13-4736•United States of America v. Ornis Leger
13-4736Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit20 de out. de 2014
UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 13-4736
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff – Appellee,
v.
ORNIS LEGER,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western
District of North Carolina, at Charlotte. Max O. Cogburn, Jr.,
District Judge. (3:12-cr-00206-MOC-DSC-4)
Submitted: October 16, 2014 Decided: October 20, 2014
Before MOTZ, WYNN, and THACKER, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Peter C. Anderson, BEVERIDGE & DIAMOND, P.C., Charlotte, North
Carolina, for Appellant. Anne M. Tompkins, United States
Attorney, William M. Miller, Assistant United States Attorney,
Charlotte, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:
Ornis Leger appeals from the criminal judgment imposed
after a jury found him guilty of conspiracy to possess with
intent to distribute more than 100 kilograms of marijuana and
possession with intent to distribute marijuana. Leger contends
that there was insufficient evidence to convict him of the two
counts. He also alleges that the district court erred in
denying him the benefit of the safety valve provision at
sentencing. Finding no error, we affirm.
A jury verdict must by sustained when “there is
substantial evidence in the record, when viewed in the light
most favorable to the government, to support the conviction.”
United States v. Jaensch, 665 F.3d 83, 93 (4th Cir. 2011)
(internal quotation marks omitted). “Substantial evidence is
evidence that a reasonable finder of fact could accept as
adequate and sufficient to support a conclusion of a defendant’s
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. (alteration and internal
quotation marks omitted). Our review of the record persuades us
that substantial evidence supports Leger’s convictions.
Leger next contends that the district court improperly
denied him the benefit of the safety valve, which permits a
sentence pursuant to the Sentencing Guidelines range without
regard to any statutory minimum sentence. To benefit from the
safety valve, the defendant bears the burden of showing that he
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meets the five requirements set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f)
(2012) and U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 5C1.2(a) (2012).
United States v. Henry, 673 F.3d 285, 292-95 (4th Cir. 2012).
We review the district court’s determination concerning
eligibility for safety valve relief for clear error. Id. at
292.
It is undisputed that Leger met the first four
requirements. The issue before us is whether he also met the
fifth requirement of truthful and complete disclosure. See 18
U.S.C. § 3553(f)(5), USSG § 5C1.2(a)(5). To satisfy this
requirement, the defendant must truthfully disclose all
information he has “about the offense of conviction and any
other crimes that constitute relevant conduct.” United
States v. Aidoo, 670 F.3d 600, 610 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 133
S. Ct. 627 (2012).
We conclude that the district court did not clearly
err in denying Leger the benefit of the safety valve. Leger,
who claimed that he thought he was unloading furniture and not
marijuana, was found not to be credible by the jury and the
sentencing judge. He was stopped by DEA agents with
approximately 750 pounds of marijuana in his van after assisting
in the unloading of the shipment with his co-conspirators.
Although Leger consistently stated that he thought the shipment
was to be furniture; consistency is not the sole indicator of
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truthful disclosure. Leger therefore failed to satisfy the
requirement that the defendant truthfully disclose all
information he has about the offense and relevant conduct. See
USSG § 5C1.2(a)(5); Aidoo, 670 F.3d at 610.
We therefore affirm. We dispense with oral argument
because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented
in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the
decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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