Summary Calendar PATRICIA WILLIAMS; TERRI L. WATKINS v. Galveston Independent School District

*Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the Court has determined that
this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except
under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
F I L E D
October 23, 2003
Charles R. Fulbruge III
Clerk
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
No. 03-40436
Summary Calendar
PATRICIA WILLIAMS; TERRI L. WATKINS
Plaintiffs - Appellants
v.
GALVESTON INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT
Defendant - Appellee
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Texas
G-02-CV-236
Before JONES, BENAVIDES, and CLEMENT, Circuit Judges.
BENAVIDES, Circuit Judge:*
Plaintiffs-Appellants, administrators for the Galveston
Independent School District (“GISD”), filed suit against their
employer under 42 U.S.C. § 1981. Appellants allege that GISD
discriminated against them on the basis of race in setting their
salaries. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of
GISD. Because we agree with the district court that Appellants

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1 Mr. McLarty has since resigned.
2
have raised no genuine issue of material fact, we affirm.
I.
Appellant Dr. Patricia Williams serves as Executive Director
of Employee and Community Relations for GISD. Appellant Terry
Watkins serves as Executive Director of Human Resources. Both
women are African-American.
GISD assigns each administrative position to a particular “pay
grade,” a group of positions that fall within the same salary
range. Dr. Williams and Ms. Watkins are both in pay grade 8, the
highest level. At the time this suit was filed, two other
employees were also listed at pay grade 8: E.J. Garcia, Assistant
Superintendent of Curriculum and Instruction; and Paul McLarty,
Chief Financial Officer.1 Ms. Garcia and Mr. McLarty are both
white.
The roots of Appellants’ complaint go back to 2000, when GISD
reorganized its upper administration. At that time, Dr. Williams
was serving as Executive Director of Personnel, and Ms. Garcia was
serving as Superintendent for Instruction. Their salaries were
roughly equal. After GISD created the position of Executive
Director of Employee and Community Relations, then-Superintendent
Henry Boening approached Dr. Williams about taking the job. Dr.
Williams alleges that Superintendent Boening promised that if Dr.
Williams took the new position, her salary and responsibilities

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2 GISD changed the name of this position from “Executive
Director of Personnel” to “Executive Director of Human Resources.”
3 Appellants allege that Mr. McLarty and Ms. Garcia met
privately with Superintendent Boening to discuss these salary
increases, but that Appellants were not invited.
4 Ms. Watkins also complained of retaliation. She has since
abandoned that complaint.
3
would stay commensurate with the salary and responsibilities
assigned to Ms. Garcia. Dr. Williams accepted the new position,
and Ms. Watkins succeeded her.2
During the two years following this reorganization, GISD
awarded Ms. Garcia and Mr. McLarty substantial raises. GISD claims
that it was attempting to make top administrators’ salaries more
competitive with market rates.3 GISD says it did not give
Appellants similar raises because Appellants’ salaries were at or
above market rate for their positions. Between 1999 and 2002, the
four administrators in grade 8 were paid the following salaries:
Garcia Williams McLarty Watkins
99-00 $72,630 $72,630 $73,000 n.a.
00-01 $83,440 $75,129 $82,686 $71,648
01-02 $94,249 $77,630 $92,499 $76,673
Dr. Williams learned of this divergence and filed a grievance.
After Superintendent Boening and the school board denied her
grievance, she filed this suit. Ms. Watkins subsequently joined
the suit.4 Appellants allege that the difference between their
salaries and the salaries of their white colleagues constitutes

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5 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a) (2003) provides:
All persons within the jurisdiction of the
United States shall have the same right in
every State and Territory to make and enforce
contracts, to sue, be parties, give evidence,
and to the full and equal benefit of all laws
and proceedings for the security of persons
and property as is enjoyed by white citizens,
and shall be subject to like punishment,
pains, penalties, taxes, licenses, and
exactions of every kind, and to no other.
4
race discrimination in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981.5
The district court granted summary judgment in favor of GISD.
The court concluded that Appellants could not succeed on their
claim under § 1981 because their positions did not require
substantially the same responsibility as those of their white
colleagues. The court also determined that Appellants had failed
to raise any genuine issue of material fact on the question of
whether GISD’s proffered race-neutral explanations for the
disparity were pretextual.
II.
We review a district court’s grant of summary judgment de
novo. Price v. Fed. Express Corp., 283 F.3d 715, 719 (5th Cir.
2002). Summary judgment is appropriate if the evidence, viewed in
the light most favorable to the non-movant, raises no genuine
issues of material fact and is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c); Price, 283 F.3d at 719.
III.
We evaluate claims of racial discrimination based only on

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6 Appellants evidently concede that they can offer only
circumstantial evidence because they discuss only the McDonnell
Douglas analysis. Dr. Williams suggests that Superintendent
Boening steered her into her current position as Executive Director
of Employee and Community Relations and away from Assistant
Superintendent of Curriculum and Instruction, which eventually
became a higher-paying job. This allegation cannot save her claim
for discriminatory compensation, which requires that the
plaintiff’s job require substantially the same responsibility as a
higher-paid employee’s job. See Uviedo v. Steves Stash & Door Co.,
738 F.2d 1425, 1431 (5th Cir. 1984).
7 GISD does not dispute that Appellants are members of a
protected class.
5
circumstantial evidence under the familiar burden-shifting analysis
of McDonnnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-05 (1973).6
See Price, 283 F.3d at 719. Under this framework, plaintiffs begin
by establishing a prima facie case of discrimination. Pratt v.
City of Houston, 247 F.3d 601 (5th Cir. 2001).
To establish a prima facie case of discriminatory
compensation, a plaintiff must prove “(1) that she is a member of
a protected class and (2) that she is paid less than a nonmember
for work requiring substantially the same responsibility.” Uviedo
v. Steves Stash & Door Co., 738 F.2d 1425, 1431 (5th Cir. 1984);
see also Pittman v. Hattiesburg Mun. Separate Sch. Dist., 644 F.3d
1071, 1074 (5th Cir. Unit A May 1981).7 If a plaintiff’s job
responsibilities are significantly different from the
responsibilities of employees she cites as a point of comparison,
then the plaintiff has not made out a prima facie case. Id. In
considering whether two jobs require substantially the same

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8 Dr. Williams compares her responsibilities to those of Ms.
Garcia and Mr. McLarty. Ms. Watkins compares her responsibilities
to those of Mr. McLarty only.
9 The fact that GISD lists all four employees at grade 8 is
not significant. Pay grades represent a range of possible
salaries, and Appellants concede that salaries can differ within a
pay grade.
10 GISD points out that Appellants’ job titles are different
from the job titles of Mr. McLarty and Ms. Garcia. The name given
to a particular job adds little to our analysis where, as here, the
substance of the four jobs clearly differs. See Dey v. Colt
Constr. & Dev. Co., 28 F.3d 1446, 1461 (7th Cir. 1994); Orahood v.
Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ark., 645 F.2d 651, 654 (8th Cir. 1981)
(“We look to the actual job requirements and performance, not on-
job classifications or titles.”).
6
responsibility, we have looked to the jobs’ duties, see Uviedo, 738
F.2d at 1431; Pittman, 644 F.2d at 1074, including the jobs’
relative supervisory authority and responsibility for revenue, see
Cullen v. Ind. Univ. Bd. of Trs., 338 F.3d 693, 700 (7th Cir.
2003).
Appellants attempt to found their prima facie case on a
comparison between their positions and the positions held by Mr.
McLarty and Ms. Garcia.8 However, each employee’s responsibilities
are plainly dissimilar from the responsibilities of the other three
grade 8 employees.9
As Executive Director of Employee and Community Relations,10
Dr. Williams oversees employee relations, GISD’s grievance
procedure, employee programs, and parental participation. She
administers a budget of approximately $118,000 and supervises only
one employee, her secretary.

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7
As Executive Director of Human Resources, Ms. Watkins oversees
recruitment and training of teachers and other instructional
personnel, incentive and training programs, and compliance with
employment discrimination laws. She also influences employee
salary and benefits. Ms. Watkins oversees a somewhat larger
budget—approximately $290,000—and five employees report directly to
her.
Assistant Superintendent Garcia oversees GISD’s instructional
programs and helps in the planning and evaluation of those
programs. She also serves as acting superintendent when the
permanent superintendent leaves the district. Ms. Garcia
administers a budget of approximately $13 million. Eight employees
report directly to her, and she assists with the supervision of all
principals within GISD.
Chief Financial Officer McLarty oversees GISD’s entire budget
as well as maintenance, transportation, food service, athletic
programs, insurance, worker compensation, district elections, and
revenue collection. Six employees report directly to him, and he
indirectly supervises approximately 350 GISD employees.
These descriptions demonstrate that the four grade 8 positions
differ in many respects. Not only are their responsibilities
dissimilar in substance, but the scope of their authority over GISD
funds and employees differs. These four employees do not have
“substantially the same responsibility,” Uviedo, 738 F.2d at 1431.

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11 Appellants warn that ruling against them will insulate all
high-level managerial positions from discriminatory compensation
claims because no two such positions will ever have similar duties.
We disagree, and in any case the four positions presented here are
too dissimilar to facilitate comparison.
8
These differences fatally undercut Appellants’ claim for
discriminatory compensation because “[i]t is not discrimination to
treat differently situated persons differently.” Walton v. Bisco
Inds., 119 F.3d 368, 373 (5th Cir. 1997).
Appellants nonetheless describe their responsibilities as
comparable to the other grade 8 employees’ responsibilities because
all four grade 8 employees represent the district to the community
and participate in district-wide planning, policymaking, and
leadership. Described at this level of generality, almost any
managerial position would have the same responsibility as
Appellants’ positions do.11
Appellants emphasize that they are important to the district.
We have no doubt that their positions are crucial to GISD’s
operations. Undoubtedly Galveston’s principals, teachers, and
support staff also play crucial roles in the provision of
education. In evaluating a claim of discriminatory compensation,
we do not attempt to evaluate the importance of an employee’s role
in her organization. Rather, we look to the duties that employee
performs. See Uviedo, 738 F.2d 1425; Pittman, 644 F.2d at 1074.
Appellants also assert that their qualifications and
experience equal or exceed those of their colleagues. These

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9
considerations are likewise irrelevant when, as in this case,
similarly qualified persons have taken dissimilar jobs.
IV.
Appellants have failed to adduce any evidence showing that
they have substantially the same responsibility as purportedly
comparable employees. Appellants have therefore failed to raise
any genuine issue of material fact as to their prima facie case.
Because Appellants have faltered on the first step of the McDonnell
Douglas analysis, we need look no further. See Pittman, 644 F.3d
at 1074-75. We therefore AFFIRM the district court’s grant of
summary judgment.

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