Tonnas v. Stonebridge Life Ins, et al

United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
F I L E D
October 27, 2003
Charles R. Fulbruge III
Clerk
In the
United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit
_______________
m 03-30287
Summary Calendar
_______________
KATHERINE TONNAS,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
VERSUS
STONEBRIDGE LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY,
FORMERLY KNOWN AS J.C. PENNEY LIFE INSURANCE CO.,
Defendant-
Third Party Plaintiff-
Appellee,
VERSUS
KYM ADAMS WRIGHT; CHERYL ANN ADAMS; SHEILA ADAMS SANDERS;
GASKIN-SOUTHALL & ASSOCIATES MORTUARY, INC.
Third Party Defendants-
Appellees.
_________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Louisiana
m 02-CV-2453-M
_________________________

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Before SMITH, DEMOSS, and STEWART,
Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Katherine Tonnas appeals a summary judg-
ment, complaining of the district court’s failure
to address her FED. R. CIV. P. 56(f) motion
seeking further discovery. Despite reluctance
to “substitute our judgment for that of the dis-
trict court” on matters such as this, we vacate
and remand. See Wichita Falls Office Assocs.
v. Banc One Corp., 978 F.2d 915, 920 (5th
Cir. 1992).
I.
Tonnas sued in state court to obtain the
proceeds from an insurance policy issued to
her then husband, John Adams, by the
defendant insurer.1 Although Adams and Ton-
nas later divorced, Tonnas maintained that she
remained the beneficiary. The suit was
removed to federal court, whereupon the
insurer filed a third party counterclaim against
three of Adams’s daughters2 and a funeral
home. The daughters moved for summary
judgment.
In her opposition to summary judgment,
Tonnas moved, under rule 56(f), for additional
time, to take two depositions. First, she
wished to depose Sheila Sanders, who, Tonnas
believed, ten days before Adams died, had re-
moved papers from a security box at the house
where Tonnas and Adams had lived. Tonnas
alleged that the security box “contained
documentary evidence which will show that
Ms. Tonnas is the beneficiary and entitled to
any benefits due under the insurance policy.”
Secondly, Tonnas wished to depose Charles
Costa, the insurer’s Vice-President of Claims,
to learn about the handling of the insurance
application and claims process regarding the
policy at issue.
Without a hearing, the district court, in a
thirty-five-word order, granted summary judg-
ment. It made no mention of the rule 56(f)
motion.
II.
We review for abuse of discretion the denial
of a rule 56(f) motion. Stearns Airport Equip.
Co. v. FMC Corp., 170 F.3d 518, 534 (5th
Cir. 1999). “The purpose of Rule 56(f) is to
provide non-movants with a much needed tool
to keep open the doors of discovery in order
to adequately combat a summary judgment
motion.” Wichita Falls Office Assocs., 978
F.2d at 919. Although an abuse of discretion
standard leaves a district court with a certain
amount of freedom, such discretion “to deny
the requested extension is not entirely
unfettered.” Int’l Shortstop, Inc. v. Rally's,
Inc., 939 F.2d 1257, 1267 (5th Cir. 1991). A
“continuance of a motion for summary
judgment for purposes of discovery should be
granted almost as a matter of course [unless]
the non-moving party has not diligently
pursued discovery of the evidence.” Id.
Wichita Falls Office Associates, 978 F.2d
at 919, lists four requirements from
International Shortstop that a non-movant
must satisfy to receive a continuance under
* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has
determined that this opinion should not be pub-
lished and is not precedent except under the limited
circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
1 J.C. Penney Life Insurance Company even-
tually became Stonebridge Life Insurance Com-
pany.
2 Kym Adams Wright, Cheryl Ann Adams, and
Sheila Adams Sanders.

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rule 56(f). First, he must request extended
discovery before the court rules on summary
judgment. Secondly, he must put the court on
notice that further discovery relating to the
summary judgment motion is being sought.
Thirdly, he must show how the requested
discovery relates to the summary judgment
motion. Finally, he must have acted in a
diligent fashion so as not to have put himself in
the current position through inaction. Id.
(quoting Int’l Shortstop, 939 F.2d at 1268,
1267).
Tonnas satisfied all these requirements.
She made the rule 56(f) request as part of her
memorandum in opposition to the motion for
summary judgment. The request expressly
stated what Tonnas wished to accomplish dur-
ing the extension and how the two depositions
would weaken appellees’ case for summary
judgment.3 Tonnas addit ionally included an
affidavit that explained what she expected to
obtain through the depositions. Finally, she
seemingly did not behave in a slothful manner.
Her request to delay a summary judgment
ruling occurred three months before the
scheduled end of the discovery period. She
learned of an alleged eyewitness account of the
taking of the policy and spent some of the
intervening time attempting to contact that
alleged witness.
Even assuming, however, that a case may
be made for denying the rule 56(f) motion, the
district court failed to mention it. Its grant of
the summary judgment contained no reference
to the request for a delay in the summary judg-
ment. Although a court has discretion to deny
a rule 56(f) motion and could reason that Ton-
nas has failed to met one of International
Shortstop’s requirements, the courts’
reasoning normally should appear, in some
form, in the judicial record. The fact that
Tonnas apparently met all the requirements to
receive a rule 56(f) extension makes the lack
of a record of reasons for denying the
extension more perplexing. By acting without
indicating why it apparently denied the
otherwise valid rule 56(f) motion, the court
abused its discretion.
Consequently, the summary judgment is
REVERSED, and this matter is REMANDED
for further proceedings. We intimate no view
on how the district court should rule on
remand.
3 Tonnas stated that she wished to use the
depositions to prove the existence of a policy with
a specifically-designated beneficiary. Sanders
would be forced to bring what she took from the
safe deposit box, including the insurance policy.
Costa’s deposition would focus on whether the in-
surer actually issued a policy on Adams’s life.
Both documents would counter the insurer’s claim
that no documentation indicated that Tannas was
the designated beneficiary.

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