Snyder Oil Corp, et al v. Samedan Oil Corp

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
_______________
m 99-30354
_______________
SNYDER OIL CORPORATION,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
VERSUS
SAMEDAN OIL CORPORATION,
Defendant-Appellee.
_________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Louisiana
_________________________
April 13, 2000
Before DAVIS, CYNTHIA HOLCOMB
HALL,* and SMITH, Circuit Judges.
JERRY E. SMITH, Circuit Judge:
Snyder Oil Corporation (“Snyder”) appeals
an order granting transfer to the Southern Dis-
trict of Alabama pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1404(a). We affirm.
I.
Snyder1 and Samedan Oil Corporation
(“Samedan”) entered into a joint operating
agreement (“JOA”) for the development of a
federal oil and gas lease granted by the United
States Department of Interior Minerals
Management Service (“MMS”). The lease
covered “Block 261, Main Pass Area, South
and East Addition,” which is located on the
Outer Continental Shelf (“OCS”). The
* Circuit Judge of the Ninth Circuit, sitting by
designation.
1 Snyder is the parent corporation of SOCO
Offshore, Inc., and was substituted as the plaintiff.

-- 1 of 9 --

2
property is commonly referred to as “Main
Pass 261“ or “Block 261.”
Snyder sued in the Western District of Lou-
isiana, seeking a declaratory judgment
regarding the rights of the parties under the
JOA. Samedan subsequently sued, asserting
claims in the Southern District of Alabama,
then moved to dismiss or transfer the
Louisiana suit. The court denied the motion to
dismiss but transferred pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1404(a), based on a finding that Alabama
law will govern and that Alabama therefore
has the most interest in the outcome of the
litigation. The court then certified an
interlocutory appeal under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1292(b), and we granted leave to appeal.
The order of transfer was based on a choice
of law determination, and because Block 261
is located in federal waters on the OCS, the
controlling law is found in the Outer
Continental Shelf Lands Act (“OCSLA”), 43
U.S.C. §§ 1331-1356, which vests the United
States with jurisdiction over the soil and
seabed of the oceans and artificial islands and
fixed structures located thereon, and grants to
the United States the mineral resources that
are part of the OCS. Section 1333(a)(2)(A) of
that Act provides:
To the extent that they are applicable
. . . the civil and criminal laws of each
adjacent State . . . are hereby declared to
be the law of the United States for that
portion of the subsoil and seabed of the
outer Continental Shelf, and artificial
islands and fixed structures erected
thereon, which would be within the area
of the State if its boundaries were
extended seaward to the outer margin of
the outer Continental Shelf, and the
President shall determine and publish in
the Federal Register such projected lines
extending seaward and defining each
such area.
This Congressionally mandated choice of law
provision trumps any contrary contractual pro-
visions. See Union Tex. Petroleum Corp. v.
PLT Eng'g, Inc., 895 F.2d 1043, 1050 (5th
Cir. 1990).
The parties agree that § 1333(a)(2)(A) is
controlling, but Snyder contests the court’s
application of that section. Because the
President has not published the “projected
lines” required by § 1333(a)(2)(A), the courts
must adjudicate adjacency in private disputes
governed by OCSLA. We conducted the
required “adjacency determination” in Reeves
v. B & S Welding, Inc., 897 F.2d 178 (5th Cir.
1990), and the district court and both parties
recognize Reeves as the controlling precedent.
The issue is whether the district court’s
application of Reeves is correct as a matter of
law. The court found Block 261 to be
“adjacent” to Alabama for purposes of §
1333(a)(2)(A) and therefore held that Alabama
law governs the dispute.
II.
In Reeves, we held that a platform located
in the High Island Field in the Gulf of Mexico
was “adjacent” to Texas within the meaning of
§ 1333(a)(2)(A). We considered, inter alia,
the following evidence:
Testimony and exhibits before the
district court showed that [the subject
platform] is closer to the Texas coast
than to the Louisiana coast. Charts
submitted by Exxon also indicated that
the High Island Field is considered to be
“adjacent” to Texas, rather than

