Luke A. Williams, Iii v.  JON OZMINT, Commissioner, South Carolina Department of Corrections

PUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
 LUKE A. WILLIAMS, III,
Petitioner-Appellee,
v. No. 06-16 
JON OZMINT, Commissioner, South
Carolina Department of Corrections,
Respondent-Appellant. 
 LUKE A. WILLIAMS, III,
Petitioner-Appellant,
v. No. 06-17 
JON OZMINT, Commissioner, South
Carolina Department of Corrections,
Respondent-Appellee. 
Appeals from the United States District Court
for the District of South Carolina, at Columbia.
Cameron McGowan Currie, District Judge.
(3:05-cv-01648-CMC)
Argued: May 22, 2007
Decided: July 27, 2007
Before NIEMEYER and MICHAEL, Circuit Judges, and
WILKINS, Senior Circuit Juge.
Reversed in part and affirmed in part by published opinion. Judge
Michael wrote the opinion, in which Judge Niemeyer and Senior
Judge Wilkins joined.

-- 1 of 16 --

COUNSEL
ARGUED: Donald John Zelenka, Assistant Deputy Attorney Gen-
eral, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF SOUTH CAR-
OLINA, Columbia, South Carolina, for Jon Ozmint, Commissioner,
South Carolina Department of Corrections. David Isaac Bruck,
WASHINGTON & LEE UNIVERSITY, School of Law, Lexington,
Virginia, for Luke A. Williams, III. ON BRIEF: Henry Dargan
McMaster, Attorney General, John W. McIntosh, Chief Deputy Attor-
ney General, Derrick K. McFarland, Assistant Attorney General,
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF SOUTH CARO-
LINA, Columbia, South Carolina, for Jon Ozmint, Commissioner,
South Carolina Department of Corrections. Keir M. Weyble, Colum-
bia, South Carolina, for Luke A. Williams, III.
OPINION
MICHAEL, Circuit Judge:
Luke A. Williams, III, was convicted and sentenced to death in
South Carolina state court for the 1991 murders of his wife and son.
The Supreme Court of South Carolina affirmed his conviction and
sentence and later denied his application for post-conviction relief.
Thereafter, Williams petitioned for habeas review in federal court.
The district court issued the writ, concluding that Williams received
ineffective assistance when his counsel failed to request a jury
instruction that the term "life imprisonment" should be understood in
its "ordinary and plain meaning." See State v. Davis, 411 S.E.2d 220,
222 (S.C. 1991). The state appeals, and we must reverse. We con-
clude that the Supreme Court of South Carolina did not unreasonably
apply Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), when it deter-
mined that Williams’s defense was not prejudiced by the lack of a
plain meaning instruction. We also reject Williams’s cross-appeal,
concluding that the state supreme court did not unreasonably apply
the standards enunciated in Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979),
when it determined that the evidence was sufficient to establish that
Williams committed the murders and that venue was proper in Edge-
field County, South Carolina.
2 WILLIAMS v. OZMINT

-- 2 of 16 --

I.
The facts, as recounted by the Supreme Court of South Carolina in
its opinion in Williams’s direct appeal, are as follows:
At approximately 11:00 a.m. on Wednesday, June 19,
1991, the bodies of Linda Williams (Wife) and Shawn Wil-
liams (Son) were discovered inside the family van in a forest
in Edgefield County, South Carolina, approximately six
miles from their home near Augusta, Georgia. The front
bumper of the van was against a tree, and fire had partially
damaged the vehicle. The investigators detected a strong
odor of gasoline and found several metal cans containing
gasoline inside the van. Wife was discovered in the driver’s
seat, which was positioned so far back that her feet could
not reach the pedals, and Son was seated in the front passen-
ger seat. Blood was found on a piece of PVC pipe on the
van’s floorboard. Wife was dressed in a gray t-shirt, gray
sweatpants pulled down to her upper thigh, light pink socks,
nylon panties, and she was not wearing a bra or shoes. Son
was also shoeless and was wearing a t-shirt and sweatpants.
Wife suffered a black eye, a contusion on the bridge of
her nose, contusions on her left forearm, and abrasions on
her left shoulder. These injuries were consistent with having
been caused by a human fist. The autopsy revealed that
Wife’s cause of death was blunt head trauma due to a beat-
ing. Son suffered a bruise to his forehead, as well as abra-
sions to his chin, back, and right side of his neck. His cause
of death was asphyxiation due to manual strangulation.
Wounds created by the fire were postmortem. Although the
deaths occurred within the same time frame, a specific time
of death was not determined.
At trial, several friends of Wife testified that she always
dressed neatly and would not go out in public dressed in a
t-shirt without a bra. Additionally, they stated that because
Wife was short in stature, she always positioned the driver’s
seat of the van close to the steering wheel. One friend stated
that she last spoke with Wife by telephone at 2:50 p.m. on
3 WILLIAMS v. OZMINT

