Glenn Arrington v. E.r. Williams, Inc.; E. Randy Williams, Jr.

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 12-6123
GLENN ARRINGTON,
Plaintiff – Appellant,
v.
E.R. WILLIAMS, INC.; E. RANDY WILLIAMS, JR.,
Defendants – Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia, at Alexandria. James C. Cacheris, Senior
District Judge. (1:11-cv-00535-JCC-TCB)
Submitted: May 17, 2012 Decided: August 1, 2012
Before AGEE, DAVIS, and DIAZ, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
David Ludwig, DUNLAP, GRUBB & WEAVER, PC, Leesburg, Virginia;
Henri T. Hammond, Washington, D.C., for Appellant. Teresa Burke
Wright, Amanda Vaccaro, JACKSON LEWIS, LLP, Reston, Virginia,
for Appellees.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

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PER CURIAM:
Glenn Arrington sued E.R. Williams, Inc. (“ERW”) and
its CEO, E. Randy Williams, Jr., alleging that they terminated
his employment on account of race, in contravention of federal
law. The district court entered summary judgment in favor of
ERW and Williams (“Appellees”), and Arrington appealed.
Agreeing with the district court that Arrington has failed to
establish a prima facie case of discrimination, we affirm.
I.
A.
A federal contractor, ERW provides financial and
administrative services and support to government agencies.
Arrington, an African American, joined ERW’s Virginia office as
an employee, becoming the program manager for the company’s
contract to staff the TRICARE Management Activity and Health
Affairs Front Offices. In this capacity, Arrington was
responsible for fostering client relationships, managing
employees, and developing business.
After receiving reports that Kelli Anthony, a former
ERW employee, had accused Arrington of sexual harassment,
Williams, an African American, placed Arrington on
administrative leave in April 2010. Williams then hired an

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outside contractor to investigate Anthony’s allegations and
other evidence of Arrington’s misconduct in the workplace.
The ensuing investigative report cataloged accounts
from four subordinates of Arrington at ERW, all of whom accused
him of improprieties. Cheryl Thomas stated that Arrington made
false promises about the position that she filled, assuring her
that it would involve research analysis when it was actually
purely administrative. According to Thomas, Arrington also
promised that he would ensure that she received additional pay
for overtime hours, but he failed to keep that promise. Anthony
repeated her assertions that Arrington sexually harassed her,
making unwanted sexual advances toward her, asking her out on
dates several times, and calling her “at all hours of the
night.” J.A. 146. Nneka Pray stated that Arrington approached
attractive women to encourage them to work for ERW and then
changed his favored candidates’ résumés to meet qualifications.
A final employee, Jennifer Sheppard, alleged that Arrington
induced her to leave her prior employment to join ERW in a
position for which he knew that she was not qualified. Although
Arrington repeatedly assured her that she could handle the
duties, Sheppard was ultimately discharged for inadequate
performance.
At the same time that the investigation was taking
place, ERW executives received complaints about Arrington from

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three separate clients. All three clients informed the
executives that they did not want Arrington to continue to do
any work in their offices.
Initially hesitant to discharge Arrington, Williams
sought counsel from his attorney and two ERW executives, all of
whom recommended terminating Arrington’s employment. Williams
agreed that Arrington could not continue in his current
position, a decision that he characterized as grounded in “what
[he] thought was right and what was at risk for [his] company.”
Id. 600. Based on the results of the investigation, Williams
concluded that Arrington “was a liability to the company” and
that his continued employment would “create unrest within the
employees . . . [and] with the clients.” Id. 643. At bottom,
Williams thought that the numerous complaints from employees and
clients alike revealed Arrington’s ineffective leadership.
But rather than discharge Arrington outright, Williams
offered to transfer him to ERW’s Huntsville, Alabama office. In
a May 27 email, ERW gave Arrington a little over a week to
either accept the transfer offer or face termination from the
company. On June 15, ERW reiterated to Arrington that he would
be terminated if he declined to accept the Alabama position.
After he refused the new position, ERW officially discharged
Arrington on June 17 for his “inability to be an effective
manager and leader.” Id. 198.

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B.
Arrington responded to his discharge by filing suit in
the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia.
He alleged that ERW and Williams discharged him on account of
his race, in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981.1
Appellees moved for summary judgment. Holding that
Arrington had failed to establish a prima facie case of
employment discrimination, the district court entered summary
judgment in favor of Appellees. Arrington timely noted this
appeal.
II.
Arrington first challenges the district court’s
consideration of several pieces of evidence. Ascertaining no
abuse of discretion in the district court’s evidentiary rulings,
see King v. McMillan, 594 F.3d 301, 310 (4th Cir. 2010), we
reject Arrington’s claims.
Arrington argues principally that much of the evidence
relied on by the district court was hearsay that should not
have been considered. This contention, however, flows from a
misunderstanding of hearsay. Under the Federal Rules of
1
Arrington’s initial complaint included a count alleging
defamation, but he struck that claim from his amended complaint.

