Henry Uche Okpala v. Computer Sciences Corporation, Csc

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 15-1637
HENRY UCHE OKPALA,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
COMPUTER SCIENCES CORPORATION, CSC,
Defendant - Appellee,
and
ROBIN SCHERMERHORN, CSC; DAVID H. MARTIN, CSC; WILLIAM
SHOCKRO, CSC; CENTERS FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVICES, CMS,
Third Party,
Defendants.
No. 15-1914
HENRY UCHE OKPALA,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
COMPUTER SCIENCES CORPORATION, CSC,
Defendant - Appellee,
and

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ROBIN SCHERMERHORN, CSC; DAVID H. MARTIN, CSC; WILLIAM
SHOCKRO, CSC; CENTERS FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVICES, CMS,
Third Party,
Defendants.
Appeals from the United States District Court for the District
of Maryland, at Baltimore. J. Frederick Motz, Senior District
Judge. (1:13-cv-03614-JFM)
Submitted: November 30, 2015 Decided: January 20, 2016
Before WYNN and DIAZ, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior
Circuit Judge.
No. 15-1637 dismissed; No. 15-1914 affirmed by unpublished per
curiam opinion.
Henry Uche Okpala, Appellant Pro Se. Frank Daniel Wood, Jr.,
KULLMAN FIRM, Birmingham, Alabama, Joseph Richard Ward, III,
KULLMAN LAW FIRM, New Orleans, Louisiana, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

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PER CURIAM:
In these consolidated appeals, Henry Uche Okpala seeks to
appeal the district court’s orders denying his motion for
recusal and granting summary judgment to Computer Sciences
Corporation (“CSC”).
This court may exercise jurisdiction only over final
orders, 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (2012), and certain interlocutory and
collateral orders, 28 U.S.C. § 1292 (2012); Fed. R. Civ. P.
54(b); Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 545-
46 (1949). The district court’s recusal order is neither a
final order nor an appealable interlocutory or collateral order.
Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal in No. 15-1637 for lack of
jurisdiction.∗
∗ The fact that final judgment issued while this appeal was
pending does not give us jurisdiction over this appeal because
the district court’s recusal order was not an order that could
have been followed by the immediate issuance of partial final
judgment. In re Bryson, 406 F.3d 284, 288 (4th Cir. 2005)
(“[Appellate] Rule 4(a)(2) does not allow a premature notice of
appeal from a clearly interlocutory decision . . . to serve as a
notice of appeal from the final judgment.” (internal quotation
marks omitted)).
Additionally, to the extent Okpala’s informal briefs in No.
15-1637 could be construed as a request for a writ of mandamus
or No. 15-1914 could be construed as challenging the denial of
Okpala’s recusal motions, Okpala has failed to establish a valid
basis for recusal. See Belue v. Leventhal, 640 F.3d 567, 573
(4th Cir. 2011) (“[J]udicial rulings and opinions formed by the
judge on the basis of facts introduced or events occurring in
the course of the current proceedings, or of prior
proceedings[,] almost never constitute a valid basis for a bias
(Continued)

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In No. 15-1914, Okpala appeals the district court’s order
granting summary judgment to CSC. Okpala contends that (1)
CSC’s motion for summary judgment was untimely, and (2) he was
denied adequate opportunity for discovery under Fed. R. Civ. P.
56(d). Upon review of the record, we conclude that the summary
judgment motion was timely because it was filed within the
deadline set by the district court in its May 4, 2015 order.
See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(b) (“Unless a different time is set by
local rule or the court orders otherwise, a party may file a
motion for summary judgment at any time until 30 days after the
close of all discovery.” (emphasis added)); see also
Fayetteville Inv’rs v. Commercial Builders, Inc., 936 F.2d 1462,
1469 (4th Cir. 1991) (“An interlocutory order is subject to
reconsideration at any time prior to the entry of a final
judgment.”). We also conclude that Okpala was given ample
opportunity for discovery but refused to engage in the discovery
process according to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and
that, in any event, Okpala has not shown how the requested
discovery could enable him to overcome the ample evidence
submitted by CSC. Pisano v. Strach, 743 F.3d 927, 931 (4th Cir.
or partiality motion.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); see
also In re First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 860 F.2d 135, 138 (4th
Cir. 1988) (holding that mandamus relief is available only if
“petitioner has shown a clear right to the relief sought”).

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2014) (“[A] court may deny a Rule 56(d) motion [for further
discovery] when the information sought would not by itself
create a genuine issue of material fact sufficient for the
nonmovant to survive summary judgment.”). Therefore, we affirm
the district court’s grant of summary judgment to CSC.
Accordingly, in No. 15-1637, we dismiss the appeal for lack
of jurisdiction, and in No. 15-1914, we affirm the district
court’s judgment. We dispense with oral argument because the
facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the
materials before this court and argument would not aid the
decisional process.
No. 15-1637 DISMISSED
No. 15-1914 AFFIRMED

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