Energy Devel Corp v. St Martin, et al

United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
F I L E D
October 11, 2004
Charles R. Fulbruge III
Clerk
In the
United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit
_______________
m 04-30098
_______________
ENERGY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
VERSUS
MICHAEL X. ST. MARTIN; VIRGINIA RAYNE ST. MARTIN;
QUALITY ENVIRONMENTAL PROCESSES, INC.,
Defendants-Appellees.
_________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Louisiana
m 98-CV-3395
_________________________
Before JONES, SMITH, and STEWART,
Circuit Judges.
JERRY E. SMITH, Circuit Judge:*
The parties are engaged in a dizzying web
of interrelated lawsuits. It is therefore unfor-
tunate, yet understandable, that in denying
plaintiff’s request for an injunction that would
have yielded finality, the district court relied on
clearly erroneous factual assumptions. Lack-
ing guidance from this court’s jurisprudence,
the district court further misapplied applicable
Supreme Court precedent in exercising its
discretion. Regrettably, therefore, we reverse
and remand, thereby allowing the wheels of
justice to continue spinning a bit longer.
* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has
determined that this opinion should not be pub-
lished and is not precedent except under the limited
circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.

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I.
The facts and proceedings are aptly de-
scribed in our prior opinion,1 so we only brief-
ly summarize the relevant history here. Plain-
tiff Energy Development Corporation
(“EDC”) and defendants Michael St. Martin,
Virginia Rayne St. Martin, and Quality Envi-
ronmental Processes, Inc. (collectively, “the
St. Martin Group” or “SMG”) have been en-
gaged in a longstanding dispute over the min-
eral rights to a particular oilfield (the Sunrise
Field) in Terrebonne Parish, Louisiana.
We greatly oversimplify by stating that
SMG is the surface owner of the disputed
tracts, and EDC claims mineral rights to much
of the disputed land under a purported mineral
servitude granted to its predecessors in 1971.
SMG, for its part, also claims ownership of the
minerals underlying the land. The crux of the
dispute goes to whether the 1971 conveyance
resulted in a valid servitude that extends to the
present or whether, instead, SMG’s claim is
superior.
A.
In 1998, EDC sued for a declaratory judg-
ment establishing its mineral rights with re-
spect to a portion of the disputed property
(“the federal case”). The suit was later con-
solidated with an action brought when a min-
eral lessee of EDC and SMG deposited with
the district court payments due under the
leases and interpleaded EDC and SMG. A
bench trial was held in May 2000 before Judge
Schwartz,2 who, in December 2000, granted
EDC a declaratory judgment that we affirmed
in the aforementioned opinion.
B.
In 1997, EDC sued in state court (Jefferson
Parish), seeking a declaratory judgment that it
had a valid mineral servitude on a tract of land
neighboring the one at issue in the federal
case, a tract of land also owned by SMG. Al-
though that case involved a separate tract of
land, it hinged on the same factual and legal
issues relating to the validity of EDC’s mineral
servitude.
The state court entered summary judgment
for SMG in 1998, but that judgment was
reversed and remanded for trial. Energy Dev.
Corp. v. Quality Envtl. Processes, Inc., 734
So. 2d 965 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1999). On re-
mand, the trial court found that EDC did not
have a valid mineral servitude and in 1999 en-
tered judgment in favor of SMG in December
1999. The Court of Appeal affirmed on De-
cember 12, 2000SSjust eight days before the
federal district court issued its opinion and just
over a month before it entered judgment. The
Louisiana Supreme Court denied EDC’s
application for writs on March 9, 2001.3
1 Energy Dev. Corp. v. St. Martin, 296 F.3d
356, 357-61 (5th Cir. 2002) (per curiam).
2 The case was later transferred to Judge Ber-
rigan because of Judge Schwartz’s illness.
3 In June 2001, SMG sought to have the Jef-
ferson Parish court amend its ruling to encompass
much more disputed areaSSincluding the lands the
mineral rights to which were awarded to EDC in
the federal case. EDC sought, from the federal
court, a restraining order barring such an amend-
ment. That court denied the request because, inter
alia, the federal case was on its first appeal to this
court, and the district court therefore doubted that
it had jurisdiction over the case while appeal was
pending. Energy Dev. Corp. v. St. Martin, 2001
WL 839851, at *1 (E.D. La. July 20, 2001).
