United States of America v. Jayad Zainab Ester Conteh

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 14-4224
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
JAYAD ZAINAB ESTER CONTEH,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
Maryland, at Greenbelt. George L. Russell, III, District Judge.
(8:12-cr-00306-GLR-1)
Submitted: October 20, 2014 Decided: November 3, 2014
Before WILKINSON and THACKER, Circuit Judges, and DAVIS, Senior
Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Marc Gregory Hall, LAW OFFICE OF MARC G. HALL, P.C., Rockville,
Maryland, for Appellant. Rod J. Rosenstein, United States
Attorney, Thomas P. Windom, Assistant United States Attorney,
Greenbelt, Maryland, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

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PER CURIAM:
Jayad Zainab Ester Conteh (“Conteh”) appeals her
convictions after a jury trial for conspiracy to commit bank
fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1344, 1349 (2012), bank
fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2, 1344 (2012), aggravated
identity theft, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2, 1028A (2012),
and two counts of exceeding authorized access to a computer and
thereby obtaining information contained in a financial record of
a financial institution, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2,
1030(a)(2)(A) (2012). Conteh argues on appeal that the district
court erred in denying her motions to suppress evidence and
statements because the sworn application supporting her arrest
warrant was insufficient to establish probable cause and that
the officer executing the warrant did not act in reasonable good
faith reliance on the state commissioner’s determination of
probable cause. Conteh also challenges the district court’s
qualification of a witness as an expert in Sierra Leoneon
Creole, arguing that the court abused its discretion because it
so qualified him, even though he is not a federally certified
interpreter, does not possess degrees in the language, never
acted as a translator previously, and currently works as a
teacher in another field. We affirm.
We review the district court’s factual findings
underlying its denial of a motion to suppress for clear error

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and its legal conclusions de novo. United States v. McGee,
736 F.3d 263, 269 (4th Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 1572
(2014). “Probable cause to justify an arrest means [the
existence of] facts and circumstances within [a police]
officer’s knowledge that are sufficient to warrant a prudent
person, or one of reasonable caution, in believing in the
circumstances shown, that the suspect has committed . . . an
offense.” United States v. Dickey-Bey, 393 F.3d 449, 453 (4th
Cir. 2004) (internal quotation marks and alteration omitted). A
“fluid concept that turns on the assessment of probabilities,
not on any formula such as is applied to proof at trial,”
probable cause “is judged by an analysis of the totality of the
circumstances.” Id. at 453-54 (internal quotation marks
omitted). In reviewing the state commissioner’s probable cause
determination, we “must accord great deference to the
[commissioner]’s assessment of the facts presented to him” and
“may ask only whether the [commissioner] had a substantial basis
for concluding that probable cause existed.” United States v.
Blackwood, 913 F.2d 139, 142 (4th Cir. 1990) (internal quotation
marks, ellipsis, and alteration omitted).
The application supporting the arrest warrant makes
clear that law enforcement agents learned that several bank
accounts had been compromised when information for the accounts
was changed and checks were ordered without authorization.

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Conteh — in her position as a teller for the bank — had accessed
the compromised accounts with information personally identifying
the account holders in a manner suggesting her access was
unauthorized. Additionally, the owner of a vehicle observed
being used in an attempt to retrieve checks ordered without
authorization from one of the compromised accounts was relying
on a bank insider to provide him information. Under the
totality of the circumstances, the state commissioner had a
substantial basis to conclude that the supporting application
established probable cause, and we reject as unsupported by the
record Conteh’s assertion that probable cause is lacking because
the application contains a “significant misstatement” that she
was the individual who changed account information.
In addition, the district court alternatively
determined that, even if the supporting application did not
establish probable cause, suppression of the warrant and the
fruits from Conteh’s arrest was not warranted in light of the
arresting officer’s good faith reliance on the commissioner’s
determination of probable cause. United States v. Leon,
468 U.S. 897 (1984). Pursuant to the good faith exception under
Leon, evidence obtained from an invalid warrant will not be
suppressed if the officer’s reliance on the warrant was
“‘objectively reasonable.’” United States v. Perez, 393 F.3d
457, 461 (4th Cir. 2004) (quoting Leon, 468 U.S. at 922). Leon

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identifies four circumstances in which an officer’s reliance on
a warrant would not so qualify, only one of which Conteh invokes
here. Leon, 468 U.S. at 923 (noting that an officer’s reliance
on a warrant would not so qualify if the warrant was so facially
deficient that no reasonable officer could presume its
validity). We reject, however, as unsupported by the record
Conteh’s claim that the arrest warrant was facially deficient
because law enforcement agents knew she did not change account
information for the bank accounts.
Conteh also challenges the district court’s
qualification of a witness as an expert in Sierra Leoneon
Creole. We review a district court’s decision to qualify an
expert witness for abuse of discretion. United States v.
Garcia, 752 F.3d 382, 390 (4th Cir. 2014).
We reject Conteh’s contention that the witness was
unqualified as an expert in Sierra Leoneon Creole. Conteh takes
issue with the fact that the witness — who testified regarding
messages in Sierra Leoneon Creole extracted from the cellular
phone seized from her incident to her arrest — is not a
federally certified interpreter, does not hold degrees in the
language, never acted as a translator previously, and currently
works as a teacher in another field.
In undertaking its gatekeeper role to ensure that
evidence is reliable under Fed. R. Evid. 702, a district court

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“must decide whether the expert has ‘sufficient specialized
knowledge to assist the jurors in deciding the particular issues
in the case.’” Belk, Inc. v. Meyer Corp., U.S., 679 F.3d 146,
162 (4th Cir. 2012) (quoting Kumho Tire Co., Ltd. v. Carmichael,
526 U.S. 137, 156 (1999)). In making this decision, the court
should “consider the proposed expert’s full range of experience
and training.” United States v. Pansier, 576 F.3d 726, 737
(7th Cir. 2009).
Although the witness here is not a federally certified
interpreter, lack of formal certification by a professional
organization — although relevant to his expertise — is not
dispositive; Rule 702 “does not require any particular
imprimatur.” United States v. Gutierrez, 757 F.3d 785, 788
(8th Cir. 2014); see United States v. Barker, 553 F.2d 1013,
1024 (6th Cir. 1977). Further, although the witness works as a
teacher in another field, does not hold degrees in Sierra
Leoneon Creole, and had not acted as a translator for any
government agency prior to his involvement in Conteh’s case, we
conclude he was properly qualified as an expert in the language
based on his education and experience with the
language - including familiarity with its slang terms - and his
daily use of the language.
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment.
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal

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contentions are adequately presented in the materials before
this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED

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