-- 2 of 9 --

3
Louisiana, by the United States
Department of Interior Bureau of Land
Management, the United States
Department of Interior Mineral
Management Service, the National
Oceanic & Atmospheric Administration,
and the Coast Guard.
Reeves, 897 F.2d at 179.
We also considered that other courts had
construed platforms located in the High Island
Field to be adjacent to Texas under OCSLA,
specifically citing two Louisiana district court
opinions. See id. at 179-80. Lastly, we
discussed four proposed “boundary
projections,” two of which would locate the
platform in Texas waters and two of which
would locate it in Louisiana waters. See id. at
180. In other words, if these lines were
promulgated by the President pursuant to
OCSLA, two of them would result in the
platform’s being “adjacent” to Texas, and two
would result in its being “adjacent” to
Louisiana.
We rejected the appellant’s projected lines
as unsupported but considered both of the ap-
pellee’s projected lines to be plausible, the lat-
ter two being “fully consistent with the
existing Texas/Louisiana boundary established
by the Supreme Court.” Id. We therefore
determined that “[f]or purposes of this case,
we need not decide which of appellees [sic]
proposed boundaries is the proper one,”
because under either boundary projection the
platform was “adjacent” to Texas. Id.
In considering these projected lines, we
noted that
[i]t would not be proper in this case to
adjudicate the boundary itself. That
would call for more thorough
production of evidence and
consideration by the court. It is also a
matter of significant concern to the two
states themselves, and they should be
heard if that issue were to be litigated.
Id. Therefore, while Reeves instructs that
proposed boundary projections are relevant to
a private dispute, it would be improper for a
court to hold that a given boundary projection
was conclusively established for purposes of
§ 1333(a)(2)(A).
Reeves concludes as follows:
It is enough that the record evidence be-
fore the district court confirms that [the
subject platform] is closer to the Texas
coast than the Louisiana coast, that the
relevant federal agencies consider [the
subject platform] to be off the Texas
coast, that other courts have considered
other High Island platforms to be
adjacent to Texas, and that the boundary
between Texas and Louisiana projected
out into the Gulf in its original direction
from the shore, places [the subject
platform] within Texas waters. So also
does a line projected directly southward
from the Texas three league territorial
boundary. We conclude, therefore, that
the district court did not err in holding
that [the subject platform] is “adjacent”
to Texas for purposes of the OCSLA.
Id. While we did not articulate a specific test,
we therefore considered four types of evidence
in the “adjacency” analysis: (1) geographic
proximity; (2) which coast federal agencies
consider the subject platform to be “off of”;
(3) prior court determinations; and (4) project-
ed boundaries.

-- 3 of 9 --

4
III.
The President has failed to publish the
boundary projections required by OCSLA, and
the responsible federal agency, the MMS,
refused the parties’ request to make an
adjacency determination. Therefore, the
district court applied the multi-factored Reeves
analysis.
While both parties recognize Reeves as
controlling, Snyder requests that we “clarify”
Reeves to hold that in the absence of an
express determination of “adjacency” pursuant
to § 1333(a)(2)(A) by an authorized federal
agency, geographic proximity is
determinative.2 To label this request a
“clarification,” Snyder cites a related section of
OCSLA and a district court case stressing
proximity, rejects as irrelevant all federal
agency determinations not specific to this
statutory section, claims Reeves’s
consideration of other court opinions was
merely a recitation of comity and stare decisis,
and urges that all discussion of projected
boundaries in Reeves was needless dictum. An
analysis of these assertions demonstrates the
errors in Snyder’s contentions.
Snyder cites Pittencrieff Resources, Inc. v.
Firstland Offshore Exploration Co., 942
F. Supp. 271 (E.D. La. 1996), for the
proposition that geographic proximity is
determinative. Pittencrieff held that the
subject property was “adjacent” to Alabama
for purposes of OCSLA because it was nearer
to the Alabama coast than to the Louisiana
coast.
As an initial matter, a district court’s
interpretation of Reeves would not alter that
holding. Further, Pittencrieff determined
“adjacency” on the sole ground of geographic
proximity, because “[n]o party to this action
has disputed that Alabama is the closest state
geographically, and no party has provided any
reason why Louisiana or Florida should be
considered the adjacent state.” Id. at 277.
This is entirely consistent with the Reeves
multi-factored analysis; if the parties present
evidence on only one factor, that factor is
controlling.
Snyder also cites 43 U.S.C. § 1333(c),
which states that
[f]or the purposes of the National Labor
Relations Act . . . any unfair labor
practice . . . occurring upon any artificial
island . . . referred to in [§ 1333(a)] shall
be deemed to have occurred within the
judicial district of the State, the laws of
which apply to such artificial island . . .
pursuant to [§ 1333(a)], except that
until the President determines the areas
within which such State laws are
applicable, the judicial district shall be
that of the State nearest the place of
location of such artificial island.
If pro ximity were controlling for purposes of
§ 1333(a)(2)(A) as a statutory matter because
of inclusion of § 1333(c), we would not have
considered other evidence in Reeves: That
other evidence would have been irrelevant, re-
gardless of whether it was consistent or
inconsistent with this “controlling” factor.
Reeves rejects Snyder’s proposed
interpretation. The presence of § 1333(c)
demonstrates that Congress was aware of the
desirability of “default” provisions pending
Presidential action, but it chose not to provide
such provisions for § 1333(a)(2)(A). 2 The Block 261 platform is approximately six
miles closer to Louisiana than to Alabama.

