United States of America v. Basil Derrick Halliday

UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 19-4701

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

BASIL DERRICK HALLIDAY,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina, at
Greensboro. N. Carlton Tilley, Jr., Senior District Judge. (1:18-cr-00367-NCT-1)

Submitted: May 21, 2020 Decided: May 26, 2020

Before AGEE and QUATTLEBAUM, Circuit Judges, and TRAXLER, Senior Circuit
Judge.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Louis C. Allen, Federal Public Defender, Kathleen A. Gleason, Assistant Federal Public
Defender, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER, Greensboro, North
Carolina, for Appellant. Matthew G.T. Martin, United States Attorney, Michael A.
DeFranco, Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES
ATTORNEY, Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

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PER CURIAM:
A jury convicted Basil Derrick Halliday of obtaining a controlled substance using a
registration number issued to another person, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 843(a)(2) (2018).
The district court sentenced Halliday to five months’ imprisonment. On appeal, Halliday
contends that the district court erred in denying his motion for a judgment of acquittal under
Fed. R. Crim. P. 29 because the Government presented insufficient evidence that he used
a physician’s Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) registration number to acquire Suboxone.
Finding no error, we affirm.
We review de novo challenges to the sufficiency of evidence and a district court’s
denial of a motion for a judgment of acquittal under Rule 29. United States v. Alerre, 430
F.3d 681, 693 (4th Cir. 2005). A defendant challenging the sufficiency of the evidence
faces a heavy burden. United States v. Wolf, 860 F.3d 175, 194 (4th Cir. 2017). On appeal,
a jury’s verdict must be upheld “if, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the
government, substantial evidence supports it.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
“[S]ubstantial evidence is evidence that a reasonable finder of fact could accept as adequate
and sufficient to support a conclusion of a defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.”
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). In undertaking our review, we cannot “assess
witness credibility, and we assume that the jury resolved any conflicting evidence in the
prosecution’s favor.” United States v. Savage, 885 F.3d 212, 219 (4th Cir. 2018) (internal
quotation marks omitted). To reverse, “the prosecution’s failure [must be] clear.” United
States v. Palomino-Coronado, 805 F.3d 127, 130 (4th Cir. 2015) (internal quotation marks
omitted).

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To obtain a conviction under 21 U.S.C. § 843(a)(2), the Government must prove
that Halliday (1) knowingly or intentionally; (2) used another person’s registration number;
(3) for the purpose of obtaining a controlled substance. 21 U.S.C. § 843(a)(2). Although
Halliday acknowledges that he purchased Suboxone, a Schedule III controlled substance,
on five different occasions, he contends that the Government failed to submit sufficient
evidence demonstrating he used another person’s registration number to make such
purchases.
At trial, however, Halliday admitted to buying Suboxone from a pharmacy on five
occasions and providing the pharmacist with a physician’s name. The Government
presented the purchase invoices containing a physician’s name and her DEA registration
number. This physician worked at the clinic owned and managed by Halliday. Moreover,
trial testimony showed that (1) Halliday made five in-person purchases of Suboxone and
the pharmacist testified that for each purchase Halliday provided him with the ordering
physician’s name and DEA registration number; (2) the pharmacy did not have access to a
DEA registration database or a subscription to acquire or verify a prescriber’s DEA
number; (3) the physician initially provided Halliday with her DEA registration number on
her credentialing package upon hiring but testified that she never spoke to the pharmacist
or gave Halliday authorization to purchase Suboxone using her registration number.
Although Halliday denied providing the pharmacist with the physician’s DEA registration
number, it is the province of the jury to weigh credibility not ours. See Savage, 885 F.3d
at 219. Accordingly, the Government presented sufficient evidence to permit a jury to

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conclude that Halliday used the physician’s DEA registration number without her
permission.
We therefore affirm Halliday’s conviction. We dispense with oral argument
because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this
court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED