Jose Angel Contreras; Santos Elmer Contreras-Guevara; Xiomara Yesenia Contreras-Guevara v. ERIC H. HOLDER, JR., Attorney General

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 10-1875
JOSE ANGEL CONTRERAS; SANTOS ELMER CONTRERAS-GUEVARA;
XIOMARA YESENIA CONTRERAS-GUEVARA,
Petitioners,
v.
ERIC H. HOLDER, JR., Attorney General,
Respondent.
On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration
Appeals.
Submitted: March 9, 2011 Decided: March 28, 2011
Before GREGORY, KEENAN, and WYNN, Circuit Judges.
Petition denied by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Germaine Wright Sobral, MONTAGUT & SOBRAL, P.C., Falls Church,
Virginia, for Petitioners. Tony West, Assistant Attorney
General, John S. Hogan, Senior Litigation Counsel, Aimee J.
Frederickson, Office of Immigration Litigation, UNITED STATES
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Washington, D.C., for Respondent.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

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PER CURIAM:
Jose Angel Contreras (“Contreras”) and his children,
Petitioners Santos Elmer Contreras-Guevara (“Santos”) and
Xiomara Yesenia Contreras-Guevara (“Xiomara”), natives and
citizens of El Salvador, petition for review of orders of the
Board of Immigration Appeals (“Board”) dismissing their appeals
from the immigration judge’s order denying their applications
for asylum, withholding of removal and withholding under the
Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). We deny the petition for
review.
The Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”) authorizes
the Attorney General to confer asylum on any refugee. 8 U.S.C.
§ 1158(a) (2006). It defines a refugee as a person unwilling or
unable to return to her native country “because of persecution
or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race,
religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group,
or political opinion.” 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A) (2006).
“Persecution involves the infliction or threat of death,
torture, or injury to one’s person or freedom, on account of one
of the enumerated grounds . . . .” Li v. Gonzales, 405 F.3d
171, 177 (4th Cir. 2005) (internal quotation marks and citations
omitted).
An alien “bear[s] the burden of proving eligibility
for asylum,” Naizgi v. Gonzales, 455 F.3d 484, 486 (4th Cir.

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2006); see 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(a) (2010), and can establish
refugee status based on past persecution in her native country
on account of a protected ground. 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(1)
(2010). “An applicant who demonstrates that he was the subject
of past persecution is presumed to have a well-founded fear of
persecution.” Ngarurih v. Ashcroft, 371 F.3d 182, 187 (4th Cir.
2004). Without regard to past persecution, an alien can
establish a well-founded fear of persecution on a protected
ground. Id. The well-founded fear standard contains both a
subjective and an objective component. The objective element
requires a showing of specific, concrete facts that would lead a
reasonable person in like circumstances to fear persecution.
Gandziami-Mickhou v. Gonzales, 445 F.3d 351, 353 (4th Cir.
2006). “The subjective component can be met through the
presentation of candid, credible, and sincere testimony
demonstrating a genuine fear of persecution . . . . [It] must
have some basis in the reality of the circumstances and be
validated with specific, concrete facts . . . and it cannot be
mere irrational apprehension.” Li, 405 F.3d at 176 (internal
quotation marks and citations omitted).
To establish eligibility for withholding of removal,
an alien must show a clear probability that, if she was removed
to her native country, her “life or freedom would be threatened”
on a protected ground. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(A) (2006); see

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Camara v. Ashcroft, 378 F.3d 361, 370 (4th Cir. 2004). A “clear
probability” means that it is more likely than not that the
alien would be subject to persecution. INS v. Stevic, 467 U.S.
407, 429-30 (1984). Unlike asylum, withholding of removal is
mandatory for anyone who establishes that their “life or freedom
would be threatened . . . because of [their] race, religion,
nationality, membership in a particular social group, or
political opinion.” 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(A) (2006).
The protected ground must be a central reason for
being targeted for persecution. A central reason is one that is
more than “‘incidental, tangential, superficial, or subordinate
to another reason for harm.’” See Quinteros-Mendoza v. Holder,
556 F.3d 159, 164 (4th Cir. 2009) (quoting In re J-B-N-, 24 I. &
N. Dec. 208, 214 (BIA 2007)).
A determination regarding eligibility for asylum or
withholding of removal is affirmed if supported by substantial
evidence on the record considered as a whole. INS v. Elias-
Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 481 (1992). Administrative findings of
fact, including findings on credibility, are conclusive unless
any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to decide to the
contrary. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B) (2006). Legal issues are
reviewed de novo, “affording appropriate deference to the BIA’s
interpretation of the INA and any attendant regulations.”
Lin v. Mukasey, 517 F.3d 685, 691-92 (4th Cir. 2008). This

