United States v. Tassin

* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined
that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent
except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.
R. 47.5.4.
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
No. 01-31222
Summary Calendar
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
ALLEN NICHOLAS TASSIN,
Defendant-
Appellant.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Louisiana
USDC No. 01-CR-70-ALL-N
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May 20, 2002
Before JOLLY, WIENER and STEWART, Circuit Judges:
PER CURIAM:*
Allen Nicholas Tassin appeals his conviction for kidnaping and use and carrying of a firearm
in relation to that crime. Tassin argues that the district court plainly erred by failing to admonish the
jury following a juror’s comment on his failure to testify. See United States v. Griffith, 118 F.3d 324,
325-26 (5th Cir. 1997). The reference to the failure to testify was spontaneous, it was a single

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occurrence, Tassin’s exculpatory story discounting the credibility of the primary witnesses against
him was nonexistent, and the evidence that the victims did not consent to being transported across
state lines is overwhelming. In failing to admonish the jury, the district court error, if any, was
harmless. Chapman v. United States, 547 F.2d 1240, 1249-50 (5th Cir. 1977).
Tassin argues that the district court abused its discretion in allowing the Government to
present expert testimony. United States v. Williams, 822 F.2d 512, 516 (5th Cir. 1987). As the
district court concluded in denying Tassin’s motion for a new trial on this point, any evidence
regarding Tassin’s motive in set ting fire to the car was inconsequential in the face of the
overwhelming direct evidence of the kidnaping. Tassin has not shown reversible error with respect
to this issue.
Tassin argues that the district court abused its discretion by not allowing him to present
evidence of specific acts to show that a victim, called as a defense witness, was not credible. The
record is clear that the witness made a false police report and did not have a reputation for being
truthful. Tassin has not shown that evidence of specific acts would not be simply cumulative of
established facts. See United States v. Greer, 939 F.2d 1076, 1096-97 (5th Cir. 1991), related
portion reinstated, 968 F.2d 433, 434 (5th Cir. 1992) (en banc).
AFFIRMED.

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