-- 4 of 9 --

5
Snyder eschews as irrelevant all state and
federal agency actions other than a federal
agency’s “actual, express determination of
adjacency for purposes of the OCSLA.” The
Reeves court considered charts indicating that
the following federal agencies considered the
subject platform to be off the Texas coast: the
Department of Interior Bureau of Land
Management, MMS, the National Oceanic and
Atmospheric Administration (“NOAA”), and
the Coast Guard.
The parties agree that MMS would have
authority to issue official projections under
§ 1333(a)(2)(A). If it did so, the
determination of adjacency would be a
relatively simple matter of application not
requiring the Reeves approach. Until such
official projections are published, however,
some agency’s determination “pursuant” to
that section is no more relevant than an agen-
cy’s adjacency determination for some other
purpose. The former may be more probative
if it is believed that the agency more closely
followed the dictates of § 1333(a)(2)(A), but
it is not “more relevant.”
Rule 401, FED. R. EVID., defines “relevant
evidence” as “evidence having any tendency to
make the existence of any fact that is of
consequence to the determination of the action
more probable or less probable than it would
be without the evidence.” Agency
determinations of projected boundaries, or
other determinations of a similar nature, make
it more probable that if the President does ever
“project boundaries” those boundaries will be
consistent with these other agency
determinations. For example, if all federal
agencies have, for various reasons, determined
that a platform is off the coast of Texas, it is
more probable that the President will project a
boundary such that the platform is “adjacent”
to Texas.
As long as the President fails to perform
and publish the § 1333(a)(2)(A) calculations,
we must follow Reeves in considering all rele-
vant evidence. Reeves did not establish a strict
four-factor test, but instead considered all four
categories of relevant evidence before the
court. Pittencrieff correctly followed Reeves
by considering the one piece of relevant
evidence before it, and the district court
correctly considered all relevant evidence in
making its determination. We cannot apply
the formalistic test desired by Snyder, for
neither logic nor authority allows this court
arbitrarily to disregard all relevant evidence
except that of geographic proximity.3
IV.
Having rejected Snyder’s interpretation of
Reeves, we must consider whether the district
court considered categories of evidence that
are legally irrelevant to a § 1333(a)(2)(A) “ad-
jacency” determination. In its “Reasons for
Judgment,” the district court found that
references to Alabama in certain Snyder
contracts “sp[oke] volumes as to the intent of
[Snyder] and thei r [sic] original
acknowledgment of the location of Block
261.” Because § 1333(a)(2)(A) is a
mandatory choice of law provision, intent is
irrelevant. See Union Texas, 895 F.2d at1043.
Although consideration of such intent would
therefore constitute error, the court’s
statement, read in context, makes plain either
that the court either knew not to consider such
3 Snyder argues that this court should apply a
“geographic proximity” test, because its easily dis-
cernible nature would save time and money. While
judicial economy is a concern, it does not give us
free reign arbitrarily to elevate one bit of relevant
evidence to a determinative position.

