Linda Lieving v. Pleasant Valley Hospital, Inc.; Thomas Schauer

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 15-1463
LINDA LIEVING,
Plaintiff – Appellant,
v.
PLEASANT VALLEY HOSPITAL, INC.; THOMAS SCHAUER,
Defendants - Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern
District of West Virginia, at Huntington. Robert C. Chambers,
Chief District Judge. (3:13-cv-27455)
Submitted: November 30, 2015 Decided: January 6, 2016
Before NIEMEYER, MOTZ, and FLOYD, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Walt Auvil, RUSEN & AUVIL, Parkersburg, West Virginia, for
Appellant. Arie M. Spitz, Brian J. Moore, DINSMORE & SHOHL, LLP,
Charleston, West Virginia, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

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PER CURIAM:
Linda Lieving appeals the grant of summary judgment in
favor of Pleasant Valley Hospital, Inc. (“PVH”) and Thomas
Schauer, PVH’s Chief Executive Officer (collectively,
“Defendants”), in her employment discrimination action. Lieving
alleged that Defendants fostered a hostile work environment in
which she was discriminated against on the basis of her sex, in
violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42
U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (2012), and the West Virginia Human
Rights Act, W. Va. Code Ann. § 5-11-1 (2014). On appeal,
Lieving argues that she suffered unwelcome conduct based on her
sex and that such conduct was sufficiently severe and pervasive
to constitute a hostile work environment.
We review the grant or denial of summary judgment de novo,
“drawing reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to
the non-moving party.” Butler v. Drive Auto. Indus. of Am.,
Inc., 793 F.3d 404, 407 (4th Cir. 2015) (internal quotation
marks omitted). Summary judgment is only appropriate when
“there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the
movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R.
Civ. P. 56(a). “[T]he nonmoving party must rely on more than
conclusory allegations, mere speculation, the building of one
inference upon another, or the mere existence of a scintilla of

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evidence.” Dash v. Mayweather, 731 F.3d 303, 311 (4th Cir.
2013).
Title VII prohibits an employer from “discriminat[ing]
against any individual with respect to [her] compensation,
terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such
individual’s . . . sex.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2012).
Because “an employee’s work environment is a term or condition
of employment, Title VII creates a hostile working environment
cause of action.” Walker v. Mod-U-Kraf Homes, 775 F.3d 202, 207
(4th Cir. 2014) (internal quotation marks omitted). To
establish a claim for a hostile work environment, an employee
must show that she suffered “unwelcome” harassment that was
based on her sex, was “sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter
the conditions of her employment and create an abusive
atmosphere,” and was imputable to her employer. Freeman v.
Dal-Tile Corp., 750 F.3d 413, 420 (4th Cir. 2014) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
Harassment is based on an employee’s sex where, “‘but for’
the employee’s sex, he or she would not have been the victim of
the discrimination.” Wrightson v. Pizza Hut of Am., Inc., 99
F.3d 138, 142 (4th Cir. 1996). In making this determination,
“[t]he critical issue, Title VII’s text indicates, is whether
members of one sex are exposed to disadvantageous terms or
conditions of employment to which members of the other sex are

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not exposed.” Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523
U.S. 75, 80 (1998) (internal quotation marks omitted).
After reviewing the record, we find no evidence that
Lieving suffered harassment based on her sex. There is no
reason to believe that were she not female, the alleged events
at PVH would have transpired differently. Lieving primarily
complains of one incident with another employee and the
aftermath of that incident. But the incident, combined with a
few sexually suggestive offhand comments by male executives
during unrelated board meetings, is not sufficient to show that
Lieving suffered discrimination based on her sex.
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s order granting
summary judgment to Defendants. We dispense with oral argument
because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented
in the materials before this court and argument would not aid
the decisional process.
AFFIRMED

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