Defense Distributed, et al v. U.S. Dept. of State,

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 18-50811

DEFENSE DISTRIBUTED; SECOND AMENDMENT FOUNDATION,
INCORPORATED,

Plaintiffs - Appellants

CONN WILLIAMSON

Appellant
v.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE; MIKE POMPEO,
SECRETARY, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE; DIRECTORATE OF
DEFENSE TRADE CONTROLS, Department of State Bureau of Political
Military Affairs,

Defendants - Appellees

Appeals from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Texas

Before WIENER, HIGGINSON, and HO, Circuit Judges.
JAMES C. HO, Circuit Judge:
Plaintiffs are Second Amendment advocates who wish to publish plans
for how to assemble a firearm using a 3D printer. They brought this suit to
prevent the State Department from blocking their efforts. After settling with
the State Department, Plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed this suit.
United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
FILED
January 21, 2020

Lyle W. Cayce
Clerk
Case: 18-50811 Document: 00515279164 Page: 1 Date Filed: 01/21/2020

No. 18-50811
2
Plaintiffs now seek to revive their Texas suit under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 59(e). They do so in response to a nationwide injunction against
enforcement of the settlement issued by the Western District of Washington.
But Rule 59(e) authorizes motions to alter or amend judgments—not to
revive lawsuits. Accordingly, we decline the request of the Second Amendment
advocates and affirm.
I.
Plaintiff Defense Distributed is a non-profit Texas company that
promotes the Second Amendment’s individual right to keep and bear arms. It
developed plans for assembling a firearm, known as the “Liberator,” using a
3D printer, and sought to publish those plans on the internet. The company is
joined in this lawsuit by Plaintiffs Second Amendment Foundation, Inc. and
Conn Williamson, who also promote the right to keep and bear arms through
various efforts.
The State Department administers and enforces the Arms Export
Control Act of 1976, 22 U.S.C. § 2778, and its implementing regulations, the
International Traffic in Arms regulations, 22 C.F.R. § 120.1(a). The
Department ordered Defense Distributed not to publish its plans on the ground
that federal regulations prohibit their publication without the government’s
prior approval.
In response, Plaintiffs sued the State Department, the Secretary of
State, and other senior State Department officials in the Western District of
Texas. After the district court denied preliminary injunctive relief, this court
affirmed, and the Supreme Court denied certiorari, the district court ordered
the parties to discuss settlement. The parties subsequently entered a
settlement agreement that effectively permitted Plaintiffs to publish the plans.
A month later, three gun-control organizations filed an emergency
motion to intervene challenging the settlement agreement as unlawful under
Case: 18-50811 Document: 00515279164 Page: 2 Date Filed: 01/21/2020

No. 18-50811
3
the Administrative Procedure Act. The district court denied the motion to
intervene.
The parties then filed a stipulation of dismissal of the entire suit under
Rule 41(a)(1)(A)(ii). In doing so, the parties did not ask the court to retain
jurisdiction over the settlement agreement.
1

A few days later, the district court purported to enter a final judgment
acknowledging the voluntary dismissal and then dismissing the case with
prejudice. But as we shall explain below, the district court did not have
jurisdiction to issue that judgment. The court lost jurisdiction when the parties
voluntarily dismissed the entire suit under Rule 41(a)(1)(A)(ii).
On the same day that the Western District of Texas entered the
purported final judgment in the Texas suit, the state of Washington, joined by
eighteen other states and the District of Columbia, filed a lawsuit in the
Western District of Washington seeking to enjoin the settlement agreement as
a violation of the Administrative Procedure Act and the Tenth Amendment of
the U.S. Constitution. The district court in Washington quickly issued a
temporary restraining order against the State Department. That same court
then issued a preliminary injunction enjoining the State Department from
implementing or enforcing certain provisions of the settlement agreement.
In response to the Washington suit, Plaintiffs sought to vacate the
judgment accompanying the stipulated dismissal in the Texas suit, withdraw
the stipulation of dismissal, and reopen the case. Plaintiffs relied on Federal

1
If the parties had wanted to, they could have asked the district court to retain
jurisdiction—for example, to oversee enforcement of a settlement agreement. See Hospitality
House, Inc. v. Gilbert, 298 F.3d 424, 430 (5th Cir. 2002) (“The Court specified two ways in
which a court may make a settlement agreement part of its dismissal order: ‘either by
separate provision (such as a provision “retaining jurisdiction” over the settlement
agreement) or by incorporating the terms of the settlement agreement in the order.’”)
(quoting Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am. 511 U.S. 375, 381 (1994)).
Case: 18-50811 Document: 00515279164 Page: 3 Date Filed: 01/21/2020

No. 18-50811
4
Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e), as well as Rule 60(b). The district court denied
the motions. Plaintiffs appealed the denial of their Rule 59(e) motion.
This court reviews the denial of a Rule 59(e) motion for abuse of
discretion. In re Life Partners Holdings, Inc., 926 F.3d 103, 128 (5th Cir. 2019).
Relief under Rule 59(e) may issue only if Plaintiffs demonstrate “a manifest
error of law or fact or . . . newly discovered evidence.” Id.
II.
Rule 59(e) allows a party to “alter or amend a judgment.” F
ED. R. CIV. P.
59(e). It does not allow a party to revive and initiate further proceedings in a
dismissed lawsuit. So Plaintiffs’ Rule 59(e) motion must fail for that reason
alone.
Moreover, there is no “judgment” when the parties voluntarily dismiss
the entire case under Rule 41(a)(1)(A)(ii). Under Rule 41(a)(1)(A), a stipulation
of dismissal operates to dismiss the action “without a court order.” F
ED. R. CIV.
P. 41(a)(1)(A). And “[a] stipulation of dismissal under that rule ordinarily—
and automatically—strips the district court of subject-matter jurisdiction” over
the dismissed action. Nat’l City Golf Fin. v. Scott, 899 F.3d 412, 415–16 (5th
Cir. 2018).
So the district court here had no jurisdiction to enter final judgment in
this case. Under Rule 41, “a district court’s jurisdiction over a case that is
settled and voluntarily dismissed by stipulation cannot extend past the filing
date absent an express contingency or extension of jurisdiction.”
SmallBizPros, Inc. v. MacDonald, 618 F.3d 458, 461 (5th Cir. 2010). Any
actions taken after that filing are accordingly “superfluous.” Id. (quoting
Meinecke v. H & R Block of Houston, 66 F.3d 77, 82 (5th Cir. 1995)).
Case: 18-50811 Document: 00515279164 Page: 4 Date Filed: 01/21/2020

No. 18-50811
5
III.
Even if we were to conclude that the district court had jurisdiction to
issue the judgment, and that the Rule 59(e) motion was timely and otherwise
appropriate in this context, we would still have no choice but to affirm.
Rule 59(e) motions “are for the narrow purpose of correcting manifest
errors of law or fact or presenting newly discovered evidence.” Faciane v. Sun
Life Assurance Co. of Canada, 931 F.3d 412, 423 (5th Cir. 2019). District courts
have “considerable discretion in deciding whether to reopen a case under Rule
59(e).” Edward H. Bohlin Co. v. The Banning Co., 6 F.3d 350, 355 (5th Cir.
1993). “Reconsideration of a judgment after its entry is an extraordinary
remedy that should be used sparingly.” Templet v. HydroChem Inc., 367 F.3d
473, 479 (5th Cir. 2004).
Plaintiffs contend that relief under Rule 59(e) is warranted because they
could not have foreseen the Washington lawsuit—and that the resulting
national injunction unjustly interferes with the rights they sought to vindicate
in this very suit. But be that as it may, Rule 59(e) does not authorize courts to
grant relief under these circumstances. The initiation and prosecution of the
Washington suit did not render any action by the district court in Texas
erroneous, let alone manifestly erroneous. Accordingly, we cannot say that the
district court abused its discretion in denying relief under Rule 59(e).
2

2
Plaintiffs also sought relief from the district court under Rule 60(b). But they do not
present Rule 60(b) as an alternative basis for relief on appeal. And for good reason: Rule
60(b)(1) provides for relief resulting from mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable
neglect—not to redress “the consequences of decisions deliberately made, although
subsequent events reveal that such decisions were unwise.” Nat’l City Golf, 899 F.3d at 418.
Nor do any of the remaining subsections of Rule 60(b) apply. See, e.g., Edward H. Bohlin Co.,
6 F.3d at 357 (reserving relief under 60(b)(6) for when “the initial judgment [has been shown]
to have been manifestly unjust”).
Case: 18-50811 Document: 00515279164 Page: 5 Date Filed: 01/21/2020

No. 18-50811
6
* * *
Plaintiffs are undoubtedly sincere in their belief that the government
interfered with their constitutional rights by forbidding them from publishing
information about assembling the Liberator firearm to fellow citizens—as
evidenced by the settlement agreement they were able to obtain from the State
Department. And they are understandably frustrated by the nationwide
injunction that stands in their way today. But established rules of civil
procedure do not permit this court to grant the relief they seek here. We affirm.
Case: 18-50811 Document: 00515279164 Page: 6 Date Filed: 01/21/2020