-- 3 of 16 --

June 18, 1991. A neighbor testified that on June 19, 1991,
a car drove into the driveway at Williams’ home between
1:00 and 2:00 a.m. Further testimony established that at
approximately 7:00 a.m. on June 19, 1991, Wife’s van was
not parked in the driveway.
A bath towel and Son’s tennis shoes with blood stains on
them were found at Williams’ home. In addition, Williams’
right hand was severely bruised and swollen — this injury
was consistent with having occurred on June 19th. Williams
told a friend that on the day of the homicides, Wife and Son
were planning to go shopping at Columbia Mall in Colum-
bia, South Carolina. Prior to receiving the autopsy results,
Williams informed the friend that Wife had been beaten to
death, and Son had been strangled with a plastic wire wrap
similar to wire wrap Son had in his bedroom. When asked
if he killed Wife and Son, Williams did not respond.
Williams and Wife were experiencing significant marital
and financial difficulties. Neighbors and friends stated that
they frequently overheard Williams and Wife engaging in
hostile arguments. One neighbor testified that she heard a
"loud thump" during one of the arguments. In addition, Wil-
liams and Wife had declared bankruptcy, and foreclosure
proceedings had been initiated against their home.
Williams had substantially increased life insurance bene-
fits on Wife and Son during May of 1991, designating him-
self as beneficiary. On May 7, 1991, Williams upgraded
existing policies with Allstate Insurance Company to
include auto related death benefits in the amounts of
$100,000 for Wife and $20,000 for Son. Williams forged
Wife’s name on the enrollment form. After their deaths,
Williams made claims under two Allstate policies in the
amounts of $200,000 on Wife and $45,000 on Son. Wil-
liams also took out new life insurance policies for Wife and
Son with State Farm Insurance Company effective May 30,
1991, providing Wife with death benefit insurance in the
amount of $250,000 and Son with $25,000 in death benefit
insurance. [Williams applied for $500,000 in death benefit
4 WILLIAMS v. OZMINT

-- 4 of 16 --

insurance for Wife; however, until the policy was approved
a binder limited the amount of coverage to $250,000.] Wil-
liams indicated on the claims forms that Wife and Son had
died in Edgefield County, South Carolina.
State v. Williams, 468 S.E.2d 626, 628-29 (S.C. 1996).
At the conclusion of the state’s case, Williams moved for a directed
verdict, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to convict him of
the murders, that Edgefield County, South Carolina, was not the
proper venue, and that the Edgefield County circuit court lacked sub-
ject matter and personal jurisdiction. The circuit court denied the
motion, and Williams thereafter declined to testify or present other
evidence. The jury returned a guilty verdict on both charges of mur-
der. In the penalty phase the jury recommended death sentences, find-
ing two (statutory) aggravating circumstances: (1) that Williams
committed the murders for monetary gain and (2) that he murdered
two or more persons by one act or pursuant to one scheme or course
of conduct. The circuit court followed the jury’s recommendation and
imposed a separate death sentence for each murder. In his direct
appeal to the Supreme Court of South Carolina, Williams claimed,
among other things, that the evidence was insufficient to establish
venue and guilt. The state supreme court, in a thorough opinion,
affirmed Williams’s convictions and sentences, id., and the U.S.
Supreme Court denied his petition for a writ of certiorari, Williams v.
South Carolina, 519 U.S. 891 (1996).
Williams filed two applications for state post-conviction relief, the
second of which was granted by the circuit court (PCR court). The
PCR court concluded that Williams was denied effective assistance of
counsel because his trial counsel failed to request a jury instruction
that the term "life imprisonment" should be understood in its ordinary
and plain meaning. According to the PCR court, the instruction was
necessary to ensure that the jury understood the nature of its life
imprisonment option. The PCR court therefore granted Williams a
new sentencing proceeding. The state then petitioned the Supreme
Court of South Carolina for a writ of certiorari, and that court
reversed the decision of the PCR court. Although the state supreme
court concluded that Williams’s counsel was ineffective for failing to
request a plain meaning instruction, it ultimately determined that Wil-
5 WILLIAMS v. OZMINT

