United States of America v. George Antonio Mattocks

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 15-4683
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
GEORGE ANTONIO MATTOCKS,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of North Carolina, at Raleigh. James C. Fox, Senior
District Judge. (5:05-cr-00179-F-1)
Submitted: February 17, 2017 Decided: February 23, 2017
Before GREGORY, Chief Judge, and WYNN and HARRIS, Circuit
Judges.
Vacated and remanded by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Thomas P. McNamara, Federal Public Defender, Stephen C. Gordon,
Chief Appellate Attorney, Jennifer C. Leisten, Research &
Writing Attorney, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellant. John
Stuart Bruce, Acting United States Attorney, Jennifer P. May-
Parker, Phillip A. Rubin, Assistant United States Attorneys,
Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

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PER CURIAM:
George Antonio Mattocks appeals the 47-month and 29-day
statutory maximum sentence the district court imposed upon
revocation of his term of supervised release. Mattocks contends
that his sentence is plainly unreasonable because the district
court committed procedural error in failing to adequately
explain its sentence. We agree, and we vacate the district
court’s judgment and remand for resentencing.
“A district court has broad discretion when imposing a
sentence upon revocation of supervised release.” United States
v. Webb, 738 F.3d 638, 640 (4th Cir. 2013). “We will affirm a
revocation sentence if it is within the statutory maximum and is
not plainly unreasonable.” Id. (internal quotation marks
omitted). “When reviewing whether a revocation sentence is
plainly unreasonable, we must first determine whether it is
unreasonable at all.” United States v. Thompson, 595 F.3d 544,
546 (4th Cir. 2010). Our review of revocation sentences relies
on many of the same procedural and substantive considerations
that guide our review of original sentences. United States v.
Crudup, 461 F.3d 433, 438 (4th Cir. 2006). A revocation
sentence is procedurally reasonable if the district court
adequately explains the sentence after considering the Chapter
Seven policy statements and the applicable 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)

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(2012) factors. Thompson, 595 F.3d at 546-47; see 18 U.S.C.
§ 3583(e) (2012).
We conclude that the district court procedurally erred in
failing to adequately explain its selected sentence.
“Regardless of whether the district court imposes an above,
below, or within-Guidelines sentence, it must place on the
record an ‘individualized assessment’ based on the particular
facts of the case before it.” United States v. Carter, 564 F.3d
325, 330 (4th Cir. 2009) (quoting Gall v. United States, 552
U.S. 38, 50 (2007)); see also Thompson, 595 F.3d at 547. “A
court need not be as detailed or specific when imposing a
revocation sentence as it must be when imposing a post-
conviction sentence, but it still must provide a statement of
reasons for the sentence imposed.” Thompson, 595 F.3d at 547
(internal quotation marks omitted). Here, the district court
failed to address Mattocks’ nonfrivolous argument that a lower
sentence was warranted given his positive employment history,
strong family support, and that he successfully completed over
four years of supervised release prior to his first violation.
See Carter, 564 F.3d at 328 (“Where the defendant . . . presents
nonfrivolous reasons for imposing a different sentence than that
set forth in the advisory [policy statements], a district judge
should address the party’s arguments and explain why he has
rejected those arguments.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).

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Additionally, the district court failed to explain why it was
necessary to impose a sentence at the statutory maximum, as
opposed to a different sentence above the 3- to 9-month policy
statement range. See United States v. Helton, 782 F.3d 148,
151-52 (4th Cir. 2015) (“For a sentence to be procedurally
sound, a district judge must also consider the factors outlined
in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) and articulate the reasons for selecting
the particular sentence, especially explaining why any sentence
outside of the [policy statement] range better serves the
relevant sentencing purposes set forth in § 3553(a).”
(alteration and internal quotation marks omitted)).
Having concluded that Mattocks’ sentence is unreasonable,
we must determine whether it is plainly so. To be plainly
unreasonable, a sentence must “run afoul of clearly settled
law.” Thompson, 595 F.3d at 548. The requirement that a
district court offer a sufficient explanation for a sentence
well above the policy statement range is well settled in this
Circuit.* See, e.g., Thompson, 595 F.3d at 547; Carter, 564 F.3d
at 328-30; Crudup, 461 F.3d at 438-39.
Accordingly, we vacate Mattocks’ sentence and remand for
resentencing. We dispense with oral argument because the facts
* Because we conclude that Mattocks’ sentence is
procedurally unreasonable, we do not address the substantive
reasonableness of the sentence.

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and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials
before this court and argument would not aid in the decisional
process.
VACATED AND REMANDED

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