Lee Young v. North Carolina Agricultural & Technical State University

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 11-1244
LEE YOUNG,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
NORTH CAROLINA AGRICULTURAL & TECHNICAL STATE UNIVERSITY;
BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF NORTH CAROLINA;
STANLEY BATTLE,
Defendants - Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle
District of North Carolina, at Greensboro. William L. Osteen,
Jr., District Judge. (1:08-cv-00894-WO-PTS)
Submitted: December 16, 2011 Decided: January 4, 2012
Before WILKINSON, NIEMEYER, and MOTZ, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Jonathan Wall, ROBERTSON MEDLIN & BLOSS, PLLC, Greensboro, North
Carolina, for Appellant. Roy Cooper, North Carolina Attorney
General, Stephanie A. Brennan, Assistant Attorney General,
Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellees.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

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PER CURIAM:
Lee Young appeals the district court’s order granting
summary judgment in favor of North Carolina Agricultural and
Technical State University, the Board of Governors of the
University of North Carolina, and Stanley Battle (collectively
“the University”) on Young’s claims pursuant to the Family
Medical Leave Act of 1993, 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2654 (2006)
(“FMLA”). Young alleges that the University retaliated against
him for asserting his right to leave under the FMLA by
terminating his employment and ceasing its efforts to find him
another position with the University. After the University
moved for summary judgment, the district court found that Young
had failed to establish a prima facie case of retaliation and
granted the motion. We affirm.
We review de novo a district court’s order granting
summary judgment. See Robinson v. Clipse, 602 F.3d 605, 607
(4th Cir. 2010). In doing so, we must draw all reasonable
inferences in the light most favorable to the non-moving party.
Id. Summary judgment may be granted when “there is no genuine
dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A
district court should grant summary judgment unless a reasonable
jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party on the
evidence presented. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477

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U.S. 242, 249 (1986). An otherwise properly supported motion
for summary judgment will not be defeated by the existence of
some factual dispute; only disputes over facts that might affect
the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly
preclude the entry of summary judgment. Id. at 248-49. Mere
conclusory allegations are insufficient to support the non-
moving party’s case. Erwin v. United States, 591 F.3d 313, 319
(4th Cir. 2010).
It is unlawful for an employer “to interfere with,
restrain, or deny the exercise of or the attempt to exercise,
any right provided under [the FMLA].” 29 U.S.C. § 2615(a)(1)
(2006). The FMLA also prohibits an employer from discriminating
against or discharging an employee for asserting rights under
the Act. 29 U.S.C. § 2615(a)(2) (2006). Thus, § 2615(a)(2) is
broadly interpreted as prohibiting “retaliation” by employers
based on an employee’s exercise of his FMLA rights. Yashenko v.
Harrah’s N.C. Casino Co., LLC, 446 F.3d 541, 546 (4th Cir.
2006). FMLA retaliation claims, like the one Young asserts, are
generally evaluated under the McDonnell Douglas∗
∗ McDonnell Douglas v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
burden-shifting
framework. Id. at 551. To establish a prima facie case of FMLA
retaliation, a plaintiff must show “that he engaged in protected
activity, that the employer took adverse action against him, and

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that the adverse action was causally connected to the
plaintiff’s protected activity.” Id.
Although Young engaged in protected activity, he has
not produced sufficient evidence tending to show an adverse
action on the part of the University or its employees. At the
time of the events in question, Young no longer held a position
with the University from which he could be terminated.
Furthermore, contrary to Young’s argument, the record does not
suggest that the University ceased any ongoing or sustained
process to find another position for him or that it declined to
consider him for employment in other open positions.
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the district
court’s judgment. We dispense with oral argument because the
facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the
materials before this court and argument would not aid the
decisional process.
AFFIRMED

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