The Jefferson Parish court initially did expand
its ruling but later was reversed by the Louisiana
Court of Appeal, which noted that in amending the
ruling, the trial court “exercise[d] his authority
beyond the bounds of Louisiana law” and “un-

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After judgment was entered in state
courtSSan act with preclusive effect under
Louisiana law4SSSMG did not raise the issue
of res judicata with the district court, but rath-
er waited until its appeal to this court to raise
the defense, arguing that the state ruling was
not binding for res judicata purposes until af-
ter all appeals had been exhausted. Energy
Dev. Corp., 296 F.3d at 361. This court re-
jected that argument and held that SMG’s res
judicata argument was not properly before the
court, because it had been waived by SMG’s
not raising it in the federal district court. Id.
We further opined, in dictum, that the state
case would not be issue-preclusive of the
federal case, because its ruling on the validity
of the purported mineral servitude conveyance
was not essential to its decision. Id. at 362.
We therefore affirmed.
C.
While all this was transpiring, three related
suits sprang up in the Louisiana courts. In
September 1998, the lessees of EDC and SMG
brought a concursus proceeding (the Louisiana
equivalent to a federal interpleader action)
(“the first concursus”) in state court (Terre-
bonne Parish), involving yet another tract of
land in dispute between the partiesSSnot the
same portion of land at issue in the Jefferson
Parish case or the tracts adjudicated in the
federal case. Although the trial court initially
found in favor of EDC, the Louisiana Court of
Appeal remanded for consideration of SMG’s
res judicata claim based on the Jefferson Par-
ish judgment. Mandalay Oil & Gas, LLC v.
Energy Dev. Corp., 2002 WL 1434422 (La.
App. 1st Cir. July 3, 2002).5
On remand, the trial court reversed course,
finding that the Jefferson Parish judgment was
preclusive of the first concursus in that, despite
involving different areas of land, the Jefferson
Parish decision was based on the same factual
and legal disputes as that at issue in the first
concursus. EDC appealed, and recently, after
briefing in the instant appeal was complete, the
Louisiana Court of Appeal affirmed the trial
court’s decision granting judgment to SMG on
grounds of res judicata. Mandalay Oil &
Gas, LLC v. Energy Dev. Corp., 2004 WL
1737466 (La. App. 1st Cir. Aug. 4, 2004).
To recap, at this point, with the parties
having conclusively litigated their rights to
three separate neighboring tracts of land in
three different courts (two state and one fed-
eral) that had considered nearly identical legal
and factual disputes, one court (the federal
court) had found in favor of EDC, and the two
state courts had ruled for SMG. Thus, al-
though there are inconsistencies between the
factual and legal conclusions of the federal
court and those of the two state courts, the
cases involved different tracts of land, and thus
the judgments were not incapable of being
honored simultaneously.6 The matter be-
dermine[d] the federal judgment.” Energy Dev.
Corp. v. Quality Envtl. Processes, Inc., 834 So. 2d
513, 517 (La. App. 5th Cir. Nov. 26, 2002).
4 See Avenue Plaza, LLC v. Falgoust, 676
So. 2d 1077 (La. 1996) (holding that a final
judgment renders a claim res judicata unless
and until the judgment is reversed on appeal).
5 See also LA. CODE CIV. PROC. ANN. art. 2163
(allowing res judicata claims to be raised for first
time on appeal).
6 Significantly, the district court stated that the
first concursus involved the same tracts of land
whose mineral rights were later adjudicated by the
federal case to belong to EDC. Energy Dev. Corp.
v. St. Martin, 2004 WL 117606, at *2 (E.D. La.
Jan. 23, 2004). As discussed infra, this was
clearly erroneous.

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comes, however, more confusing.
D.
Regarding the so-called “collateral at-
tacks,”7 the lessees of EDC and SMG, on May
23, 2000SSfour days after the trial in the fed-
eral case came to a close but before the district
court’s opinion was released or judgment en-
teredSSfiled another concursus proceeding in
Terrebonne Parish (the “first collateral at-
tack”). This suit pitted EDC and SMG against
each other as claimants to a disputed sum.
The only difference in parties between that suit
(as well as the second collateral attack,
discussed infra) and the federal case is that the
stakeholders who initiated the concursus and
interpleader actions were different.
Importantly, the land at issue in the first
collateral attack is wholly within the area ad-
judicated by the federal court. That is, a vic-
tory for SMG in this attack would be physi-
cally irreconcilable with the federal judgment.
