11-4767•United States of America v. Michael Ray Jessup, a/k/a Michael Gray Jessup
11-4767Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit19 de mar. de 2012
UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 11-4767
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
MICHAEL RAY JESSUP, a/k/a Michael Gray Jessup,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle
District of North Carolina, at Greensboro. N. Carlton Tilley,
Jr., Senior District Judge. (1:10-cr-00351-NCT-1)
Submitted: March 15, 2012 Decided: March 19, 2012
Before DUNCAN and FLOYD, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior
Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Louis C. Allen III, Federal Public Defender, William S.
Trivette, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Greensboro, North
Carolina, for Appellant. Ripley Rand, United States Attorney,
Angela H. Miller, Assistant United States Attorney, Greensboro,
North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
-- 1 of 3 --
2
PER CURIAM:
Michael Ray Jessup pled guilty to being a felon in
possession of a firearm. The district court sentenced him to
188 months’ imprisonment. Jessup contends on appeal that the
sentence is unreasonable because it is greater than necessary to
accomplish the goals of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2006). We find
that the sentence is reasonable and therefore affirm.
We review a sentence imposed by a district court for
reasonableness, applying a deferential abuse-of-discretion
standard. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 46, 51 (2007).
Such review requires consideration of both the procedural and
substantive reasonableness of a sentence. Id. at 41; see United
States v. Carter, 564 F.3d 325, 328 (4th Cir. 2009).
The district court followed the necessary procedural
steps in sentencing Jessup, appropriately treated the Sentencing
Guidelines as advisory, properly calculated and considered the
applicable Guidelines range, and weighed the relevant 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(a) factors. We examine the substantive reasonableness of
a sentence under the totality of the circumstances. United
States v. Pauley, 511 F.3d 468, 473 (4th Cir. 2007). Here, the
district court considered the relevant sentencing factors,
specifically noting that Jessup had a history of violent
offenses, that he posed a significant danger when in possession
of firearms, and that, upon his arrest, he had the shotgun
-- 2 of 3 --
3
strapped to his leg and he was also in possession of a sheath
knife.
This court accords a sentence within a properly
calculated Guidelines range an appellate presumption of
reasonableness. United States v. Mendoza-Mendoza, 597 F.3d 212,
216 (4th Cir. 2010). Such a presumption is rebutted only by
showing “that the sentence is unreasonable when measured against
the [§ 3553(a)] factors.” United States v. Montes-Pineda, 445
F.3d 375, 379 (4th Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks
omitted). We conclude that the district court’s consideration
of the § 3553(a) factors and imposition of the 188-month,
within-Guidelines sentence was reasonable and not an abuse of
discretion. See Gall, 552 U.S. at 41; United States v. Allen,
491 F.3d 178, 193 (4th Cir. 2007) (applying appellate
presumption of reasonableness to within-Guidelines sentence).
Accordingly, we affirm the 188-month sentence. We
dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the
court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
-- 3 of 3 --
Conecte o Omnilex para pesquisar o corpus jurídico pelo seu assistente de IA.