Marvin Earl Williams, Jr. v. WILLIAM STANLEY, Superintendent, Johnston Correctional Institution

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 13-7720
MARVIN EARL WILLIAMS, JR.,
Petitioner – Appellant,
v.
WILLIAM STANLEY, Superintendent, Johnston Correctional
Institution,
Respondent - Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of North Carolina, at Raleigh. James C. Fox, Senior
District Judge. (5:99-hc-00123-F)
Submitted: July 31, 2014 Decided: August 20, 2014
Before NIEMEYER, KING, and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Mary Sheehan Pollard, Nicholas Collins Woomer-Deters, NORTH
CAROLINA PRISONER LEGAL SERVICES, INC., Raleigh, North Carolina,
for Appellant. Sandra Wallace-Smith, NORTH CAROLINA DEPARTMENT
OF JUSTICE, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

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PER CURIAM:
Marvin Earl Williams, Jr., was convicted in North
Carolina state court of first-degree murder, burglary with
explosives, and safecracking, and he was sentenced to death.*
Following state direct appeal and post-conviction proceedings,
Williams filed a 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2012) petition, raising
numerous claims. The district court granted summary judgment
against Williams as to all claims, but it granted a certificate
of appealability as to one claim: that trial counsel was
ineffective in failing to move for a mistrial or a hearing
following a juror’s request to be excused from the jury. On
appeal, Williams challenges the district court’s denial of
relief on that claim without an evidentiary hearing. For the
reasons that follow, we affirm.
A federal court may grant habeas corpus relief on a
claim adjudicated on the merits by a state court only if the
state court’s ruling was either (1) “contrary to, or involved an
unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as
determined by the Supreme Court,” or (2) “based on an
unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence
presented in the State court proceedings.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).
* The North Carolina Superior Court has since vacated
Williams’ death sentence and imposed a sentence of life
imprisonment, on grounds unrelated to this appeal.

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We review for abuse of discretion the decision to deny an
evidentiary hearing in a § 2254 proceeding. Wolfe v. Johnson,
565 F.3d 140, 160 (4th Cir. 2009).
We have recognized that a habeas petitioner
who has diligently pursued his habeas corpus claim in
state court is entitled to an evidentiary hearing in
federal court, on facts not previously developed in
the state court proceedings, if the facts alleged
would entitle him to relief, and if he satisfies one
of the six factors enumerated by the Supreme Court in
Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 313 (1963).
Wolfe, 565 F.3d at 168 (internal quotation marks omitted); see
Townsend, 372 U.S. at 313 (listing factors). In making this
determination, the reviewing court evaluates the petition under
the standards applicable to a Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) motion to
dismiss. Conaway v. Polk, 453 F.3d 567, 582 (4th Cir. 2006);
see Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 570 (2007)
(stating Rule 12(b)(6) standard).
On appeal, Williams does not allege that the facts
presented to the district court relative to the motion for
summary judgment entitle him to habeas relief. Nor does he
fairly challenge the district court’s consideration of his claim
under § 2254(d)’s deferential standard of review. Rather, he
argues that the district court erred in failing to hold an
evidentiary hearing, as he has both alleged facts which, if
true, are sufficient to warrant habeas relief and met several

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Townsend factors. By way of relief, he seeks only a remand to
the district court for an evidentiary hearing.
Even assuming Williams can meet the Townsend test,
however, he faces another hurdle to his request for a hearing.
The Supreme Court has held that “[i]f a claim has been
adjudicated on the merits by a state court, a federal habeas
petitioner must overcome the limitation of § 2254(d)(1) on the
record that was before that state court.” Cullen v. Pinholster,
131 S. Ct. 1388, 1400 (2011). In such a circumstance, any
evidentiary hearing in federal court is unwarranted, as new
evidence adduced during such a hearing could not be considered
in making the determination under § 2254(d)(1). Id. at 1399-
400.
We have reviewed the record and submissions of the
parties and conclude that the district court properly determined
that the state court adjudicated Williams’ claim on the merits.
See Winston v. Pearson, 683 F.3d 489, 502 (4th Cir. 2012).
Thus, under Pinholster, Williams is not entitled to adduce
evidence to support a claim under § 2254(d)(1). Moreover, under
§ 2254(d)(2), the court may only grant habeas relief when the
state court’s factual determination was unreasonable “in light
of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” Any
new evidence presented at an evidentiary hearing would not
entitle Williams to relief on his claim under § 2254(d)(2).

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Because Williams is not entitled to the only relief he
seeks on appeal, we affirm the district court’s judgment. We
deny Williams’ motion for appointment of counsel. We dispense
with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are
adequately presented in the materials before this court and
argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED

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