EDC and SMG filed cross-motions for sum-
mary judgment; EDC argued that the federal
case rendered the concursus res judicata, and
SMG urged that the Jefferson Parish case had
preclusive effect and required a judgment on
their behalf.
On June 30, 2003, the Terrebonne Parish
court granted EDC’s motion for summary
judgment and ruled against SMG, finding that
the federal case has res judicata effect over the
concursus action. SMG has appealed that
decision to the Louisiana First Circuit Court of
Appeal, where it pends.8
Shortly after filing the first collateral attack,
the parties’ lessees filed yet another concursus
action (actually two that have been
consolidated) (the “second collateral attack”)
in Terrebonne Parish, again naming EDC and
SMG as competing claimants to revenues from
disputed lands, among which are several tracts
that are within the lands the mineral rights to
which were awarded to EDC in the federal
case. Again, therefore, a judgment for SMG in
the second collateral attack would create
irreconcilable federal and state judgments that
the parties could not possibly harmonize.
Not surprisingly, the parties have filed
cross-motions for summary judgment, with
EDC urging that the federal case be given pre-
clusive effect and SMG arguing that the Jef-
ferson Parish case should render the concursus
res judicata. As of the briefing of this case,
7 The parties devote a considerable amount
of space in their briefs debating whether this is
an appropriate taxonomy. Although the dis-
trict court referred to the cases EDC seeks to
have enjoined as the first and second “col-
lateral attacks,” SMG argues that this labeling
was “obviously for organizational purposes
and perhaps clarity . . . . Judge Berrigan did
not rule that the concursus proceedings are
attacks.” EDC replies that “unlike Appellees,
EDC believes the district court used the term
‘collateral attacks’ advisedly, not merely for
convenience.”
We decline to take sides in this endless de-
bate. Our use of the phrase “collateral at-
tacks” is not meant to connote any pejorative
judgment on the nature of the suits.
8 As we have noted, the Louisiana First Circuit
Court of Appeal recently affirmed the trial court’s
ruling in the first concursus, holding that the Jef-
ferson Parish judgment is claim-preclusive over
that case. After this decision was issued, SMG
moved the same appellate court, in which its appeal
in the first collateral attack is pending, to reverse
the decision in the first collateral attack on the
premise that the recent decision is “clearly
controlling” of the first collateral attack. EDC has
opposed the motion, and the court has yet to rule.

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the Terrebonne Parish trial court had not ruled
on these motions.
E.
Fearing the potentially irreconcilable con-
flicts that could result from an adverse deci-
sion in the first or second collateral attack,
EDC in October 2003 moved the district court
for a preliminary injunction prohibiting SMG
from pursuing the first and second collateral
attacks, ordering SMG to dismiss its appeal in
the first collateral attack, and directing SMG
to dismiss its claims in the second collateral
attack. EDC argued that the collateral attacks
were res judicata as a result of the federal case
and therefore must be enjoined.
EDC acknowledged that although the All
Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651, authorizes the
court to issue such an injunction, its power is
sharply circumscribed by the Anti-Injunction
Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2283, which prohibits federal
courts from enjoining state court proceedings
except in three narrowly tailored situations:
(i) where expressly authorized by an act of
Congress, (ii) where necessary in aid of its
jurisdiction, or (iii) to protect or effectuate its
judgments (commonly known as the “relitiga-
tion exception”). EDC argued, and continues
to urge on appeal, that all three exceptions
apply, so the district court is entitled to grant
the injunction it requests.
The district court denied EDC’s motion,
Energy Dev. Corp. v. St. Martin, 2004 WL
117606, at *7 (E.D. La. Jan. 23, 2004), decid-
ing that, although the relitigation exception
undoubtedly applies, the court, in the exercise
of its broad discretion with respect to issuing
injunctions, would not do so here. EDC
appeals that denial.
II.
A.
Application of the exceptions to the Anti-
Injunction Act is reviewed de novo,9 but the
decision to grant or deny a preliminary injunc-
tion lies within the sound discretion of the dis-
trict court, and that decision will be reversed
only on abuse of discretion.10 In exercising its
discretion, the district court inevitably makes
preliminary factual determinations and con-
clusions of law.11 Those factual findings are
reviewed for clear error, the legal conclusions
de novo.12 Where a denial of an injunction is
based on clearly erroneous factual bases or
incorrect application of law to facts, a district
court has abused its discretion.13
B.
