United States of America v. Dallas McKoy Harris

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 13-4023
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
DALLAS MCKOY HARRIS,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of North Carolina, at Raleigh. Terrence W. Boyle,
District Judge. (5:02-cr-00202-BO-1)
Submitted: March 27, 2014 Decided: April 8, 2014
Before NIEMEYER, KING, and AGEE, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam.
Thomas P. McNamara, Federal Public Defender, Stephen C. Gordon,
Assistant Federal Public Defender, Raleigh, North Carolina, for
Appellant. Thomas G. Walker, United States Attorney, Jennifer
P. May-Parker, Kristine L. Fritz, Assistant United States
Attorneys, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

-- 1 of 5 --

2
PER CURIAM:
Dallas McKoy Harris pled guilty to conspiracy to
distribute and possess with intent to distribute at least 50
grams of cocaine base. In January 2003, the district court
sentenced Harris to 144 months’ imprisonment, to be followed by
60 months of supervised release. This sentence was subsequently
reduced to 120 months pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c) (2012).
In March 2011, Harris was released from incarceration.
In June 2012, the probation officer moved for
revocation of Harris’ supervised release, alleging that Harris
committed four violations of his supervised release. Harris
admitted to the Grade C violations alleged, but disputed the
charged Grade A violation of trafficking in cocaine base. After
a hearing, the district court found that Harris committed all
four charged violations. The court revoked supervised release
and imposed a thirty-month sentence of imprisonment. Harris
appeals, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to support
the finding that he violated his supervised release by
trafficking in cocaine base. Finding no clear error, we affirm.
We review a district court’s decision to revoke
supervised release for abuse of discretion. United States v.
Pregent, 190 F.3d 279, 282 (4th Cir. 1999). To revoke release,
the district court must find a violation of a condition of
release by a preponderance of the evidence. 18 U.S.C.

-- 2 of 5 --

3
§ 3583(e)(3) (2012). We review for clear error factual findings
underlying the conclusion that a violation of the terms of
supervised release occurred. See United States v. Carothers,
337 F.3d 1017, 1019 (8th Cir. 2003).
We conclude that the district court did not abuse its
discretion in finding that Harris violated the conditions of
supervised release by trafficking in cocaine. The government
presented evidence that Harris was driving a vehicle from which
79 grams of crack cocaine was thrown. A Raleigh police officer
stopped the vehicle and detained Harris and his two passengers.
One passenger was found in possession of 27 grams of cocaine and
a sum of money. Cocaine residue was found on a black tray under
the front passenger seat.
Harris denied knowing that there was cocaine in the
vehicle and denied having seen the 79 grams of crack being
thrown from the truck. Harris was charged in state court with
trafficking cocaine by possession by vehicle and conspiracy to
traffic cocaine. He pled guilty to misdemeanor maintaining a
vehicle for the storage of a controlled substance.
Based on this evidence, the district court found it
more likely than not that Harris was involved in the trafficking
of crack cocaine. The North Carolina offense of trafficking of
cocaine requires proof that the defendant was in possession of
28 grams or more of cocaine. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 90-95(h)(3).

-- 3 of 5 --

4
Possession can be actual or constructive. United States v.
Burgos, 94 F.3d 849, 873 (4th Cir. 1996). Constructive
possession can be shown by evidence of dominion and control over
the drugs themselves or over the premises or vehicle in which
the contraband is found. United States v. Blue, 957 F.2d 106,
107 (4th Cir. 1992).
Viewed in the light most favorable to the Government,
see United States v. Green, 599 F.3d 360, 367 (4th Cir. 2010),
the evidence established each of the elements of trafficking.
The amount of cocaine base exceeded 28 grams, and Harris pled
guilty in state court to maintaining a vehicle for the storage
of a controlled substances, thus establishing his knowledge of
the presence of the drugs. See State v. Simpson, 748 S.E.2d
756, 759 (N.C. App. 2013). This evidence, along with the fact
that Harris was driving the vehicle in which crack cocaine was
found and from which the crack cocaine was thrown, supports the
district court’s finding that it was more likely than not that
Harris knowingly possessed—either actually or constructively—
more than 28 grams of crack cocaine, and thus violated the
conditions of his supervised release by trafficking.
Accordingly, we find no clear error in the district
court’s determination the Harris committed the Grade A violation
of his supervised release. See United States v. White, 620 F.3d
401, 410 (4th Cir. 2010); see also United States v. Stevenson,

-- 4 of 5 --

5
396 F.3d 538, 542 (4th Cir. 2005) (providing that court of
appeals will not reverse factual finding if district court’s
view of the evidence is plausible in light of the totality of
the evidence, even if the appeals court would have resolved the
facts differently).
We therefore affirm the revocation judgment and the
30-month sentence. We dispense with oral argument because the
facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the
materials before this court and argument would not aid the
decisional process.
AFFIRMED

-- 5 of 5 --