United States of America v. Luis Fernandez Jauregui Madriz, a/k/a Jose Luis Gonzalez Gonzalez

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 12-4704
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
LUIS FERNANDEZ JAUREGUI MADRIZ, a/k/a Jose Luis Gonzalez
Gonzalez,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
Maryland, at Baltimore. James K. Bredar, District Judge.
(1:11-cr-00096-JKB-3)
Submitted: June 17, 2013 Decided: July 9, 2013
Before TRAXLER, Chief Judge, and WILKINSON and MOTZ, Circuit
Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Barbara E. Kittay, Rockville, Maryland, for Appellant. Rod J.
Rosenstein, United States Attorney, Joshua L. Kaul, Assistant
United States Attorney, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

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PER CURIAM:
A jury convicted Luis Fernandez Jauregui Madriz of
possession with intent to distribute cocaine and cocaine base,
in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). Madriz appeals,
asserting that the district court erred in denying his motion to
suppress the cocaine found on his person during a directed
traffic stop. We affirm.
I.
Based on calls intercepted during an investigation into a
drug organization, federal law enforcement officers had
information that on February 6, 2010, Madriz would pick up a
quantity of narcotics to deliver to a supplier. On that day,
the officers watched Madriz’s home and followed him when he and
his father left in a car.
At the direction of the federal officers, the Maryland
State Police stopped the vehicle on the Baltimore-Washington
Parkway. One of the state police officers asked Madriz’s
father, who was driving, if there was anything illegal in the
car, and Madriz’s father nodded. Soon thereafter, the state
police officers removed Madriz and his father from the vehicle,
and a drug-detection canine alerted the police to the presence
of narcotics in the vehicle. The officers searched the vehicle

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but did not discover any weapons or contraband. A pat down of
Madriz and his father had also yielded negative results.
Officer Daniel Peterson subsequently conducted an
additional search of Madriz. Officer Peterson testified that he
detected a hard bulge near Madriz’s groin area, and that Madriz
initially denied that he was concealing anything. Officer
Peterson testified that he then moved to undo Madriz’s belt, at
which point Madriz admitted that he had drugs. According to
Officer Peterson, he then undid Madriz’s pants and removed from
Madriz’s underwear what turned out to be a 131.1 gram package of
cocaine.
Madriz moved to suppress the cocaine, contending that the
state police officers performed an unlawful search and seizure.
The district court denied the motion. A jury subsequently
convicted Madriz of the charged crime. Madriz’s sole appellate
challenge is to the denial of his motion to suppress.
II.
“We review a district court’s factual findings underlying a
motion to suppress for clear error, and the court’s legal
determinations de novo.” United States v. Edwards, 666 F.3d
877, 882 (4th Cir. 2011). “When a motion to suppress has been
denied, we review the evidence in the light most favorable to
the government.” Id.

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A.
On appeal, Madriz first contends that the district court
should have suppressed the cocaine because the Maryland State
Police lacked authority to conduct the stop at that location on
the Baltimore-Washington Parkway, which is within exclusive
federal jurisdiction. In rejecting this argument, the district
court reasoned that the state police officers acted at the
“behest and direction and under the direct and immediate
supervision” of federal agents who did have authority, and who
had probable cause to believe that Madriz was involved in a drug
conspiracy. Tr. of Motions Hr’g 221-22.
Madriz does not contest the district court’s finding that
the stop was supported by probable cause. And, under the
circumstances of this case, the fact that the state police acted
in an area of exclusive federal jurisdiction does not render the
stop unreasonable. See United States v. Mason, 52 F.3d 1286,
1289 n.5 (4th Cir. 1995) (rejecting argument that drug
paraphernalia seized by customs officers technically
unauthorized to conduct search had to be suppressed, because the
lack of authorization “d[id] not rise to the level of a
constitutional violation” under the circumstances); United
States v. DiCesare, 765 F.2d 890, 897 (9th Cir. 1985) (refusing
to suppress evidence on the basis that customs officer who
obtained search warrant may have lacked authority to do so,

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where authorized officials participated in the investigation and
executed the warrant). Thus, the district court did not err in
finding that the stop was reasonable.
B.
Madriz next argues that the district court should have
suppressed the cocaine because the search of his underwear,
which led to the seizure of the cocaine, was unreasonable.
Again, we disagree.
To determine whether a search is reasonable, “we examine
the search in its complete context and consider the following
factors: 1) the place in which the search was conducted; 2) the
scope of the particular intrusion; 3) the manner in which the
search was conducted; and 4) the justification for initiating
the search.” Edwards, 666 F.3d at 883.
The place of the search -- along the busy Baltimore-
Washington Parkway in the afternoon -- cuts in favor of
suppression. “We have repeatedly emphasized the necessity of
conducting a strip search in private.” Edwards, 666 F.3d at 883
(internal quotation marks omitted).
However, the remaining factors dictate our conclusion that
the district court did not err in finding the search reasonable.
First, the search was justified. We agree with the district
court that the police had probable cause to arrest Madriz for
conspiracy to distribute narcotics prior to the second pat down

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by Officer Peterson. Tr. of Motions Hr’g 215. Therefore, even
though that search preceded Madriz’s formal arrest, the search
was nonetheless justified as a search incident to his arrest.
See Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 111 (1980); United States
v. Han, 74 F.3d 537, 541 (4th Cir. 1996) (“A search may be
incident to a subsequent arrest if the officers have probable
cause to arrest before the search.”); United States v. Miller,
925 F.2d 695, 698 (4th Cir. 1991).
Further, both the scope and the manner of the search were
reasonable. During the pat down, Officer Peterson identified a
hard object in Madriz’s groin area; Officer Peterson limited the
scope of his subsequent search to that area. Officer Peterson
first asked Madriz what the object was; not believing Madriz’s
answer, Officer Peterson moved to unbuckle Madriz’s belt, at
which point Madriz informed the officer that the object was
drugs. Officer Peterson checked the space between Madriz’s
pants and underwear before briefly pulling out Madriz’s
underwear and discovering and removing the cocaine. Officer
Peterson proceeded cautiously at every step of the search, and
at no point did the search threaten Madriz’s safety. Compare
Edwards, 666 F.3d at 885 (finding a strip search unreasonable
because the search “posed a significant and an unnecessary risk
of injury” to the defendant). Accordingly, the district court
did not err in finding the search reasonable.

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III.
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm. We dispense with
oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are
adequately presented in the materials before this court and
argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED

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