Praylor v. TX Dept Cr Justice, et al

United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
F I L E D
August 26, 2005
Charles R. Fulbruge III
Clerk
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
No. 04-50854
Summary Calendar
JOSHUA PRAYLOR,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE; AHIA SHABAAZ; OWEN
MURRAY, Medical Director; JOSEPHINE SESSION; WILLIAM LESLIE
NORTHROP; VALENCIA POLLARD; WILLIAM GONZALES, DR.; UNIVERSITY
OF TEXAS MEDICAL BRANCH AT GALVESTON CORRECTIONAL MANAGED
CARE DIVISION; TEXAS TECH UNIVERSITY HEALTH SCIENCE CENTER,
Defendants-Appellees.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Texas
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Before BARKSDALE, STEWART, and CLEMENT, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Joshua Praylor, Texas prisoner # 1128305, appeals the denial
of his civil rights complaint against numerous officials of the
Texas Department of Criminal Justice (TDCJ) and the University of
Texas and Texas Tech University health care systems (hereinafter,
TDCJ). See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). Praylor argues that the
TDCJ’s denial of his request for hormone therapy to treat his
transsexualism constitutes cruel and unusual punishment under the
Eighth Amendment. Praylor has filed an injunction seeking to

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No. 04-50854
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instruct the TDCJ to provide him with hormone therapy and
brassieres. His motion is DENIED.
A dismissal for failure to state a claim under
§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is reviewed under the same de novo standard
of review applicable to dismissals made pursuant to FED. R. CIV.
P. 12(b)(6). Harris v. Hegmann, 198 F.3d 153, 156 (5th Cir.
1999). The Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause of the Eighth
Amendment protects an inmate from improper medical care, but only
if the care is “sufficiently harmful to evidence deliberate
indifference to serious medical needs.” Estelle v. Gamble, 429
U.S. 97, 106 (1976).
Although this circuit has not addressed the issue of
providing hormone treatment to transsexual inmates, we will
follow those circuits that have determined transsexualism to be a
serious medical need raising Eighth Amendment considerations.
See Cuoco v. Moritsugu, 222 F.3d 99, 103 (2d Cir. 2000); White v.
Farrier, 849 F.2d 322, 325 (8th Cir. 1988); Meriwether v.
Faulkner, 821 F.2d 408, 413 (7th Cir. 1987); Supre v. Ricketts,
792 F.2d 958, 963 (10th Cir. 1986). Likewise, this court
recognizes that while some method of treatment of inmate
transsexuals is required, such inmates do not have a
constitutional right to hormone therapy. Rather, the prison
facility must afford the transsexual inmate some form of
treatment based upon the specific circumstances of each case.

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In Praylor’s case, the record reflects that he did not
request any form of treatment other than hormone therapy.
Testimony from the medical director at the TDCJ revealed that the
TDCJ had a policy for treating transsexuals, but that Praylor did
not qualify for hormone therapy because of the length of his term
and the prison’s inability to perform a sex change operation, the
lack of medical necessity for the hormone, and the disruption to
the all-male prison. Cf. De’Lonta v. Angelone, 330 F.3d 630, 635
(4th Cir. 2003). Moreover, the director testified that Praylor
had been evaluated on two occasions and denied eligibility for
hormone treatment and that the TDCJ did provide mental health
screening as part of its process for evaluating transsexuals.
See Supre, 792 F.2d at 963. Accordingly, based upon the instant
record and circumstances of Praylor’s complaint, the denial of
his specific request for hormone therapy does not constitute
deliberate indifference. See Meriwether, 821 F.2d at 413; Supre,
792 F.2d at 963.
AFFIRMED; MOTION FOR INJUNCTION DENIED.

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