William K. Stone v. HVM, L.L.C., d/b/a Extended Stay America

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 09-2038
WILLIAM K. STONE,
Plaintiff – Appellant,
v.
HVM, L.L.C., d/b/a Extended Stay America,
Defendant – Appellee,
and
TRAVELOCITY.COM L.P.; SABRE, INCORPORATED,
Defendants.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia, at Newport News. Robert G. Doumar, Senior
District Judge. (4:09-cv-00072-RGD-JEB)
Submitted: December 13, 2010 Decided: January 5, 2011
Before WILKINSON, NIEMEYER, and WYNN, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Gerald Glenn Poindexter, POINDEXTER & POINDEXTER, Surry,
Virginia, for Appellant. William B. Tiller, Kelly B. Martin,
TILLER LAW GROUP, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

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PER CURIAM:
William K. Stone appeals the district court’s
dismissal of his personal injury action against HVM, L.L.C.,
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure
to file his complaint within the applicable statute of
limitations. Finding no reversible error, we affirm.
In Virginia, “every action for personal injuries,
whatever the theory of recovery, . . . shall be brought within
two years after the cause of action accrues.” Va. Code Ann.
§ 8.01-243(A) (2007 & Supp. 2010). The following elements must
be present before a cause of action accrues: “(1) a legal
obligation of a defendant to the plaintiff, (2) a violation or
breach of that duty or right, and (3) harm or damage to the
plaintiff as a proximate consequence of the violation or
breach.” Locke v. Johns-Manville Corp., 275 S.E.2d 900, 904
(Va. 1981). Additionally, a cause of action accrues “from the
date the injury is sustained . . . and not when the resulting
damage is discovered,” Va. Code Ann. § 8.01-230 (2007), even if
the initial injury is slight or additional damage occurs later.
McHenry v. Adams, 448 S.E.2d 390, 393 (Va. 1994); see Brown v.
Am. Broadcasting Co., Inc., 704 F.2d 1296, 1300 (4th Cir. 1983)
(“Once a cause of action is complete and the statute of
limitations begins to run, it runs against all damages resulting

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from the wrongful act, even damages which may not arise until a
future date.”). Upon review, we conclude that Stone’s cause of
action against HVM accrued more than two years prior to the
filing of his personal injury action. See Giarratano v.
Johnson, 521 F.3d 298, 302 (4th Cir. 2008) (stating standard of
review for Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal); Goodman v. Praxair, Inc.,
494 F.3d 458, 464 (4th Cir. 2007) (en banc) (stating that Rule
12(b)(6) dismissal of complaint as time-barred proper where “all
facts necessary to the affirmative defense clearly appear[] on
the face of the complaint”). Therefore, the district court
correctly found that Stone’s complaint was time-barred.
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment.
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the
court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED

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