leave, and failure to give her
an “outage incentive check” for 2002.
2 McDonald’s complaint also lists as defendants
various individual employees of Entergy, T. Roe
Price Retirement Plan Services, Inc., and the law
firm of Wise, Carter, Child & Carraway, P.A.
Each of those defendants was dismissed from this
case, and McDonald does not appeal that order.

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taliation (in terms of the imposition of adverse
working conditions and, ultimately, termina-
tion). In addition, she asserted claims against
UnumProvident and Hearther Friant under
ERISA, 29 U.S.C. § 1001 et seq., for denial of
disability benefits.3 The court found no genu-
ine issue of material fact with regard to any of
McDonald’s claims and granted summary
judgment, dismissing all claims with prejudice.
II.
Summary judgment “shall be rendered
forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers
to interrogatories, and admissions on file,
together with affidavits, if any, show that there
is no genuine issue as to any material fact and
that the moving party is entitled to a judgment
as a matter of law.” FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c).
We review the grant of summary judgment de
novo, using the same criteria employed by the
district court. Patterson v. Mobil Oil Corp.,
335 F.3d 476, 487 (5th Cir. 2003).
[T]he plain language of Rule 56(c) man-
dates the entry of summary judgment, after
adequate time for discovery and upon mo-
tion, against a party who fails to make a
showing sufficient to establish the existence
of an element essential to that party’s case,
and on which that party will bear the bur-
den of proof at trial. In such a situation,
there can be ‘no genuine issue as to any
material fact,’ since a complete failure of
proof concerning an essential element of
the nonmoving party’s case necessarily ren-
ders all other facts immaterial.
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-
23 (1986). The plaintiff bears the initial bur-
den of establishing a prima facie case of em-
ployment discrimination. To state a prima fa-
cie case for retaliatory discharge, a plaintiff
must establish, inter alia, that there was a
causal link between the protected action taken
by the plaintiff and the subsequent termination.
See Mota v. Univ. of Tex. Houston Health Sci.
Ctr., 261 F.3d 512, 519 (5th Cir. 2001).
The district court found that Entergy was
entitled to judgment as a matter of law on the
title VII and § 1981 retaliatory discharge
claims because, even assuming that McDonald
had not voluntarily ended her employment
with Entergy,4 McDonald brought forth no ev-
idence of a causal link between the filing of her
suit and her alleged termination.
We agree with the district court. Not only
did McDonald fail to present any evidence,
other than pure speculation, of a causal link,
but she stated in deposition that her employ-
ment with Entergy ended because she was un-
able to perform her job duties, not because she
had sued. McDonald’s claims of retaliatory
discharge under title VII and § 1981 therefore
fail as a matter of law.5
3 Although McDonald’s enumerated claims
mention § 1981, none of them refers specifically to
title VII or ERISA. We agree with the district
court, however, that because McDonald is proceed-
ing pro se, her complaint should be read liberally.
See Atchison v. Collins, 288 F.3d 177, 179 n.2
(5th Cir. 2002).
4 Whether McDonald was actually fired is an
issue in dispute.
5 McDonald also asserts that Entergy imposed
adverse working conditions, in the form of monitor-
ing her phone calls and invading her privacy, in
retaliation for the filing of suit. This retaliation
claim is wholly without merit. It is based entirely
on the fact that an employee of Entergy listened to
a voicemail message relevant to McDonald’s long-
term disability claim that McDonald had volun-
tarily left for him and then gave a transcript of that
message to Entergy’s attorney. McDonald does
(continued...)

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III.
To determine whether UnumProvident and
its employee, Friant, are entitled to judgment
as a matter of law on McDonald’s ERISA
claims, we must first consider what standard of
review applies to the plan administrator’s de-
cision to deny benefits in this case. Where, as
here, a policy gives an administrator discre-
tionary authority over a claimant’s entitlement
to benefits, we review a denial of benefits for
abuse of discretion. Vega v. Nat’l Life Ins.
Servs., Inc., 188 F.3d 287, 295 (5th Cir. 1999)
(en banc). Less deference is given under the
abuse of discretion standard where an admin-
istrator is self-interested. Id. at 296.
The district court found that UnumProvi-
dent was not operating under a conflict of in-
terest in administering the Entergy plan. We
have no reason to dispute that finding and
therefore apply a pure abuse of discretion stan-
dard to UnumProvident’s decision to deny
McDonald’s claim for long-term disability
benefits.
UnumProvident asserts that it ultimately de-
nied benefits because McDonald never sub-
mitted a physician’s certification of her physi-
cal limitations and presented no medical evi-
dence indicating she was unable to perform the
material duties of her job. Because McDonald
has offered no coherent challenge to the merits
of UnumProvident’s decision, there is no basis
for finding abuse of discretion.
AFFIRMED.6
5(...continued)
not point to any violation of law occasioned by this
action.
6 Entergy’s motion to strike portions of McDon-
ald’s reply brief is DENIED.

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