-- 5 of 9 --

6
intent in making its legal determination or that
at least such consideration did not affect that
determination:
After considering [federal agency
determinations] along with the other
Reeves factors this court is persuaded
that Main Pass 261 is located offshore
Alabama, and, therefore, this matter
should be transferred. It should also be
noted that in other contracts between
[Snyder] and other parties, [Snyder]
refers to Main Pass 261 and Block 261
as being located “offshore Alabama.”
(Emphasis added.) Therefore, contrary to
Snyder’s assertion, the court did not
improperly consider “intent” evidence.
Samedan submitted charts, maps, notices,
and reports published by the MMS, the Bureau
of Land Management, NOAA, and the Coast
Guard, supporting the conclusion that Block
261 is considered to be off the coast of
Alabama.4 Samedan also presented evidence
that the Louisiana State Lands Office does not
consider Block 261 to be off the coast of Lou-
isiana, but that Alabama state agencies do con-
sider it to be o ff Alabama. Lastly, Samedan
presented evidence that if the Mississippi-
Alabama border is extended seaward from the
three mile line through the OCS, either due
south or in the natural southeasterly direction
of the common boundary (the two projections
favorably considered in Reeves), Block 261
lies eastward of the extension and hence is in
Alabama waters.5
A.
The documentary evidence introduced by
Samedan demonstrates that several federal
government agencies, for purposes other than
OCSLA, have considered Block 261 to be off
the coast of Alabama. For example, an MMS
chart and diagram illustrates the Mississippi-
Alabama boundary and the MMS extension of
that boundary seaward into federal waters.
Snyder does not dispute that a continuation of
that line places Block 261 in Alabama waters.
Likewise, an MMS notice to lessees articulates
that activities in the Block 261 area affect only
Alabama.
Also introduced was an NOAA report con-
taining the NOAA’s extension of boundaries
for a now-defunct federal program; it is
undisputed that the Louisiana-Mississippi
boundary so extended is significantly west of
Block 261.6 A chart demonstrated that Block
261 falls within the jurisdiction of the Alabama
district of the Coast Guard Captain of the Port
Zone,7 and a U.S. Geological Survey report
refers to the area of Block 261 as the “Mis-
sissippi-Alabama” OCS.
4 The phrase “off the coast of” avoids use of the
term “adjacent,” as the agency determinations at
issue are not adjacency determinations pursuant to
§ 1333(a)(2)(A).
5 As in Reeves, considering this last piece of
evidence is not adjudicating the Mississippi-
Alabama border. It merely recognizes the
probative value of the fact that either proposed
extension, if used by the President, would place the
platform “adjacent” to Alabama.
6 Snyder, while contesting its relevance, did
argue that a straight-line extension of the Lou-
isiana-Mississippi boundary would instead run
north of Block 261.
7 In particular, it falls within the Mobile,
Alabama, District instead of the New Orleans,
Louisiana, District.

-- 6 of 9 --

7
Citing Rhoads v. Virginia-Florida Corp.,
476 F.2d 82 (5th Cir. 1973), Snyder argues
that this documentary evidence is irrelevant
without testimony as to what the documents
were intended to convey. Rhoads held that
private surveyor drawings that had not been
verified by testimony were not admissible for
testimonial use. We stated that
[b]efore the documents could be
admitted for “testimonial use,” that is,
where the documents themselves would
“testify” as direct evidence on a material
disputed issue of fact, they were
required to be verified. “[W]henever
such a document is offered as proving a
thing to be as therein represented, then
it is offered testimonially, and it must be
associated with a testifier.” 3 Wigmore,
On Evidence, § 790, at 218 (Chadbourn
ed. 1970). Verification required at the
minimum a showing by the testimony of
some competent witness that the lines of
t h e d r a w i n g s w e r e c o r r e c t
representations of the actual physical
characteristics of the land and objects
which they purported to show.
Rhoads, 476 F.2d at 85.
Although Samedan does not distinguish its
proffers from those in Rhoads, they are
distinguishable.8 When co nsidering
admissibility, the initial step is always to
determine the purpose for which the
documents are being offered. See 22 CHARLES
A. WRIGHT & KENNETH W. GRAHAM, JR.,
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 5164,
at 38 (1978). Rhoads notes that in Florida a
private survey could be used as direct
evidence, but only if it was shown to be “a
resurvey tieing into or based on lines, calls and
measurements previously established by the
official U.S. government survey, if there is
one, and if not, the oldest private survey under
which property rights in the area were
originally acquired.” Rhoads, 476 F.2d at 85
n.5. We observed that without testimony,
“[t]here [was] no evidence that lines, calls and
monuments portrayed on the drawings were
based on or tied in to [sic], or derived from, an
official survey or the oldest private survey.”
Id. at 85.
Taken in context, the quotation by Wig-
more relied on in Rhoads is as follows:
It may, sometimes, to be sure, not be of-
fered as a source of evidence, but only
as a document whose existence and ten-
or are material in the substantive law ap-
plicable to the case, as where . . . in
ejectment for land conveyed by deed
containing a map, the map is to be used
irrespective of the correctness of the
drawing; here we do not believe
anything because the map represents it.
But whenever such a document is
offered as proving a thing to be as
therein represented, then it is offered
testimonially, and it must be associated
with a testifier.
8 Instead, Samedan relies on the inference that
Reeves considered similar evidence without
testimony, supported by the fact that Reeves notes
“[t]estimony and exhibits” concerning geographic
proximity but only “[c]harts” concerning federal
agency determinations. See Reeves, 897 F.2d
at 179. Because relevancy objections can be
waived, however, we must review the admissibility
(continued...)
8(...continued)
of such documents.

