Braswell, et al v. Illinois Ctrl RR Co

*Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that
this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except
under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
____________________
No. 00-60410
Summary Calendar
RANDY BRASWELL; WORLDWIDE MACHINERY SALES, INC.,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
versus
ILLINOIS CENTRAL RAILROAD COMPANY,
Defendant-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Mississippi
(3:99-CV-173-BN)
February 12, 2001
Before HIGGINBOTHAM, WIENER, and BARKSDALE, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
At issue is whether the district court erred in granting
judgment as a matter of law in favor of Illinois Central Railroad
Company (ICRR) at the close of plaintiffs’ case.
Braswell and his company, Worldwide Machinery Sales
(Braswell), alleged that the ICRR’s negligence in maintaining a
railroad bridge south of Magnolia, Mississippi, restricted the flow
of the Little Tangipahoa River, causing flooding of Braswell’s
property in January and March 1999. Braswell had the burden of

-- 1 of 3 --

2
proving ICRR’s bridge was a substantial contributing cause of his
damages. See Ga. Pac. v. Armstrong, 451 So. 2d 201, 205 (Miss.
1984) (“[T]he burden is upon the [upper riparian land owner] to
show that the acts of the lower riparian landowner were a
substantial contributing cause of the damages he suffered.”).
In ruling from the bench, the district court summarized: no
eyewitnesses could explain what had occurred at the bridge at the
time of the flooding, and the court had excluded Braswell’s experts
(those who could explain why the flooding occurred; Braswell does
not appeal that ruling); therefore, the evidence was insufficient
to send the case to the jury. Furthermore, “[t]he pictures [of the
scene following the flood] are certainly graphic in describing and
showing the amount of debris that was present there, but that was
taken two days later. The court nor the jury has any way of
determining whether, in fact, that debris was present, [or] whether
it obstructed [the river’s flow at the time of the flood]”. It
stated:
[I]n the absence of any experts and in the
absence of any direct testimony and [with] a
very, very minimal amount of even
circumstantial evidence, the court finds that
there is simply no reason why this motion
should not be granted ....
“We review rulings on a judgment as a matter of law de novo,
employing the same standards that the district court applied.”
McCoy v. Hernandez, 203 F.3d 371, 374 (5th Cir. 2000). “In
evaluating such a motion ... the court is to view the entire trial

-- 2 of 3 --

3
record in the light most favorable to the non-movant and draw all
inferences in its favor.” Omnitech Int’l, Inc. v. Clorox Co., 11
F.3d 1316, 1323 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 815 (1994).
The record is devoid of evidence from which a jury could infer
that the ICRR bridge was a substantial cause of the flooding of
Braswell’s property. “[A]fter viewing the trial record in the
light most favorable to the nonmovant, there is no ‘legally
sufficient evidentiary basis’ for a reasonable jury to have found
for the prevailing party”. Hill, 121 F.3d at 170 (quoting FED. R.
CIV. P. 50(a)).
AFFIRMED

-- 3 of 3 --