-- 5 of 16 --

liams was not prejudiced by the deficient performance. Specifically,
the court found "no evidence in the record to support the . . . conclu-
sion . . . that had the jury been given a ‘plain meaning’ charge there
is a reasonable possibility it would have [reached a different result
and] returned two life sentences." J.A. 188.
Next, Williams filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in U.S.
District Court, and that court granted relief. First, the district court
agreed with the Supreme Court of South Carolina that Williams’s
counsel was ineffective for failing to request a plain meaning instruc-
tion. Second, the court determined that counsel’s ineffectiveness "was
reasonably likely to have affected the outcome of [Williams’s] capital
sentencing hearing" because, among other things, Williams’s "prior
history contained a number of mitigating factors," including no crimi-
nal record. J.A. 385. The district court rejected Williams’s claim that
the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions or South Car-
olina venue. The state appeals the award of the writ on Williams’s
ineffective assistance claim, and Williams cross-appeals, arguing that
the writ should have been awarded on the additional ground that the
evidence was not sufficient to establish his guilt or proper venue.
II.
When, as in this case, a district court’s decision on a petition for
a writ of habeas corpus is based on a state court record, our review
is de novo. Frazer v. South Carolina, 430 F.3d 696, 703 (4th Cir.
2005). Federal habeas review in this case focuses only on legal deter-
minations made by the Supreme Court of South Carolina in adjudicat-
ing the merits of claims raised by Williams. Accordingly, the
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA),
Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996), provides that a federal
writ may not be issued unless the underlying state court adjudication
"resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreason-
able application of, clearly established Federal law as determined by
the Supreme Court of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). The
Supreme Court instructs us that "[u]nder § 2254(d)(1)’s ‘unreasonable
application’ clause . . . a federal habeas court may not issue the writ
simply because that court concludes in its independent judgment that
the relevant state-court decision applied clearly established federal
law erroneously or incorrectly. Rather, that application must also be
6 WILLIAMS v. OZMINT

-- 6 of 16 --

[objectively] unreasonable." Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 411
(2000).
III.
A.
Williams contends that he was denied his Sixth Amendment right
to assistance of counsel when his lawyer failed to request the South
Carolina "plain meaning" instruction in his capital sentencing pro-
ceeding. In rejecting Williams’s claim, the Supreme Court of South
Carolina applied Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), the
U.S. Supreme Court case that sets the standards for judging whether
a criminal defendant’s conviction or death sentence must be set aside
because counsel rendered ineffective assistance. A conviction or
death sentence must be set aside when counsel’s performance was
deficient and the deficient performance prejudiced the defense. Id. at
687. The deficiency inquiry centers on whether counsel’s perfor-
mance "fell below an objective standard of reasonableness" as mea-
sured by prevailing professional norms. Id. at 688. To avoid "the
distorting effects of hindsight," however, "a court must indulge a
strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range
of reasonable professional assistance." Id. at 689. The defendant (or
petitioner) bears the burden of overcoming this presumption. Id.
When counsel’s assistance in a capital sentencing proceeding was
deficient, the prejudice inquiry centers on "whether there is a reason-
able probability that, absent [counsel’s] errors, the sentencer . . .
would have concluded that the balance of aggravating and mitigating
circumstances did not warrant death." Id. at 695. The "totality of the
evidence before the judge or jury" must be considered in making this
determination. Id. Our review convinces us that the Supreme Court of
South Carolina did not engage in an unreasonable application of
Strickland when it determined that although Williams’s counsel per-
formed in a deficient manner when he failed to request the plain
meaning instruction, there was no resulting prejudice.
B.
South Carolina law provides a capital defendant with the right,
invoked by request, to a jury instruction at sentencing that "the term
7 WILLIAMS v. OZMINT

