United States of America v. Dondie Williams

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 16-4106
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
DONDIE WILLIAMS,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern
District of West Virginia, at Wheeling. Frederick P. Stamp, Jr.,
Senior District Judge. (5:15-cr-00008-FPS-JES-1)
Submitted: November 30, 2016 Decided: December 13, 2016
Before WILKINSON and AGEE, Circuit Judges, and DAVIS, Senior
Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Brian C. Crockett, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Kristen M.
Leddy, Research and Writing Specialist, Martinsburg, West
Virginia, for Appellant. William J. Ihlenfeld, II, United States
Attorney, Stephen L. Vogrin, Assistant United States Attorney,
Wheeling, West Virginia, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

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PER CURIAM:
Dondie Williams entered a conditional guilty plea to
possession with intent to distribute cocaine base, in violation of
21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(C) (2012). Williams reserved the
right to appeal the district court’s denial of his motion to
suppress the cocaine base and other evidence seized during a
traffic stop. On appeal, he argues only that police lacked an
articulable reasonable suspicion to initiate the stop. We affirm.
When considering the denial of a motion to suppress, “[w]e
review de novo a district court’s rulings with respect to
reasonable suspicion and probable cause.” United States v. Palmer,
820 F.3d 640, 648 (4th Cir. 2016). “Absent clear error, we will
not disturb factual findings made by a district court after an
evidentiary hearing on suppression issues.” Id. Because the
Government prevailed on the suppression issue below, “we view the
evidence in the light most favorable to the [G]overnment.” Id.
We evaluate the legality of a traffic stop under the two-pronged
inquiry announced in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). Palmer,
820 F.3d at 648-49.
Williams was a passenger in a vehicle that was stopped for,
among other reasons, excessive window tint. “As we have
recognized, illegally tinted windows are alone ‘sufficient to
justify’ a traffic stop.” Id. at 650 (citing United States v.
Green, 740 F.3d 275, 279 n.1 (4th Cir. 2014)); see N.C. Gen. Stat.

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§ 20-127(b), (d) (2015). Additionally, the facts that police
issued the driver only a warning for the tint, failed to confirm
the existence of a no-contact order between Williams and the
vehicle’s driver, and may have suspected drug activity do not
defeat the district court’s conclusion that sufficient reasonable
suspicion of a traffic violation justified the stop. See Palmer,
820 F.3d at 649 (“[W]e do not attempt to discern an officer’s
subjective intent for stopping the vehicle.”); United States v.
Williams, 740 F.3d 308, 312 (4th Cir. 2014) (“[A]n officer who
observes a traffic offense may have probable cause even where he
has additional motives for the stop.”).
Accordingly, we conclude that the district court properly
denied Williams’ motion to suppress and affirm the district court’s
judgment. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and
legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before
this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED

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