Dupriest v. Eaton Corp, et al

*Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the Court has determined that
this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except
under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
F I L E D
October 14, 2003
Charles R. Fulbruge III
Clerk
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
_____________________
No. 03-40088
Summary Calendar
_____________________
HARRIET DUPRIEST,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
versus
EATON CORPORATION; REGIONS BANK,
Defendants-Appellees.
_________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Texas
USDC No.: 5:00-CV-332
_________________________________________________________________
Before JOLLY, JONES, and WIENER, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
In 1993, an Arkansas court entered a divorce decree dissolving
the marriage of Harriet and Mose Dupriest. Mose Dupriest died in
1999. In 2000, Harriet Dupriest, pro se, filed a complaint against
Regions Bank and Eaton Corporation (“the defendants”) seeking to
recover her deceased ex-husband’s pension and life insurance
benefits and personal property. The parties consented to
disposition by a magistrate judge, who granted summary judgment for
the defendants.
On appeal, Dupriest argues that the magistrate judge violated

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her due process and equal protection rights by refusing to set
aside the Arkansas divorce decree, which she contends is invalid
and fraudulent. She also argues that the magistrate judge erred by
refusing to consider certain evidence and by refusing to compel
discovery. We have reviewed the record and the briefs, and we
AFFIRM the summary judgment essentially for the reasons stated in
the magistrate judge’s comprehensive, well-reasoned opinion.
Furthermore, the magistrate judge’s evidentiary and discovery
rulings reflect no abuse of discretion.
Dupriest’s argument, raised for the first time on appeal, that
the magistrate judge abused her discretion by not transferring the
case to “an appropriate federal district” is patently frivolous.
Dupriest states in her brief that she used an acquaintance’s
address to establish residence in Texas even though she resided in
Arkansas and, therefore, the district court did not have personal
jurisdiction. Dupriest chose the forum for this lawsuit and never
complained about it before the magistrate judge. She is in no
position to do so now.
Dupriest’s motion for appointment of counsel is DENIED. Her
motion for a 90-day extension of time to reconstruct the record on
appeal due to illness in the family is DENIED. Her alternative
motion to strike the reconstructed record because she does not
agree with the contents is DENIED. Eaton Corporation’s motion to
accept the reconstructed record on appeal is GRANTED, and its
alternative motions to require Dupriest to identify deficiencies in

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the reconstructed record, or to dismiss the appeal because of
Dupriest’s failure to satisfy her responsibilities under Federal
Rule of Appellate Procedure 11(a), are DENIED as moot.

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