-- 7 of 16 --

life imprisonment is to be understood in its ordinary and plain mean-
ing." Southerland v. State, 524 S.E.2d 833, 835 (S.C. 1999). The
instruction is available even if the defendant might become eligible
for parole, and a trial court’s refusal to grant a request for the instruc-
tion is reversible error on direct appeal. Id. at 834. The purpose of the
plain meaning instruction is to ensure that the jury understands its
sentencing options (life imprisonment or death) without speculating
about the possibility of parole. See State v. Norris, 328 S.E.2d 339,
344 (S.C. 1985).
Because a South Carolina capital defendant’s right to the plain
meaning instruction is so well entrenched, the state supreme court
concluded that Williams’s trial counsel rendered substandard (defi-
cient) performance when he failed to request the instruction. Instead
of asking for a plain meaning instruction, counsel’s initial strategy
was to ask for a parole eligibility instruction to advise the jury that,
if it opted for a life sentence, Williams would be eligible for parole
in thirty years. Counsel explained at the PCR hearing that he
requested the parole eligibility instruction to enable the jury to under-
stand that a life sentence meant "more than five or ten or fifteen
years." J.A. 63. The trial court refused the parole eligibility instruc-
tion, which is not required to be given at the defendant’s request. See
McWee v. State, 593 S.E.2d 456, 457 (S.C. 2004). Williams’s counsel
did not follow up with a request for the plain meaning instruction. As
the South Carolina Supreme Court observed, counsel acknowledged
that he had no strategic or tactical reason for not requesting the plain
meaning instruction. He admitted that he believed the trial court
would give the plain meaning instruction as a matter of course; and
when it was not given, it did not occur to him to raise the issue with
the court.
In these circumstances the Supreme Court of South Carolina did
not unreasonably apply Strickland’s performance standard. Wil-
liams’s counsel was well aware of the plain meaning instruction and
of its availability upon request. He surely knew that the instruction
would have furthered his goal of making the jury aware that a life
sentence would in all events result in a long prison term, and he could
not provide a satisfactory explanation for his failure to ask for the
instruction. Thus, the state supreme court reasonably concluded that
the representation provided by Williams’s counsel was deficient
8 WILLIAMS v. OZMINT

-- 8 of 16 --

under Strickland’s performance standard, that is, it fell below an
objective standard of reasonableness as measured by prevailing pro-
fessional norms. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688.
After determining that Williams’s counsel was deficient in his per-
formance, the Supreme Court of South Carolina considered whether
counsel’s substandard performance prejudiced the defense. The state
supreme court’s analysis focused first on why the PCR court had
erred in concluding that Strickland’s prejudice requirement was satis-
fied. The PCR court believed that, without the plain meaning instruc-
tion, Williams’s defense at the sentencing phase was prejudiced
because: (1) the state relied largely on its circumstantial proof in the
guilt phase to establish the statutory aggravating factors in the sen-
tencing phase; (2) Williams had no prior criminal record; and (3) he
was released on bond prior to trial. The state supreme court, after
"carefully consider[ing]" the trial record, concluded that Williams was
not "prejudiced by the lack of a plain meaning charge." J.A. 187.
In the sentencing phase the jury found two statutory aggravating
factors that allowed it to recommend that Williams be sentenced to
death for each murder: (1) Williams committed each murder for the
purpose of receiving money or a thing of monetary value, and (2) he
murdered two or more persons by one act or pursuant to one scheme
or course of conduct. The Supreme Court of South Carolina con-
cluded that strong evidence, "albeit circumstantial," supported the
jury’s finding of the two statutory aggravating factors. J.A. 187. The
state supreme court recounted this evidence as follows.
Williams and his wife had been experiencing significant martial
problems, and they were in dire financial straits; they had recently
declared bankruptcy, and foreclosure proceedings had been initiated
against their home. In the month before the murders, Williams had
substantially increased life insurance coverage on his wife and son,
naming himself beneficiary. Williams forged his wife’s signature on
forms that added vehicle-related death benefits under family automo-
bile policies. The bodies were found in the family van, which had
been partially burned. Right after the murders Williams displayed
injuries to his right hand (severe bruising and swelling) that were con-
sistent with the beating (or blunt head trauma) that killed his wife.
The son’s death was due to strangulation. After the murders, but
9 WILLIAMS v. OZMINT

