Segudino Razo; Delfa Razo v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue

* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the Court has determined that
this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except
under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
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United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
F I L E D
June 14, 2005
Charles R. Fulbruge III
Clerk
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
No. 04-60629
SEGUDINO RAZO; DELFA RAZO
Petitioners - Appellants
v.
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE
Respondent - Appellee
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Appeal from the United States Tax Court
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Before GARWOOD, GARZA, and BENAVIDES, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Petitioners-Appellants Segudino and Delfa Razo (“the Razos”)
appeal the tax court’s determination that the notice of
determination issued by the Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”) was
not an abuse of discretion. Having reviewed the record and
considered the briefs and arguments on appeal, we affirm the
judgment of the tax court.
The Razos raise two issues on appeal. First, the Razos
contend that their offer in compromise was rejected solely on the

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1 We note that in its notice of determination to the Razos,
the IRS rejected the Razos’ offer in compromise and sustained the
federal tax lien; at the same time, however, the IRS also deemed
the Razos’ account “temporarily not collectible,” thereby
suspending its collection activities against the Razos.
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basis of the amount of the offer, in violation of 26 U.S.C. §
7122(c)(3)(A) (“[A]n officer or employee of the Internal Revenue
Service shall not reject an offer-in-compromise from a low-income
taxpayer solely on the basis of the amount of the offer.”).
Second, the Razos contend that the IRS abused its discretion in
rejecting the offer in compromise.
We review administrative determinations of the IRS not
involving underlying tax liability for abuse of discretion.
Jones v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 338 F.3d 463, 466 (5th Cir.
2003).
Regarding the Razos’ first contention, we conclude that the
amount of the offer in compromise was not the sole reason for its
rejection. Other factors considered by the IRS include the
Razos’ equity and income and the fact that accepting the offer in
compromise would not change the likelihood that the Razos’ assets
would soon be taken by other creditors. Therefore, the IRS did
not act in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 7122(c)(3)(A) in rejecting
the Razos’ offer in compromise.
Regarding the Razos’ second contention, we conclude that the
IRS did not abuse its discretion in rejecting the Razos’ offer in
compromise.1 Pursuant to 26 U.S.C. § 6330(c)(3), an IRS

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determination must take into account (1) verification that the
applicable law and proper procedures were followed, (2) any
issues raised by the taxpayer, and (3) whether the need for
efficient tax collection is balanced with the concern that a
collection action be no more intrusive than necessary. The IRS
determination in this case takes each of these into consideration
and is, therefore, not an abuse of discretion. Consequently, we
affirm the judgment of the tax court.
AFFIRMED.

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