Summary Calendar ROOZBEH SHARIATZADEH v. John Ashcroft, Us Attorney General

* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined
that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent
except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.
R. 47.5.4.
** This provision has been renumbered. It is now 8 C.F.R.
§ 1003.1(a)(7). See 68 Fed. Reg. 9831 (Feb. 28, 2003).
United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
F I L E D
April 8, 2003
Charles R. Fulbruge III
Clerk
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
No. 02-60542
Summary Calendar
ROOZBEH SHARIATZADEH
Petitioner
v.
JOHN ASHCROFT, US ATTORNEY GENERAL
Respondent
--------------------
Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
BIA No. A72-908-785
--------------------
Before KING, Chief Judge, and WIENER and CLEMENT, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Roozbeh Shariatzadeh challenges a final order of removal
issued by the Board of Immigration Appeals (the Board) on June 7,
2002. The Board summarily affirmed the IJ’s decision pursuant to
8 C.F.R. § 3.1(a)(7).**
Shariatzadeh argues that the Board failed to review the IJ’s
decision, thereby removing itself from a meaningful role in the
appeals process. The Board’s summary affirmance pursuant to

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No. 02-60542
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8 C.F.R. § 3.1(a)(7) did not constitute a failure to review. The
“streamlining” regulation, 8 C.F.R. § 3.1(a)(7), authorizes a
single Board member to affirm, without opinion, the results of an
immigration judge’s decision. 8 C.F.R. § 3.1(a)(7)(ii). The
regulation designates the decision of the IJ, and not the Board’s
summary affirmance, as the proper subject of judicial review.
See 64 Fed. Reg. 56,137 (“[t]he decision rendered below will be
the final agency decision for judicial review purposes”); 64 Fed.
Reg. 56,138.
Shariatzadeh argues that the IJ erred in ignoring the
testimony of his sister and in relying on alleged inconsistencies
in his testimony and in his prior application for labor
certification to make a negative credibility finding. He
concedes, however, that the credibility issue did not affect the
IJ’s conclusion that he was statutorily ineligible for asylum
because of “firm resettlement” in the Netherlands. See 8 C.F.R.
§ 208.13(c)(1)(2000); INA § 208(b)(2)(A)(vi), 8 U.S.C.
§ 1158(b)(2)(A)(vi). He argues that his three and one-half years
in the Netherlands was not long enough to establish economic and
social ties and that he had no intent to settle permanently in
the Netherlands. This argument is unavailing. Shariatzadeh does
not argue that he falls within one of the two exceptions to firm
resettlement. See 8 C.F.R. § 208.15(a), (b). As substantial
evidence supports the IJ’s decision that he was firmly resettled,

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he cannot prevail. INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 481
(1992).
The IJ’s negative credibility determination had no effect on
the finding of firm resettlement. As such, the negative
credibility finding is of no import in this appeal.
Shariatzadeh’s claim that the IJ ignored his sister’s testimony
is untrue; the IJ referenced his sister’s testimony several times
in his written decision.
Shariatzadeh argues that the IJ’s negative credibility
findings resulted in the erroneous denial of his application for
voluntary departure. Review of this issue is statutorily
precluded. 8 U.S.C. § 1229c(f). Accordingly, his petition for
review is DENIED.
PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED.

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