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court will reverse the Board only if “the evidence . . .
presented was so compelling that no reasonable factfinder could
fail to find the requisite fear of persecution.” Elias-
Zacarias, 502 U.S. at 483-84; see Rusu v. INS, 296 F.3d 316, 325
n.14 (4th Cir. 2002).
The Petitioners argue that they established
entitlement to relief as a result of their membership in a
particular social group and their political opinion. The Board
has defined “persecution on account of membership in a
particular social group” within the meaning of the INA to mean
“persecution that is directed toward an individual who is a
member of a group of persons all of whom share a common,
immutable characteristic[,] . . . one that the members of the
group either cannot change, or should not be required to change
because it is fundamental to their individual identities or
consciences.” Matter of Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 233-34
(BIA 1985), overruled on other grounds by Matter of Mogharrabi,
19 I. & N. Dec. 439 (BIA 1987). Further, as detailed in In re
C-A-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 951, 960 (BIA 2006) and affirmed in In re
A-M-E & J-G-U-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 69, 74-76 (BIA 2007), in
addition to “immutability,” the Board requires that a particular
social group have: “(1) social visibility, meaning that members
possess characteristics . . . visible and recognizable by others
in the native country, . . . (2) be defined with sufficient

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particularity to avoid indeterminacy, . . . and (3) not be
defined exclusively by the fact that its members have been
targeted for persecution[.]” Scatambuli v. Holder, 558 F.3d 53,
59 (1st Cir. 2009) (internal citations and quotation marks
omitted).
After reviewing the record, we conclude substantial
evidence supports the finding that the Petitioners failed to
show they were targeted by gang members on account of a
protected ground. The Petitioners claimed they had a well-
founded fear of persecution based on their membership in a
particular social group, i.e., families who resist extortion
from MS-13 or other gangs. They also claimed a well-founded
fear on account of a political opinion based on their resistance
to the gangs and the gangs’ extortion attempts. In addition,
Xiomara and Santos claimed they had a well-founded fear of
persecution because they were targeted on account of their
father’s resistance to the extortion attempts. A person’s or a
group’s opposition to gangs and resistance to recruitment or
extortion efforts “are all amorphous characteristics that
neither provide an adequate benchmark for determining group
membership, nor embody concrete traits that would readily
identify a person as possessing those characteristics.”
Lizama v. Holder, 629 F.3d 440, 447 (4th Cir. 2011) (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted). Furthermore, substantial

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evidence supports the finding that the Petitioners were not
targeted on account of a political opinion. They failed to show
that they were targeted by the gangs for any reason other than
the gangs’ desires to increase their own coffers. Finally,
substantial evidence supports the finding that Xiomara and
Santos were not targeted on account of their relationship to
their father. The record does not compel a finding that were it
not for their relationship to their father, the children would
not have been harassed.
We further conclude that the immigration judge did not
err by declining to make a determination regarding past
persecution because the judge properly ruled that the
Petitioners failed to show a nexus between their fear of
persecution and a protected ground.
We also conclude that the Petitioners failed to show
the Board or the immigration judge erred in disposing of their
claim under the CAT. The record does not compel a finding that
any possible torture the Petitioners may face when they return
to El Salvador will be with the willful blindness, acquiescence
or instigation of the El Salvadorian government. See 8 C.F.R.
§ 1208.18(a) (2010).
Accordingly, we deny the petition for review. We
dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal

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contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the
court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
PETITION DENIED

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