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Evidence, “hearsay” is, in critical part, a statement that “a
party offers in evidence to prove the truth of the matter
asserted in the statement.” Fed. R. Evid. 801(c). It follows,
then, that a statement is not hearsay where the proponent offers
it not to prove the truth of the matter asserted but rather for
another purpose. Here, as the district court properly ruled,
evidence of employee and client complaints about Arrington’s
performance was considered because ERW and Williams’s
“decisionmaking was under challenge, and [they] explained it on
the basis of the information [they] received,” Crockett v.
Abraham, 284 F.3d 131, 134 (D.C. Cir. 2002). Where, as here,
“third-party statements concerning the plaintiff’s performance
are offered not for the truth of the matters asserted therein,
but as an explanation of why [the employer] believed that
terminating the plaintiff’s employment . . . was necessary and
appropriate,” evidentiary rules governing the consideration of
hearsay are not implicated. See Royall v. Nat’l Ass’n of Letter
Carriers, 507 F. Supp. 2d 93, 98 n.10 (D.D.C. 2007).2
2
Arrington also maintains that the evidence of employee and
client complaints was not relevant. Alternatively, he claims
that the district court should have refused to consider the
evidence because the danger of unfair prejudice substantially
outweighed the probative value of the evidence. Arrington,
however, did not raise these grounds for objection before the
district court and thus has waived them on appeal.

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III.
Arrington next contends that the district court erred
in granting summary judgment to Appellees. We review de novo
the district court’s grant of summary judgment, viewing the
facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. EEOC
v. Xerxes Corp., 639 F.3d 658, 668 (4th Cir. 2011). Summary
judgment is appropriate if the moving party “shows that there is
no genuine dispute as to any material fact” and that it is
“entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed R. Civ. P.
56(a). “The mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in
support of the plaintiff’s position will be insufficient; there
must be evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the
plaintiff.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252
(1986). A nonmoving party cannot resist summary judgment
“‘through mere speculation or the building of one inference upon
another.’ ” Othentec Ltd. v. Phelan, 526 F.3d 135, 140 (4th Cir.
2008) (citation omitted); see also Francis v. Booz, Allen &
Hamilton, Inc., 452 F.3d 299, 308 (4th Cir. 2006) (“Mere
unsupported speculation is not sufficient to defeat a summary
judgment motion if the undisputed evidence indicates that the
other party should win as a matter of law.”).
Arrington maintains that he has met his burden of
proving a prima facie case of employment discrimination. We

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find Arrington’s contentions meritless and accordingly affirm
the district court’s grant of summary judgment.
A plaintiff alleging discriminatory discharge must
establish a prima facie case. King v. Rumsfeld, 328 F.3d 145,
149 (4th Cir. 2003). A prima facie case of employment
discrimination comprises four elements: (1) membership in a
protected class; (2) adverse employment action; (3) performance
at a level meeting the employer’s legitimate expectations at the
time of the adverse employment action; and (4) more favorable
treatment given similarly situated employees outside of the
protected class. See Gerner v. Cnty. of Chesterfield, 674 F.3d
264, 266 (4th Cir. 2012); King, 328 F.3d at 149. In evaluating
whether a plaintiff has met his burden of demonstrating a prima
facie case of employment discrimination, our focus is on the
perception of the decision maker. Evans v. Techs. Applications
& Serv. Co., 80 F.3d 954, 960–61 (4th Cir. 1996).
Because Arrington has failed to show that his job
performance at ERW met ERW’s legitimate expectations at the time
of his discharge, we hold that he has not satisfied his burden
of establishing a prima facie case of employment discrimination.
During the approximately six weeks that Arrington was on
administrative leave, Williams and other ERW executives received
a wealth of evidence detailing Arrington’s misconduct in the
workplace. Four of Arrington’s subordinates lodged complaints

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about Arrington’s job performance, including one employee’s
allegations that Arrington sexually harassed her. Moreover,
three of ERW’s clients expressed dissatisfaction with
Arrington’s work, directing ERW to remove him from any work
involving them. Reviewing these complaints, Williams and other
ERW supervisors felt that Arrington was unfit to continue work
in his position at the Virginia office. Arrington has simply
proffered no evidence that he was meeting ERW’s expectations at
the time of his discharge or that ERW and Williams harbored any
nefarious motives in terminating his employment. Arrington is
thus unable to resist summary judgment.3
IV.
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of
the district court. We dispense with oral argument because the
facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the
materials before the court and argument would not aid the
decisional process.
AFFIRMED
3
Because we conclude that Arrington has failed to
demonstrate adequate job performance, we need not address his
other challenges to the district court’s decision.

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