Matula, et al v. Lower CO River Auth, et al

*Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the Court has determined that
this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except
under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
F I L E D
June 15, 2005
Charles R. Fulbruge III
Clerk
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
For the Fifth Circuit
No. 04-41343
LENHART MATULA and JOSEPH McCREARY,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
VERSUS
LOWER COLORADO RIVER AUTHORITY and
JOSEPH BEAL, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
For the Southern District of Texas
(6:03-CV-12)
Before WIENER, DeMOSS, and PRADO, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Appellants Lenhart Matula and Joseph McCreary filed suit in
federal court against Appellees Lower Colorado River Authority
(“LCRA”) and Joseph Beal, in his official capacity as general
manager of LCRA (together, “Appellees”). Appellants alleged age
discrimination, discrimination on the basis of veteran status,
retaliation, and hostile work environment, arising under the Texas
Commission on Human Rights Act (“TCHRA”), TEX. LABOR CODE § 21.001

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et seq.; the Age Discrimination and Employment Act of 1967
(“ADEA”), 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq.; Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 (“Title VII”), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.; the Texas
Veteran’s Employment Preference Act (“TVEPA”), TEX. GOV’T CODE §
657.003; and the Veteran’s Employment Emphasis Under Federal
Contracts Act, also referred to as the Vietnam Era Veterans’
Readjustment Assistance Act (“VEVRA”), 38 U.S.C. § 4212.
The district court granted LCRA’s motion to dismiss the TVEPA
claim on the grounds that injunctive relief was not permitted under
Texas law and that LCRA was not a “public entity” under the Act.
The court dismissed the VEVRA claims because the statute does not
provide a private cause of action and instead permits only
administrative remedies through the Department of Labor. The court
granted LCRA’s motion to dismiss the TCHRA claims for failure to
exhaust administrative remedies.
The court then, in two separate orders, granted LCRA’s motion
for partial summary judgment, as to each Plaintiff’s individual
claims arising under Title VII and the ADEA. The court entered
judgment for LCRA on the Title VII and ADEA claims, and Appellants
appealed. Appellants argue the district court erred both in the
dismissal and in the grant of summary judgment to LCRA.
This Court reviews de novo the district court’s dismissal of
Appellants’ claims under Rule 12(b)(6). See Calhoun v. Hargrove,
312 F.3d 730,733 (5th Cir. 2002). “A court may dismiss a complaint

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only if it is clear that no relief could be granted under any set
of facts that could be proved consistent with the allegations.”
Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984); see also FED. R.
CIV. P. 12(b)(6). We review a district court’s grant of summary
judgment de novo, applying the same standard as the district court.
Young v. Equifax Credit Info. Servs. Inc., 294 F.3d 631, 635 (5th
Cir. 2002); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c).
After thorough review of the briefs, the oral arguments of the
parties, and review of relevant portions of the record, we AFFIRM
the district court’s dismissal of Appellants’ state and federal
veteran claims and the claims arising under the TCHRA and the
district court’s grant of summary judgment to LCRA on Appellants’
Title VII and ADEA claims essentially for the reasons articulated
in the three memorandum opinions and orders filed September 30,
2004.
AFFIRMED.

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