In its explanatory order, the district court
referred to the first concursus in Terrebonne
Parish, which, in reality, dealt with land that
does not overlap with the land at issue in the
federal case. Nevertheless, the court described
this action as “involving, again, tracts of land
9 See St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co. v. Williamson,
332 F.3d 304, 308 (5th Cir. 2003) (“The applica-
tion of the relitigation exception to the Anti-In-
junction Act . . . is a question of law that we review
de novo.”)
10 See Quintero v. Klaveness Ship Lines, 914
F.2d 717, 720 (5th Cir. 1990).
11 See Sugar Busters LLC v. Brennan, 177
F.3d 258, 265 (5th Cir. 1999).
12 Id.
13 Cf. G.C. & K.B. Invs., Inc., 326 F.3d 1096,
1107 (9th Cir. 2003) (concluding that the grant of
an injunction under the relitigation exception to the
Anti-Injunction Act where the district court “rests
its conclusions on clearly erroneous factual
findings” is an abuse of discretion).

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the mineral rights to which were later
adjudicated by the federal case to belong to
EDC.” Energy Dev. Corp., 2004 WL 117606,
at *2. This is a clearly erroneous statement of
fact. Although EDC makes much of this in its
brief, SMG does not attempt to refute EDC’s
arguments.
This factual misunderstanding, by itself,
would not be significant. After all, EDC is not
now trying to enjoin the first concursus
proceeding. Unfortunately, however, in calcu-
lating whether to issue the requested injunc-
tion, the district court found this “fact” signifi-
cant. Denying the request for an injunction,
the district court concluded,
[S]hould the Louisiana First Judicial Cir-
cuit Court of Appeal or the Louisiana
Supreme Court decide that the federal
judgment is not claim preclusive as to
the first collateral attack and the [first
concursus], then this Court’s decision to
enjoin the second collateral proceeding
under the relitigation exception would
cause a permanent inconsistency in the
judgments of the three proceedings.
Id. at *4. It is apparent, from the order, that
this fear of inconsistency was central to the
court’s logic in denying the injunction.
As EDC points out, however, though the
decision in the first concursus is legally incon-
sistent with the logic underpinning the federal
case, the two are not physically inconsistent.
Because the two judgments affect different
tracts of land, the parties are perfectly capable
of respecting both judgments simultaneously.
As EDC puts it, “EDC can enjoy its servitude
on the federal property while the St. Martin
Group simultaneously enjoys its servitude over
the property covered by the first concursus.”
Although it may not be an abuse of discretion
to deny the injunction sought by EDC, denying
it based on a clearly erroneous finding of fact
that obviously was significant to the court’s
disposition of the case does constitute such an
abuse.
C.
As we have said, the Anti-Injunction Act
precludes federal courts from staying proceed-
ings in state courts except where the case falls
into one of the three narrowly-tailored statu-
tory exceptions. 28 U.S.C. § 2283.14 Only
where (i) expressly authorized by statute,
where (ii) necessary to aid the court’s jurisdic-
tion, or (iii) to protect or effectuate its judg-
ments may a federal court proceed with the
extraordinary step of enjoining a state court
action. At the district court and again on ap-
peal, EDC urges that all three of these excep-
tions apply.
The district court unambiguously ruled that
the third exception (commonly known as the
“relitigation exception”) applies. Energy Dev.
Corp., 2004 WL 117606, at *4. The court did
not, however, make explicit findings with re-
spect to the other two exceptions. The court
noted that “[a]lthough EDC argued in brief
that all three exceptions applied and Defen-
dants argued in brief that none of the excep-
tions apply, both parties focused in oral argu-
ment on the relitigation exception. The Court
finds that to be the appropriate exception to
consider.” Id. at *3. But, as SMG concedes,
the district court “simply chose to focus on the
relitigation exception at oral argument,” rather
than EDC steering the discussion in that dir-
14 See also Chick Kam Choo v. Exxon Corp.,
486 U.S. 140, 145-46 (1988) (quoting Atl. Coast-
line R.R. v. Locomotive Eng’rs, 398 U.S. 281, 287
(1970)) (“[T]he exceptions are narrow and are ‘not
[to] be enlarged by loose statutory construction.’”).

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ection. In any case, the order does not analyze
the other two exceptions.
