United States of America v. Nanci Brook Byrd

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 15-4777
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
NANCI BROOK BYRD,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle
District of North Carolina, at Greensboro. Catherine C. Eagles,
District Judge. (1:15-cr-00053-CCE-13)
Submitted: September 20, 2016 Decided: October 28, 2016
Before WYNN and HARRIS, Circuit Judges, and DAVIS, Senior
Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Stephen F. Wallace, WALLACE LAW FIRM, High Point, North
Carolina, for Appellant. Clifton Thomas Barrett, Assistant
United States Attorney, Greensboro, North Carolina, for
Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

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PER CURIAM:
Nanci Brook Byrd pled guilty, pursuant to a written plea
agreement, to conspiracy to possess pseudoephedrine with intent
to manufacture methamphetamine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846
(2012). The district court sentenced Byrd to 40 months’
imprisonment. In accordance with Anders v. California, 386 U.S.
738 (1967), Byrd’s counsel has filed a brief certifying that
there are no meritorious grounds for appeal but generally
questioning the adequacy of the plea hearing and the
reasonableness of the sentence. Although notified of her right
to do so, Byrd has failed to file a pro se brief. We affirm the
district court’s judgment.
Because Byrd did not move to withdraw her guilty plea, we
review the adequacy of the Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 hearing for plain
error. United States v. Sanya, 774 F.3d 812, 815 (4th Cir.
2014). Before accepting a guilty plea, the district court must
conduct a plea colloquy in which it informs the defendant of,
and determines she understands, the rights she is relinquishing
by pleading guilty, the charge to which she is pleading, and the
maximum and mandatory minimum penalties she faces. Fed. R.
Crim. P. 11(b)(1); United States v. DeFusco, 949 F.2d 114, 116
(4th Cir. 1991). The court also must ensure that the plea was
voluntary and not the result of threats, force, or promises not
contained in the plea agreement, Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b)(2), and

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“that there is a factual basis for the plea,” Fed. R. Crim. P.
11(b)(3). Our review of the record confirms that the district
court fully complied with Rule 11.
We review a defendant’s sentence “under a deferential
abuse-of-discretion standard.” Gall v. United States, 552 U.S.
38, 41 (2007). Under this standard, a sentence is reviewed for
both procedural and substantive reasonableness. Id. at 51. In
determining procedural reasonableness, we consider whether the
district court properly calculated the defendant’s advisory
Sentencing Guidelines range, gave the parties an opportunity to
argue for an appropriate sentence, considered the 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(a) (2012) factors, and sufficiently explained the
selected sentence. Id. at 49-51. If a sentence is free of
“significant procedural error,” then we review it for
substantive reasonableness, “tak[ing] into account the totality
of the circumstances.” Id. at 51. “Any sentence that is within
or below a properly calculated Guidelines range is presumptively
reasonable.” United States v. Louthian, 756 F.3d 295, 306 (4th
Cir. 2014).
Our review of the record leads us to conclude that Byrd’s
sentence is procedurally sound. While Byrd requested a
probationary sentence, her arguments in support of that request
fail to overcome the presumption of reasonableness accorded her

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40-month sentence. We therefore conclude that her sentence is
substantively reasonable.
In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the entire
record in this case and have found no meritorious grounds for
appeal. We therefore affirm the district court’s judgment.
This court requires that counsel inform Byrd, in writing, of the
right to petition the Supreme Court of the United States for
further review. If Byrd requests that a petition be filed, but
counsel believes that such a petition would be frivolous, then
counsel may move in this court for leave to withdraw from
representation. Counsel’s motion must state that a copy thereof
was served on Byrd.
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before
this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED

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