United States of America v. Edwin Marquis Bates

UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 20-4141

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

EDWIN MARQUIS BATES,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina, at
Greensboro. Thomas D. Schroeder, Chief District Judge. (1:19-cr-00281-TDS-1)

Submitted: August 25, 2020 Decided: August 27, 2020

Before KING and AGEE, Circuit Judges, and SHEDD, Senior Circuit Judge.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Louis C. Allen, Federal Public Defender, Ames C. Chamberlin, Assistant Federal Public
Defender, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER, Greensboro, North
Carolina, for Appellant. Nicole Royer DuPre, Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE
OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

2

PER CURIAM:
Edwin Marquis Bates appeals his conviction and 100-month sentence imposed
following his guilty plea to possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, in violation of 18
U.S.C. § 922(g). On appeal, counsel for Bates has filed a brief pursuant to Anders v.
California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), asserting that there are no meritorious grounds for appeal
but questioning the district court’s application of a two-level Sentencing Guidelines
enhancement and the substantive reasonableness of Bates’ sentence. In addition, Bates has
filed a pro se supplemental brief contesting the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his
guilty plea and the two-level Guidelines enhancement, as well as the extent to which the
district court based its sentencing decision on his criminal history. For the reasons that
follow, we affirm.
Before accepting a guilty plea, the district court must ensure, among other things,
that the plea is supported by an independent basis in fact. Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b)(3). At
the plea hearing, Bates admitted each element of the offense and offered no objection to
the Government’s thorough factual proffer. Accordingly, we reject Bates’ sufficiency
challenge and discern no plain error in the court’s acceptance of Bates’ guilty plea. See
United States v. Vonn, 535 U.S. 55, 58-59 (2002) (providing standard of review for
unpreserved claims of Rule 11 error).
Next, we review Bates’ sentence “under a deferential abuse-of-discretion standard.”
Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 41 (2007). Under this standard, a sentence is reviewed
for both procedural and substantive reasonableness. Id. at 51. In determining procedural
reasonableness, we consider, among other things, whether the district court properly

3

calculated the defendant’s Guidelines range. Id. If a sentence is free of “significant
procedural error,” then we review it for substantive reasonableness, “tak[ing] into account
the totality of the circumstances.” Id. “Any sentence that is within or below a properly
calculated Guidelines range is presumptively reasonable.” United States v. Louthian, 756
F.3d 295, 306 (4th Cir. 2014). “Such a presumption can only be rebutted by showing that
the sentence is unreasonable when measured against the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors.” Id.
As initially calculated, Bates’ Guidelines range—with or without the disputed 2-
level enhancement—exceeded the applicable 120-month statutory maximum. Thus, as
Anders counsel rightly acknowledges, regardless of the propriety of the enhancement, the
district court correctly calculated a Guidelines term of 120 months. Finally, we conclude
that nothing in the record rebuts the presumption of substantive reasonableness accorded
Bates’ downward variance sentence.
In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the entire record in this case and have
found no meritorious issues for appeal. We therefore affirm Bates’ criminal judgment.
This court requires that counsel inform Bates, in writing, of the right to petition the
Supreme Court of the United States for further review. If Bates requests that a petition be
filed, but counsel believes that such a petition would be frivolous, then counsel may move
in this court for leave to withdraw from representation. Counsel’s motion must state that
a copy thereof was served on Bates.

4

We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are
adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the
decisional process.
AFFIRMED