-- 7 of 9 --

8
WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE § 790, at 218 (Chad-
bourn ed. 1970). The documentary evidence
presented by Samedan is admissible for
reasons akin to the ejectment example given by
Wigmore. The district court did not use the
evidence of agency determinations because it
believed that information to be “correct,”
whatever that would mean where an infinite
number of boundary projections are possible.
Instead, the court considered the evidence be-
cause irrespective of whether it is “correct” in
some abstract sense, the fact that the agencies
consider the location to be off the coast of Al-
abama makes it more probable that the
President will “project” a boundary that agrees
with this result.
The admissibility of the documentary
evidence is further supported by Wigmore’s
treatment of official reports. Wigmore
favorably recommends the Uniform Official
Reports as Evidence Act (1936), which
provides as follows:
Written reports or findings of fact made
by officers of this State on a matter
within the scope of their duty as defined
by statute shall, in so far as relevant, be
admitted as evidence of the matters stat-
ed therein. . . . Any adverse party may
cross-examine any person making such
reports or findings or any person fur-
nishing information used therein; but the
fact that such testimony may not be ob-
tainable shall not affect the admissibility
of the report or finding, unless, in the
opinion of the Court, the adverse party
is unfairly prejudiced thereby.
WIGMORE, supra, § 1673 at 822.
Therefore, because official reports are in-
herently more reliable than are private reports,
and, more importantly, because the reports are
relevant irrespective of whether they are
“correct,” the court properly considered the
documentary evidence.
B.
Snyder contends that Samedan’s affidavit
and deposition testimony are irrelevant.9 Mr.
Mayeux, a registered land surveyor in five
states, examined the agency maps and charts
submitted by Samedan. He confirmed the lo-
cation of Block 261 thereon and concluded
that an extension of the Mississippi-Alabama
boundary, whether due south or in its natural
southeasterly direction, results in Block 261’s
falling on the Alabama side of the extension.
Mr. St. Romain, Administrator of the
Louisiana State Lands Office, stated that
Block 261 is not “considered by the Louisiana
State Land Office to be located in waters
adjacent to the State of Louisiana.” Mr. Gane,
Chief of Coastal Programs for the Alabama
Department of Environmental Management,
stated that that agency considers Block 261 to
be subject to its management. Mr. Griggs,
director of the Alabama Department of
Conservation and Natural Resources, Land
Division, stated that the Land Division
considers Block 261 to be located adjacent to
Alabama. Mr. Easterly, who represented
Louisiana in the development of the NOAA
report proffered by Samedan, stated that the
9 Snyder also objected based on hearsay, lack of
personal knowledge, and lack of expertise. These
specific evidentiary determinations are not at issue
in this interlocutory appeal, in which Snyder argues
that certain categories of evidence are inadmissible
as a matter of law. Furthermore, Snyder fails even
to articulate, let alone establish, the legal standard
that the court abused its discretion on any of these
other grounds. See General Elec. Co. v. Joiner,
522 U.S. 136 (1997); Curtis v. M&S Petroleum,
Inc., 174 F.3d 661, 667 (5th Cir. 1999).

-- 8 of 9 --

9
program defined adjacency by using an
extended lateral seaward boundary of the
state.
These categories of evidence are
admissible. Experts may examine and discuss
federal agency reports. While not considered
by the court in Reeves, there is likewise no
reason to deem irrelevant the opinions of
affected state agenciesSSthey may be less
probative than are opinions of federal
agencies, but they are not irrelevant. In the
absence of Presidential action pursuant to
§ 1333(a)(2)(A), it is relevant what affected
federal and state agencies have determined,
regardless of whether their determinations are
“correct” in some abstract sense.
AFFIRMED.

-- 9 of 9 --