Pope v. Boise Cascade Corp

*Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the Court has determined that this opinion should not be
published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R.
47.5.4.
United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
F I L E D
July 14, 2003
Charles R. Fulbruge III
Clerk
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
No. 03-30131
Summary Calendar
RISSA MCWILLIAMS POPE,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
BOISE CASCADE CORP.,
Defendant-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for
the Western District of Louisiana
(USDC No. 00-CV-2072)
_______________________________________________________
Before REAVLEY, BARKSDALE and CLEMENT, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Rissa Pope appeals the summary judgment entered against her in her suit under the
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). In ADA cases we employ the burden-shifting

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analysis applicable to Title VII cases. See McInnis v. Alamo Cmty. Coll. Dist., 207 F.3d
276, 279 (5th Cir. 2000). The plaintiff’s first step in making a prima facie case is to show
that she is disabled or is regarded as disabled. Id. Pope does not claim that she was
disabled, but proceeded on the theory that she was regarded as disabled by her employer,
appellee Boise Cascade Corp. The definition of disabled includes being regarded as
having a disability. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(C).
The record shows that Boise Cascade revoked an employment offer to Pope when
it came to believe that she might have attempted suicide. After Pope’s counsel contacted
Boise Cascade, it reconsidered its decision and hired Pope on a probationary basis. We
assume without deciding that Pope raised a genuine issue of material fact in support of
her claim that she was regarded as disabled, although this issue was disputed and the
district court found otherwise. Pope indisputably suffered an adverse employment action
in that she was terminated, and we further assume that she otherwise established a prime
facie case of disability discrimination. Therefore, the burden of production shifted to
Boise Cascade to articulate a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for her termination.
Boise Cascade did so with evidence that Pope was terminated because of several
incidents accurately described by the district court, including the submission of a diluted
urine sample for drug testing.
The burden then shifted to Pope to offer evidence of pretext, and summary
judgment was appropriate if she failed to meet this burden. See Price v. Fed. Express
Corp., 283 F.3d 715, 720 (5th Cir. 2002); Haynes v. Pennzoil Co., 207 F.3d 296, 300 (5th

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Cir. 2000). The plaintiff must offer substantial evidence of pretext amounting to more
than her subjective belief of discrimination. Auguster v. Vermilion Parish Sch. Bd., 249
F.3d 400, 402-03 (5th Cir. 2001) (affirming summary judgment).
Summary judgment may be awarded if, as to an issue on which the nonmoving
party has the burden of proof, there is insufficient evidence for a jury to return a verdict
for that party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249-50 (1986). “If the
evidence is merely colorable, or is not significantly probative, summary judgment may be
granted.” Id. (citations omitted). We have reviewed the record and agree with the district
court that Pope failed to make an evidentiary showing of pretext sufficient to defeat
defendant’s summary judgment motion. Pope’s brief on appeal, without a single citation
to the record, fails to persuade us otherwise.
AFFIRMED.

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