Lyn-Lea Travel Corp, et al v. American Airlines, e

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
_______________
m 00-10123
Summary Calendar
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LYN-LEA TRAVEL CORPORATION,
DOING BUSINESS AS FIRST CLASS INTERNATIONAL TRAVEL MANAGEMENT,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
STEPHEN GARDNER,
Appellant,
VERSUS
AMERICAN AIRLINES, INC.,
Defendant-Appellee,
SABRE GROUP, INC.,
Intervenor-Defendant-Appellee.
_________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Texas
(3:96-CV-2068-BC(R))
_________________________
November 27, 2000

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2
Before SMITH, BENAVIDES, and
DENNIS, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Because this is an appeal only from a con-
tempt order, we dismiss the appeal for want of
appellate jurisdiction. Generally, we may en-
tertain appeals only from final decisions. See
28 U.S.C. § 1291. “[A] decision is not final,
ordinarily, unless it ‘ends the litigation on the
merits and leaves nothing for the court to do
but execute the judgment.’” Cunningham v.
Hamilton County, Ohio, 527 U.S. 192, 204
(1999) (quoting Catlin v. United States, 324
U.S. 229, 233 (1945)).
A civil contempt order is not an appealable
final order for purposes of § 1291.1 Although
we have recognized some exceptions to this
rule, none applies here.2
Although Lyn-Lea attempts to characterize
Gardner as a third party so that we might find
the district court’s order final as applied to
him, Gardner is functionally a party to the ac-
tion. First, he is active counsel for Lyn-Lea
and thus has a continuing duty to advance the
interests of his client. See Appeal of Licht &
Semonoff, 796 F.2d 564, 569-70 (1st Cir.
1986). The congruence of interests between
Gardner and Lyn-Lea weighs against treating
attorneys as nonparties for purposes of
interlocutory appeals. See Cunningham v.
Hamilton County, 527 U.S. 198, 207 (1999).
In addition, Gardner and Lyn-Lea are jointly
and severally liable for the sanctions, a factor
that weighs against allowing immediate
appeal.3 Thus, Gardner is not a third party in
any meaningful sense, and his sanctions are not
appealable as a final order.
Even though Lyn-Lea and Gardner do not
appeal from a final order, we may still hear the
appeal if it falls within the collateral order
doctrine. See Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan
Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949). It does not.
A decision may be immediately appealable
if it (1) conclusively determines the disputed
question; (2) resolves an important question
completely separate from the merits of the ac-
tion; and (3) is effectively unreviewable on
appeal from a final judgment. Coopers & Ly-
* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has
determined that this opinion should not be
published and is not precedent except under the
limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R.
47.5.4.
1 See, e.g., Quilling v. Funding Resource
Group, 227 F.3d 231, 234 (5th Cir. 2000); Police
Ass’n v. City of New Orleans, 100 F.3d 1159,
1166 (5th Cir. 1996); In re Grand Jury Subpoena,
926 F.2d 1423, 1429 (5th Cir. 1991); Drummond
County v. District 20, United Mine Workers, 598
F.2d 381, 383 (5th Cir. 1979).
2 See, e.g., Lamar Financial Corp. v. Adams,
918 F.2d 564, (5th Cir. 1990) (finding that a civil
contempt order was final and appealable because it
functioned as a criminal contempt order); Petroleos
Mexicanos v. Crawford Enters., Inc., 826 F.2d
392, 398 (5th Cir. 1987) (finding a civil contempt
order imposing monetary sanctions final and
appealable where the order related to actions of a
(continued...)
2(...continued)
third party and where the underlying criminal
prosecution had ended).
3 See Cleveland Hair Clinic, Inc. v. Puig, 104
F.3d 123, 126 (7th Cir. 1997) (holding that an
attorney for a party in ongoing litigation could not
immediately appeal an award of sanctions for
which he and his client were jointly and severally
liable).

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3
brand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 468-69
(1978); In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 190 F.3d
375, 381 (5th Cir. 1999). If the order in
question fails any of these criteria, it is not
appealable. Gulfstream Aerospace Corp. v.
Mayacamas Corp., 485 U.S. 271, 276 (1988).
We need not address whether the order
meets the first two criteria, because it plainly
fails the third. Appellants run no risk of losing
their ability to appeal the contempt order,
because the district court entered final judg-
ment on September 29, 2000.4
The appeal is DISMISSED for want of
jurisdiction.
4 See Cleveland Hair, 104 F.3d at 126 (“A
disgruntled attorney will be able to present the
sanctions issue on appeal from the final decisions,
even if the sanctioned litigant chooses not to,
because an appeal at the end of the case brings up
all interlocutory orders.”).

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