United States of America v. Ronald Scott

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 09-4310
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
RONALD SCOTT,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
Maryland, at Baltimore. Andre M. Davis, District Judge. (1:08-
cr-00034-AMD-1)
Submitted: January 28, 2010 Decided: March 4, 2010
Before MOTZ and AGEE, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior
Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Gary A. Ticknor, Elkridge, Maryland, for Appellant. Rod J.
Rosenstein, United States Attorney, Christopher Mason, Special
Assistant United States Attorney, Baltimore, Maryland, for
Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

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PER CURIAM:
Ronald Scott entered a conditional guilty plea to
possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, reserving the
right to appeal the district court’s denial of his motion to
suppress evidence. Scott was sentenced to 180 months in prison.
He appeals, contending that he was seized in violation of the
Fourth Amendment and that the district court improperly denied
the suppression motion. We affirm.
I
At approximately 6:00 a.m. on September 24, 2007, two
Baltimore police officers were traveling in an area where heavy
drug trafficking was known to occur between 5:00 a.m. and 9:00
a.m. The officers observed Scott slumped over in his car,
apparently asleep. The officers approached the vehicle, knocked
on a window, and, when Scott did not respond, knocked more
loudly. Scott awoke and began to open the door. The officers
shut the door and instructed him to roll the window down
instead. Scott placed his key in the ignition and opened the
window. In response to an inquiry about his well-being, Scott
replied that “he was just coming down off his high.” Scott’s
speech was slurred, and his eyes appeared glassy. Scott also

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volunteered that he had been out “hacking,” or operating an
illegal taxi service, and was waiting for his fare to return.
The officers then asked Scott to exit the vehicle. He
complied, removing his keys from the ignition. The officers
placed the keys on the hood of Scott’s car, turned him around,
and placed his hands on top of the car. During a pat-down of
Scott’s outer garments, one officer felt the butt of a gun. The
officers retrieved the gun and placed Scott under arrest.
The district court denied Scott’s motion to suppress
the firearm. The court determined that the Fourth Amendment was
not implicated when the officers approached Scott, roused him,
and initiated a conversation with him. Once Scott informed the
officers that he was coming down from a high, however, the court
found that the officers had probable cause to arrest him for
possession of narcotics and to search him incident to that
arrest.
II
In reviewing a district court’s ruling on a motion to
suppress, we review the district court’s factual findings for
clear error, United States v. Blake, 571 F.3d 331, 338 (4th Cir.
2009), giving “due weight to inferences drawn from those facts
by . . . judges and local law enforcement officers.” Ornelas v.

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United States, 517 U.S. 690, 699 (1996). Legal conclusions on a
motion to suppress are reviewed de novo. Blake, 571 F.3d at
338. When the district court denies a suppression motion, we
review the evidence in the light most favorable to the
Government. United States v. Neely, 564 F.3d 346, 349 (4th Cir.
2009).
III
“[V]oluntary citizen-police encounters do not
implicate the Fourth Amendment.” United States v. Black, 525
F.3d 359, 364 (4th Cir. 2008). While the Fourth Amendment
prohibits unreasonable seizures of persons, a “seizure does not
occur simply because a police officer approaches an individual
and asks a few questions.” Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429,
434 (1991). Absent a seizure, a police-citizen encounter is
considered consensual and “will not trigger Fourth Amendment
scrutiny.” Id. at 439. If a reasonable person would feel free
“to disregard the police and go about his business,” California
v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 628 (1991), “the encounter is
consensual.” United States v. Farrior, 535 F.3d 210, 218 (4th
Cir. 2008). Whether an encounter is consensual is determined
based upon the totality of the circumstances. Bostick, 501 U.S.
at 437.

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Here, we agree with the district court that the Fourth
Amendment was not implicated when the officers approached Scott,
roused him, and inquired about his well-being. Scott was
observed slumped over in his vehicle at a time and in a
neighborhood known for significant illicit drug activity. Scott
had the keys to the car, and the officers did not request--much
less retain--his license or other identification. See United
States v. Weaver, 282 F.3d 302, 310-13 (stating retention of
identification “highly material” to whether encounter is
consensual or constitutes a seizure). While the officers did
close Scott’s door and ask him to instead open the window in
order to talk to him, we agree with the district court that this
did not transform the encounter into a seizure. The officers
neither said nor did anything to suggest that Scott’s compliance
was required or that Scott was not free to end the exchange.
Rather, they made a request, with which Scott voluntarily
complied. See INS v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 215-16 (1984) (fact
that person responds to officer or complies with request does
not change consensual nature of encounter).
IV
Once Scott informed the officers that he was operating
an illegal taxi service and was coming down from a “high,” the

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officers had probable cause to arrest him for a narcotics
offense or for operating the taxi service. See Devenpeck v.
Alford, 543 U.S. 146, 152 (2004) (“warrantless arrest . . . is
reasonable . . . where there is probable cause to believe that a
criminal offense has been or is being committed”). Further, the
search of Scott’s person was justified as a search incident to
that arrest. See Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763
(1969). It is immaterial that Scott’s formal arrest occurred
subsequent to the search of his person. See Rawlings v.
Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 111 (1980) (“Where the formal arrest
followed quickly on the heels of the challenged search of [the
arrestee’s] person, [it is not] particularly important that the
search preceded the arrest rather than vice versa.”). We agree
with the district court that the search of Scott’s person did
not violate the Fourth Amendment.
V
We accordingly affirm. We dispense with oral argument
because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented
in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the
decisional process.
AFFIRMED

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