-- 9 of 16 --

before Williams received the autopsy results, he accurately described
the causes of the deaths to a friend, stating that his wife had been
beaten to death and that his son had been strangled by a plastic wire
wrap. From this evidence the Supreme Court of South Carolina con-
cluded that the jury "found [Williams] planned in cold blood the
deaths of his child and his wife, making arrangements to benefit
financially." J.A. 188. The gist of the state supreme court’s analysis
of the factual record is that the strong evidence supporting the two
statutory aggravating factors — two murders, both committed for
financial gain — weighs in favor of the conclusion that Williams was
not prejudiced by the lack of a plain meaning instruction. See Strick-
land, 466 U.S. at 696 ("[A] verdict or conclusion only weakly sup-
ported by the record is more likely to have been affected by errors
than one with overwhelming record support.").
The Supreme Court of South Carolina then considered the two
items of mitigating evidence considered by the state PCR court, spe-
cifically that Williams was released on bond (and met his bond condi-
tions) prior to his convictions and that he had no prior criminal
record. The state supreme court indicated that the lack of a plain
meaning instruction did not affect the jury’s consideration of these
two mitigating factors. First, the state supreme court found it unsur-
prising that Williams met the conditions of his bond. After all, the
court said, Williams "ha[d] achieved what he set out to accomplish,"
that is, the death of his wife and son and the prospect of substantial
life insurance or death benefits. J.A. 188. Second, the court concluded
that "given the nature of [Williams’s] crimes . . . the fact that he had
no prior criminal record [is] irrelevant to the question whether he was
prejudiced by the lack of a ‘plain meaning’ charge." Id. Here, the
court was referring to "the evidence demonstrat[ing] that [Williams’s]
motives were financial gain and the elimination of his domestic [or
financial] problems." Id. It was the depraved motive of financial gain
that allowed the jury to find one of the aggravating factors that trig-
gered the recommendation of death. The state supreme court thus
indicated by its evaluation that the aggravating factors outweighed the
mitigating factors by a significant degree.
The Supreme Court of South Carolina concluded its analysis of
Strickland’s prejudice factor by considering whether there was any-
thing "in th[e] record to indicate that the jurors in [Williams’s] capital
10 WILLIAMS v. OZMINT

-- 10 of 16 --

trial were concerned with parole eligibility, or confused about the
meaning of a life sentence." J.A. 188. The court found nothing, and
the record supports that determination. First, the aggravating factors
found by the jury (two murders and a financial motive) are not ones
that indicate that the jury was concerned about how long Williams
would serve if he received a life sentence or whether he would be a
danger to society if he was paroled at some future date. It appeared
to be solely the nature of, and the motive behind, Williams’s crimes
that triggered the jury’s recommendation of death. Second, there is no
indication in the record that a plain meaning instruction would have
prompted the jury to give more weight to the mitigating evidence. The
aggravating factors — a double murder planned in cold blood for
financial gain — simply outweighed the mitigating factors, such as
bond compliance and lack of a prior criminal record.
The Supreme Court of South Carolina thus concluded that there
was no reasonable probability that, had a plain meaning instruction
been given to Williams’s sentencing jury, the jury would have con-
cluded that the balance of aggravating and mitigating factors did not
warrant the death sentence. This decision, we conclude, did not
involve an unreasonable application of Strickland. Of course, the dis-
trict court concluded that the decision of the Supreme Court of South
Carolina was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of
Strickland, in four respects. We will evaluate the district court’s deci-
sion and explain why that court’s reasoning does not provide a suffi-
cient basis under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) to set aside the state court
determination.
First, the district court said that the Supreme Court of South Caroli-
na’s determination that Williams’s lack of a prior criminal record was
irrelevant to the prejudice question is contrary to Strickland, which
required the state court to consider the "totality of the evidence." See
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 695; see also Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S.
104, 114-15 (1982) (sentencer may not be precluded from considering
any mitigating factor). The state supreme court did not exclude Wil-
liams’s clean record from its consideration of the prejudice factor.
Rather, the state supreme court weighed Williams’s lack of a prior
record against the cold-blooded and brutal nature of the murders and
the aggravating factors of financial motive and a double murder; only
then did the court conclude that the lack of a prior record was irrele-
11 WILLIAMS v. OZMINT