Such failure to address EDC’s argument
was not reversible error. After all, only one of
the exceptions need apply, and therefore, be-
cause the district court held that the relitiga-
tion exception applies, yet declined to issue the
injunction, it did not matter whether the other
two exceptions apply. Nevertheless, the par-
ties expend significant energy arguing whether
we should find those exceptions to apply. We
decline the invitation and, instead, invite the
district court to weigh in on those issues on
remand.
The district court did rule, on the other
hand, with respect to the relitigation excep-
tionSSspecifically, holding that it undoubtedly
applies. We agree.
SMG argues strenuously that the relitiga-
tion exception, “grounded in principles of res
judicata and collateral estoppel,”15 cannot ap-
ply to the collateral attacks because there is
not exact similarity of parties among those
cases and the federal case. For res judicata
(and thus the relitigation exception) to apply,
four elements must be present:
(1) [T]he parties in a later action must
be identical to (or at least in privity
with) the parties in a prior action; (2) the
judgment in the prior action must have
been rendered by a court of competent
jurisdiction; (3) the prior action must
have concluded with a final judgment on
the merits; and (4) the same claim or
cause of action must be involved in both
suits.
Regions Bank v. Rivet, 224 F.3d 483, 488 (5th
Cir. 2000) (internal quotation marks and
citations omitted).
SMG weakly argues that EDC cannot make
such a showing because the suits do not in-
volve the same parties in that the petitioners
(the stakeholders as opposed to the claimants)
in the concursus are different from the stake-
holders who initiated the federal interpleader
action.16 In reality, the additional parties,
Mandalay Oil & Gas and Voyager Petroleum
(lessees of the parties to this suit), are mere
stakeholders in the concursus proceedings; the
competing claimants (the same parties as in
this suit) are the real parties in interest. Thus,
the inclusion of the additional part ies in the
captions of the concursus proceedings is not
sufficient to defeat the identity of the parties
for res judicata purposes.
Moreover, Voyager and Mandalay are suc-
cessors in interest to Louisiana Land and Ex-
ploration Company (“LL&E”), the stakeholder
in the federal interpleader action that was con-
solidated with the federal declaratory action
that formed the basis of the federal judgment.17
Thus, as LL&E’s successors in interest, they
are deemed t o be in privity with LL&E, and
there is therefore identity of the parties for res
15 Vasquez v. Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc.,
325 F.3d 665, 675 (5th Cir. 2003).
16 SMG makes this argument despite the fact
that EDC prevailed on the res judicata issue in the
first collateral attack.
17 See Benson & Ford, Inc. v. Wanda Petrol-
eum Co., 833 F.2d 1172, 1174 (5th Cir. 1987)
(opining that successors in interest are bound by
prior judgments); see also Southmark Props. v.
Charles House Corp., 742 F.2d 862, 869 (5th Cir.
1984) (stating that “parties” to be bound refers to
real parties in interest, “not formal or paper par-
ties”).

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judicata purposes. As a result, the district
court was correct to hold that the relitigation
exception to the Anti-Injunction Act applies.
D.
Even though it held that the relitigation
exception applies, the district court declined to
issue an injunction, concluding that Parsons
Steel v. First Ala. Bank, 474 U.S. 518 (1986),
precluded it from doing so, at least with re-
spect to the first collateral attack (in which the
trial court had already ruled on the res judi-
cata issue). In Parsons Steel, the Court con-
sidered whether a federal court could enjoin
the enforcement of a state court judgment
where the state court had already rejected a
res judicata claim. Id. The Court held that
even where a federal court found that res
judicata should bar a parallel state court action
(i.e., the relitigation exception applies), an
injunction may not issue “[o]nce the state
court has finally rejected a claim of res
judicata . . . .” Id. at 524. Issuing an
injunction in such a circumstance would
violate the Full Faith and Credit Act, which
provides that state court proceedings “shall
have the same full faith and credit [in federal
court] as they have by law or usage in the
courts of such State . . . from which they are
taken.” 28 U.S.C. § 1738. Accordingly, “a
federal court must give the same preclusive
effect to a state-court judgment as another
court of that State would give.” Parsons
Steel, 474 U.S. at 523.
The district court believed that Parsons
Steel barred it from issuing the requested in-
junction, at least with respect to the first col-
lateral attack. Energy Dev. Corp., 2004 WL
117606, at *4. Specifically, the court stated
that the Full Faith and Credit Act “requires this
Court to give the trial court’s decision, that the
federal court decision is claim preclusive as to
the first collateral proceeding, full faith and
credit.” Id. The court had very little caselaw
from this circuit interpreting and applying
Parsons Steel to analogous situations from
which to draw guidance, and we disagree with
its decision.
