United States of America v. Prince-Oyibo, 320 F.3d 494, 501 4th Cir. 2003

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 05-4834
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
versus
RENEE FRIEDMAN JONES,
Defendant - Appellant.
No. 05-1887
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
versus
POLA FRIEDMAN,
Claimant - Appellant,
and
RENEE FRIEDMAN JONES,
Defendant.
Appeals from the United States District Court for the Western
District of North Carolina, at Asheville. Lacy H. Thornburg,
District Judge. (CR-04-71)

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Submitted: August 23, 2006 Decided: September 18, 2006
Before NIEMEYER and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior
Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Charles R. Brewer, Asheville, North Carolina, for Appellants.
Gretchen C. F. Shappert, United States Attorney, Charlotte, North
Carolina, Thomas R. Ascik, Assistant United States Attorney,
Asheville, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
See Local Rule 36(c).

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PER CURIAM:
Renee Friedman Jones appeals her conviction for producing
false identification documents in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1028(a)
(2000), money laundering in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1956(1)(B)(I)
(2000), and making a false statement to a federal agent in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (2000). Finding no error, we affirm.
Jones, a driver’s license examiner at the North Carolina
Department of Motor Vehicles, conspired with Isidro Ramos to issue
identification documents to non-qualifying people for money. She
claims that the district court denied her ability to present a
defense when it did not admit portions of her diary, a letter of
commendation and other documentary evidence. Evidentiary rulings
are reviewed for abuse of discretion. United States v.
Prince-Oyibo, 320 F.3d 494, 501 (4th Cir. 2003). Defendants have
a constitutional right to present evidence in their favor, but “a
defendant’s right to present a defense is not absolute: criminal
defendants do not have a right to present evidence that the
district court, in its discretion, deems irrelevant or immaterial.”
Id. (citing Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, 408 (1988)). The
documents Jones sought to admit related to her role in helping
investigate DMV employee Monica Cody’s illegal issuance of driver’s
licenses. The documents are irrelevant because the Cody
investigation occurred prior to Jones’ crimes and were unrelated to
the charges against Jones. The documents were also cumulative

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because Jones and two DMV officials all testified about her role in
the Cody investigation. The district court did not abuse its
discretion by declining to admit the documents.
On the second day of the trial, the local newspaper ran
a story describing Jones’ case. Jones did not raise any motions or
issues related to the article, but the district court cautioned the
jury to base its verdict only on the evidence presented at trial
and not on the contents of the article. Jones now claims that the
publicity denied her ability to receive a fair trial. As Jones did
not raise this issue below, this court reviews this claim for plain
error. United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732-34 (1993).
Jurors are presumed to be impartial and only in extreme
circumstances may prejudice to a defendant’s right to a fair trial
be presumed from the existence of pretrial publicity itself.
Wells v. Murray, 831 F.2d 468, 472 (4th Cir. 1987). “It is the
defendant’s responsibility to demonstrate a strong possibility of
jury bias. . . . [I]t is not sufficient to simply allege adverse
publicity without a showing that the jurors were biased thereby.”
Id. Jones has merely alleged adverse publicity without any showing
that the jurors were biased. Jones fails to prove any prejudice
from the publicity.
After Jones’ conviction, the district court entered an
order of forfeiture for her interest in a $30,000 plot of land.
Jones does not challenge the forfeiture order, but her mother, Pola

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Friedman, filed a timely petition seeking to recover a portion of
the value of the lot. She contended that she gave Jones small
amounts of money each month over a five year period totaling
$12,500 for the purpose of buying a home. The district court ruled
that Friedman failed to prove any legal interest in the property
and lacked standing to challenge the forfeiture order. This court
reviews a district court’s dismissal for lack of standing de novo.
See Marshall v. Meadows, 105 F.3d 904, 905-06 (4th Cir. 1997).
A third party seeking to assert an interest in forfeited
property bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the
evidence that either: (1) she has a legal right, title or interest
in the property; or (2) she is a bona fide purchaser for value of
the right, title, or interest. 21 U.S.C. § 853(n)(6); United
States v. Schecter, 251 F.3d 490, 494 (4th Cir. 2001). The term
“legal interest in the property” encompasses “all legally protected
rights, claims, titles, or shares in real or personal property.”
United States v. Reckmeyer, 836 F.2d 200, 205 (4th Cir. 1987).
Friedman was not a bona fide purchaser for value and has
no title interest in the property because her name does not appear
on either the sales contract or the deed. A legitimate third-party
petition in forfeiture requires “that the interest exist in the
property subject to forfeiture.” Reckmeyer, 836 F.2d at 205.
Friedman states that she gave the money to Jones to buy a home, but
offers no evidence to prove that the small amounts of money given

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over the course of five years were actually used to purchase the
property. Friedman failed to link or trace her money to the
forfeited property. See Reckmeyer, 836 F.2d at 206 n.3. In
addition, as an unsecured, general creditor of Jones she does not
have a protected legal interest against the forfeited property
under § 853(n)(6)(A). See Schecter, 251 F.3d at 496; Reckmeyer,
836 F.2d at 206. Friedman finally contends that she has an
interest in equity because the money given to Jones constituted a
resulted trust. Even if Friedman had a trust with Jones, the trust
is merely a general unsecured trust for $12,500 and not related to
the forfeited property. Friedman failed to prove her money was
used to purchase the land and as a result did not establish an
interest, legal or equitable, in the forfeited property
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment. We
dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions
are adequately presented in the materials before the court and
argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED

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