-- 11 of 16 --

vant to the prejudice question. The court was thus saying that the
aggravating factors were so significant that the addition of a plain
meaning instruction would not have transformed Williams’s clean
record — which the jury was instructed to consider in mitigation —
into a factor that outweighed William’s depraved motive and his cold-
blooded planning and execution of the murders.
Second, the district court noted that the Supreme Court of South
Carolina, in concluding that the lack of a plain meaning instruction
did not prejudice Williams, erred in relying on lack of evidence of
juror concern about parole eligibility under a life sentence. The dis-
trict court believed that the state court’s reliance on this factor was
contrary to the U.S. Supreme Court decisions in Simmons v. South
Carolina, 512 U.S. 154 (1994); Shafer v. South Carolina, 532 U.S.
36 (2001); and Kelly v. South Carolina, 534 U.S. 246 (2002). These
decisions require a state court, as a matter of due process, to instruct
a capital sentencing jury that a defendant would be ineligible for
parole if the prosecution has put the defendant’s future dangerousness
in issue, and the only sentencing alternative to death is life imprison-
ment without the possibility of parole. See, e.g., Shafer, 532 U.S. at
51. Kelly made clear that a court must give a parole ineligibility
instruction under these circumstances regardless of whether the jury
indicates concern about parole. 534 U.S. at 256-57. Neither Kelly nor
any other Supreme Court case has considered the question raised by
the district court — whether a state court may rely on the absence of
evidence of juror concern or confusion about parole eligibility or the
meaning of a life sentence in considering whether the lack of a plain
meaning instruction prejudiced the defense. Again, the purpose of
South Carolina’s plain meaning instruction is to ensure that a capital
jury understands its sentencing options (life imprisonment or death)
without speculating about the possibility of parole. It is not unreason-
able for a court, in reviewing a record for prejudice resulting from
lack of a plain meaning instruction, to look for signs of juror confu-
sion about parole eligibility or the meaning of a life sentence. In any
event, the Supreme Court of South Carolina in Williams’s case did
not act contrary to, or unreasonably apply any U.S. Supreme Court
precedent, when it relied on the lack of evidence of juror confusion
about the consequences of the sentencing options.
Third, the district court concluded that the state supreme court, in
conducting its prejudice analysis, unreasonably failed to consider the
12 WILLIAMS v. OZMINT

-- 12 of 16 --

likely effect of statements made by the prosecution and defense in
closing arguments. The prosecutor told the jury that imposing a life
sentence on Williams would "pat him on the back" and indicate that
Edgefield County "forgave" him. J.A. 376. Defense counsel later told
the jury that it would hear a charge that "life [in prison] means the
remainder of one’s natural life." J.A. 377. This charge never material-
ized because counsel did not request a plain meaning instruction. The
district court concluded that these statements could have confused the
jury about the meaning of a life sentence. We disagree. The prosecu-
tor’s statement simply reflected the view that a death sentence would
be the most appropriate punishment. This view was expressed without
any mention that parole might be possible under a life sentence. Fur-
ther, it is not likely that defense counsel prompted the jury to make
parole eligibility a deciding factor in its sentencing recommendation
when he mistakenly said that a plain meaning instruction would be
given. The statements therefore are not of sufficient materiality to
allow us to say that the state supreme court was unreasonable in deter-
mining that "[t]here is nothing in th[e] record to indicate that the
jurors in [Williams’s] capital trial were concerned with parole eligi-
bility, or confused about the meaning of a life sentence." J.A. 188.
Fourth, the district court concluded that the Supreme Court of
South Carolina’s prejudice inquiry involved an unreasonable applica-
tion of Strickland because the court "did not mention" several mitigat-
ing factors. These factors included Williams’s good behavior during
childhood; his many friends in high school, where he was active in
sports; his ten-year estrangement from his family as a result of a will
contest, and the reconciliation after he was arrested for murder; and
his "quiet, withdrawn" nature while an inmate in the Edgefield
County Jail. J.A. 379. The district court treated the state supreme
court’s failure to mention these factors as an indication that the state
court did not follow Strickland’s directive to "consider the totality of
the evidence before the . . . jury," including the "aggravating and miti-
gating circumstances," Strickland, 466 U.S. at 695. As we discussed
above, the state supreme court specifically mentioned two mitigating
factors: that Williams adhered to his bond conditions and obligations
and that he had no prior criminal record. Moreover, the state supreme
court stated that it had "carefully considered whether the record sup-
ports the . . . conclusion that [Williams] was prejudiced by the lack
of a plain meaning charge." J.A. 187. The state supreme court thus
13 WILLIAMS v. OZMINT