The district court described Parsons Steel
as precluding injunctions under the relitigation
exception to instances where “the state court
has yet to rule on a claim of res judicata based
on the federal action.” Id. In reality, as noted
above, the Court’s holding precludes issuing
an injunction only where “the state court has
finally rejected a claim of res judicata . . . .”
Parsons Steel, 474 U.S. at 524 (emphasis
added). As for the finality requirement, that
determination must be made under state law,
i.e., whether a Louisiana state court would
view the res judicata determination of the trial
court in the first collateral attack as final
enough to be binding upon other state courts.
Because the answer to that question is not
necessary to our judgment and was not suffi-
ciently briefed, we decline to venture a guess.
Notwithstanding finality, however, the state
court in the first collateral attack did not even
reject the argument that the federal case was
claim preclusive over that action, but instead,
the trial court in the first collateral attack em-
braced the argument. Granting an injunction
under these circumstances would therefore not
run afoul of the Full Faith and Credit Act or
Parsons Steel. As a result, the district court’s
denial of an injunction, based as it was upon an
erroneous interpretation of applicable law, was
an abuse of discretion.
E.
EDC contends that the district court further
erred as a matter of law by failing to hold that
the law of the case doctrine precludes SMG

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9
from pursuing collateral attacks in state court.
According to EDC, this court in its July 2002
opinion conclusively determined that the Jef-
ferson Parish judgment cannot have preclusive
effect superior to that of the federal judgment.
Therefore, goes the argument, SMG’s collat-
eral attacks, in which it urges that the Jefferson
Parish judgment requires victory in its favor,
are themselves doomed to failure. That being
the case, EDC believes it is all the more
appropriate that the district court enjoin those
proceedings.
This argument is unpersuasive. Not only is
EDC incorrect in its characterization of our
July 2002 opinion, but even if it were correct,
that does not necessarily compel the district
court to grant its request for an injunction.
In the July 2002 opinion, we declined
SMG’s request to reverse the federal judgment
on the ground that the Jefferson Parish judg-
ment was preclusive. Energy Dev. Corp., 296
F.3d at 361. SMG had not raised this argu-
ment at the district court and pursued it for the
first time on appeal. Id. Because SMG failed
to raise the argument in the district court, we
“decline[d] to consider the defendants’ asser-
tion of res judicata or collateral estoppel at this
stage of the litigation.” Id. at 363.
Nevertheless, EDC continues to urge that
“this Court necessarily found that the St. Mar-
tin Group’s res judicata motion failed on the
merits.” This is incorrect. Because this court
unambiguously determined that the res judi-
cata claim was not properly before the court,
any discussion of the merits of the argument is
obvious dictum and cannot be relied on as the
law of the case.18
III.
As the parties’ briefs indicate, they are fully
aware that the mere fact that an injunction may
issue under the Anti-Injunction Act, does not
necessarily require that the district court must
issue the requested injunction. See Chick Kam
Choo v. Exxon Corp., 486 U.S. 140 (1988).
On remand, the district may again, in its sound
discretion, find that the extraordinary remedy
of enjoining state court proceedings is
inappropriate. Nevertheless, the district
court’s decision to deny EDC’s request, based
as it was on erroneous factual underpinnings
and a misapplication of Supreme Court
precedent, constituted an abuse of discretion.
In reconsidering its earlier denial of EDC’s
request for an injunction, the district court
must proceed with the understanding that the
first concursus, although legally inconsistent
with the federal judgment, is not physically in-
consistent. Moreover, because the state court
has not yet finally rejected EDC’s res judicata
claim, Parsons Steel does not preclude the
court from preventing a physically conflicting
judgment in the first collateral attack.
As a result, the denial of EDC’s motion for
preliminary injunction is REVERSED, and this
matter is REMANDED for further pro-
ceedings consistent with this opinion.
18 See also Mandalay Oil & Gas, LLC v.
Energy Dev. Corp., 2004 WL 1737466, at *7 (La.
App. 1st Cir. Aug. 8, 2004) (affirming judgment
for SMG in the first concursus) (“Because it chose
not to consider the exception on what are essen-
tially procedural grounds, the court’s alleged find-
ings regarding the limits of the Jefferson Parish
judgment are irrelevant to its decision, and are
merely dicta.”).

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