Bryant v. Southwestern Bell

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
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m 00-20103
Summary Calendar
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MAGGIE BRYANT,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
VERSUS
SOUTHWESTERN BELL YELLOW PAGES, INC.,
Defendant-Appellee.
_________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Texas
(H-98-CV-3534)
_________________________
September 18, 2000
Before SMITH, BENAVIDES, and
DENNIS, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Maggie Bryant appeals an adverse summary
judgment regarding her title VII retaliation
claim. Finding no error, we affirm.
I.
In 1992, Bryant, a black female, began
working in the Houston office of
Southwestern Bell Yellow Pages, Inc.
(“SWBYP”) as a Telemarketing
Administrator. In 1996, she began work in
* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has
determined that this opinion should not be
published and is not precedent except under the
limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R.
47.5.4.

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Advertising Services, where she supported
crews of telemarketing representatives. In
February 1998, she sent a letter to Edward
Whitacre, CEO of SWBYP’s parent company,
in which she complained of, inter alia, office
football pools and general racial discrimination
by SWBYP.
In March 1998, two positions for Customer
Service Specialist (“CSS”) opened in Houston,
Texas. Employees wishing to apply for the
positions were required to submit a one-page
Job Vacancy Request (“JVR”) by March 31,
1998. According to company policy and
training, an employee is to fill out a JVR, ob-
tain a supervisor’s signature, and then submit
the form to Human Resources. Bryant filled
out a JVR on March 17 and submitted it to
Manager Steve Herrera for his signature.1
Because Bryant's immediate supervisor,
George Jolliff, was on vacation, Herrera
transferred Bryant’s JVR to Jolliff’s immediate
supervisor, Gale Wickham.
Wickham signed Bryant’s JVR on
March 17 and immediately gave it to his
secretary,2 who sent it to Jolliff. When Jolliff
returned from vacation on March 23, he
immediately sent Bryant’s JVR back to Bryant
with a note questioning whether she had
submitted the document to Human Resources.
Because Bryant had left for vacation on March
23, however, she did not receive the signed
JVR until March 30, when she noted the
presence of the JVR and read Jolliff’s note, but
did not submit the document to Human
Resources until after the March 31 deadline.
The two CSS positions were filled by two
white female SWBYP employees. Bryant sued
SWBYP, alleging race discrimination and re-
taliation in violation of title VII, 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e et seq., and age discrimination in
violation of the ADEA, 29 U.S.C. § 621 et
seq. The court granted summary judgment in
favor of SWBYP on all claims, and Bryant
appeals the summary judgment on her
retaliation claim.
II.
Bryant alleges that, on account of her Feb-
ruary 28 letter complaining of race
discrimination, local SWBYP management
knowingly delayed the submission of her JVR
such that she would be precluded from
promotion to the CSS position. We review a
grant of summary judgment de novo,
employing the same standards as did the
district court. See Urbano v. Continental
Airlines, Inc., 138 F.3d 204, 205 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1000 (1998).
We apply the McDonnell Douglas burden-
shifting “three step” to title VII claims of un-
lawful retaliation. See Long v. Eastfield
College, 88 F.3d 300, 304 (5th Cir. 1996);
Casarez v. Burlington Northern/Santa Fe Co.,
193 F.3d 334, 337 (5th Cir. 1999). The
plaintiff must first prove his prima facie case
by a preponderance of the evidence. See id.
If that is successful, the burden of production
shifts to the defendant to articulate a
legitimate, non-retaliatory reason for the
challenged action. See id. The burden then
shifts back to the plaintiff to offer evidence
that the proffered reason is a pretext for
unlawful retaliation. See id.
To establish a prima facie case of
retaliation, Bryant must show: (1) that she
engaged in activity protected by title VII; (2)
1 Bryant asserts that a note accompanied the
JVR, but she presented no evidence in that regard.
2 This secretary was a temporary replacement
for Wickham’s regular secretary.

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that an adverse employment action occurred;
and (3) that a causal connection exists between
the participation in the protected activity and
the adverse employment action. See Casarez,
193 F.3d at 338-39; Long, 88 F.3d at 304.
Bryant’s letter complaining of racial
discrimination satisfies the first element, but
Bryant fails to demonstrate elements two and
three.
Bryant’s charge of retaliation rests on the
allegedly retaliatory delay by local
management in signing her JVR. Bryant is,
however, solely responsible for her untimely
submission. Bryant possessed the signed
version of the JVR on March 30, accompanied
by the note of her supervisor querying whether
she had submitted the form to Human
Resources, and she offers no explanation for
her failure to submit that document either on
March 30 or on March 31.
The “delaying tactics” of local management
did not deny Bryant the opportunity to apply
for the CSS position, and therefore Bryant
fails to establish an adverse employment
action. Moreover, she presented no evidence
that local management even knew of her Feb-
ruary 28 letter during the JVR process, and
therefore she also failed to establish a causal
connection between her letter and the alleged
adverse action. Bryant therefore fails to
satisfy the first element of the McDonnell
Douglas framework.
AFFIRMED.

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