United States of America v. Ravar Carjon Harris

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 13-4463
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff – Appellee,
v.
RAVAR CARJON HARRIS,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle
District of North Carolina, at Greensboro. James A. Beaty, Jr.,
District Judge. (1:12-cr-00258-JAB-1)
Submitted: January 30, 2014 Decided: February 11, 2014
Before NIEMEYER, AGEE, and THACKER, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
John Carlyle Sherrill, III, SHERRILL & CAMERON, PLLC, Salisbury,
North Carolina, for Appellant. Terry Michael Meinecke,
Assistant United States Attorney, Greensboro, North Carolina,
for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

-- 1 of 5 --

2
PER CURIAM:
Ravar Carjon Harris appeals his conviction after a
jury found him guilty of possession of a firearm by a felon, in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (2012). Counsel has filed a
brief pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967),
finding no meritorious grounds for appeal but questioning
whether the district court erred by denying Harris’ motion to
suppress. Harris was notified of his right to file a pro se
supplemental brief, but he has not done so. Finding no error,
we affirm.
In considering the denial of a motion to suppress,
this court reviews the district court’s legal conclusions de
novo and its factual findings for clear error. United States v.
Foster, 634 F.3d 243, 246 (4th Cir. 2011). “We [also] defer to
the district court’s credibility determinations, for it is the
role of the district court to observe witnesses and weigh their
credibility during a pre-trial motion to suppress.” United
States v. McGee, 736 F.3d 263, 270 (4th Cir. 2013) (internal
quotation marks omitted). When a motion to suppress has been
denied by the district court, “[w]e . . . construe the evidence
in the light most favorable to the Government, the prevailing
party below.” Foster, 634 F.3d at 246.
The district court properly denied Harris’ motion to
suppress. It is well established that “the police can stop and

-- 2 of 5 --

3
briefly detain a person for investigative purposes if the
officer has a reasonable suspicion supported by articulable
facts that criminal activity ‘may be afoot,’ even if the officer
lacks probable cause.” United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7
(1989) (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968)). In
assessing the validity of a Terry stop, “we consider the
totality of the circumstances[,] . . . giv[ing] due weight to
common sense judgments reached by officers in light of their
experience and training.” United States v. Perkins, 363 F.3d
317, 321 (4th Cir. 2004).
We conclude that the officer in this case had
reasonable suspicion to justify a Terry stop based on several
factors, such as “the context of the stop, the crime rate in the
area, and the nervous or evasive behavior of the suspect.”
United States v. George, 732 F.3d 296, 299 (4th Cir. 2013)
(citing Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 124 (2000)).
Moreover, “multiple factors may be taken together to create a
reasonable suspicion even where each factor, taken alone, would
be insufficient.” Id. at 300.
Here, the officer observed Harris walking in a
high-crime area of the city known for drug activity where
additional patrols had been ordered, even during the daytime
hours. See id. The officer also considered that, after making
eye contact with Harris, Harris pulled the hood over his head

-- 3 of 5 --

4
and walked away from the officer into a nearby wooded area. See
United States v. Bumpers, 705 F.3d 168, 175 (4th Cir.) (“[A]
defendant’s flight upon seeing a police car in a high-crime area
was enough to create a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity
sufficient to justify a Terry stop.”) (citing Wardlow, 528 U.S.
at 124-25)), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 218 (2013). Taken
together, we conclude that these circumstances are articulable
facts from which the officer, based on his training and
experience, could form a reasonable suspicion justifying Harris’
initial stop. Thus, the district court properly denied Harris’
motion to suppress.
In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the record
in this case and have found no meritorious grounds for appeal.
We therefore affirm the district court’s judgment. This court
requires that counsel inform Harris in writing of the right to
petition the Supreme Court of the United States for further
review. If Harris requests that a petition be filed, but
counsel believes that such a petition would be frivolous, then
counsel may move in this court for leave to withdraw from
representation. Counsel’s motion must state that a copy thereof
was served on Harris.
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and
legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials

-- 4 of 5 --

5
before this court and argument would not aid the decisional
process.
AFFIRMED

-- 5 of 5 --