-- 13 of 16 --

implied that it considered all of the mitigating circumstances, includ-
ing the unmentioned ones, but ultimately determined there was not a
reasonable probability that, had a plain meaning instruction been
given, the jury would have concluded that the balance of aggravating
and mitigating factors warranted two life sentences instead of death.
See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 695. This determination did not involve
an unreasonable application of Strickland.
For the foregoing reasons the district court’s order granting Wil-
liams’s application for a writ of habeas corpus will be reversed.
IV.
In Williams’s direct appeal the Supreme Court of South Carolina
rejected his claims that the evidence was not sufficient to support
either his convictions or venue in South Carolina. Williams reasserted
these claims in his federal habeas petition, and they were also rejected
by the district court. He cross-appeals this aspect of the district court’s
decision.
"[T]he Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects
a defendant in a [state] criminal case against conviction except upon
proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute
the crime with which he is charged." Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S.
307, 315 (1979) (quotation marks and citation omitted). "To deter-
mine whether this due process right has been violated, the appropriate
inquiry before the passage of AEDPA was a straightforward question
of ‘whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to
the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essen-
tial elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.’" Sarausad v.
Porter, 479 F.3d 671, 677 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting Jackson, 443 U.S.
at 319 (emphasis in original)). Now, under the AEDPA provision cod-
ified at 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), "we inquire whether a state court
determination that the evidence was sufficient to support a conviction
was an ‘objectively unreasonable’ application of [the standard enunci-
ated in] Jackson." Id.
A.
South Carolina defines murder as "the killing of any person with
malice aforethought." S.C. Code Ann. § 16-3-10. In rejecting Wil-
14 WILLIAMS v. OZMINT

-- 14 of 16 --

liams’s claim that the evidence was insufficient for a jury to find guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt, the Supreme Court of South Carolina
began by focusing on the evidence that demonstrated Williams’s
motive and planning. He and his wife were experiencing severe finan-
cial difficulties, as evidenced by their bankruptcy and the foreclosure
on the family home; neighbors regularly overheard loud arguments
between Williams and his wife; and he substantially increased the life
insurance coverage (naming himself the beneficiary) on his wife and
son a month before the murders. Immediately after the murders, Wil-
liams’s right hand was severely bruised, and the injury marks on his
wife’s body were consistent with injuries that would be inflicted in a
beating with a human fist. Finally, Williams described the methods
that were used to murder his wife and son before he received the
autopsy results. This evidence, along with the other evidence recited
in the statement of facts, see part I supra, was sufficient for any ratio-
nal trier of fact to find Williams guilty, beyond a reasonable doubt,
of murdering his wife and son.
B.
South Carolina law requires a murder indictment to specify the
place of the victim’s death for purposes of establishing venue and
providing adequate notice to the defendant. See S.C. Code Ann. § 17-
19-30; State v. Brisbon, 474 S.E.2d 433, 436 (S.C. 1996) (quoting
State v. Bostick, 131 S.E.2d 841, 842 (S.C. 1963)). Williams’s jury
was thus instructed that the state was required to prove beyond a rea-
sonable doubt that the murders occurred in Edgefield County, South
Carolina, as alleged in the indictment. Williams contends here, as he
did in his direct appeal, that there was insufficient evidence to support
a finding that the murders occurred in Edgefield County rather than
in Georgia. The factual issue of where the murders occurred is a close
one to be sure. The evidence would have allowed the jury to find that
the victims were murdered in either Edgefield County, South Caro-
lina, or in Georgia. The jury nevertheless found that the deaths
occurred in Edgefield County. An objectively reasonable application
of the Jackson standard requires that a reviewing court "faced with a
record of historical facts that supports conflicting inferences must pre-
sume . . . that the trier of fact resolved any such conflicts in favor of
the prosecution, and must defer to that resolution." Jackson, 443 U.S.
at 326. The Supreme Court of South Carolina pointed to evidence that
15 WILLIAMS v. OZMINT

-- 15 of 16 --

supported the jury’s determination that the murders occurred in South
Carolina: the victims were dressed in a way that suggested they were
forced from their home suddenly while still alive; their bodies were
found in South Carolina; and Williams signed insurance claim forms
conceding that his wife and son had died in Edgefield County. The
state supreme court’s conclusion that there was sufficient circumstan-
tial evidence to support the inference (and a finding beyond a reason-
able doubt) that the victims died in South Carolina was not
objectively unreasonable under the standards enunciated in Jackson.
V.
For the reasons stated in part III of this opinion, the district court’s
order issuing a writ of habeas corpus for Luke A. Williams, III, is
reversed. For the reasons stated in part IV, the district court’s determi-
nation that the writ cannot be granted on the grounds that the evidence
was insufficient to establish guilt or venue is affirmed.
REVERSED IN PART AND
AFFIRMED IN PART
16 WILLIAMS v. OZMINT

-- 16 of 16 --