United States of America v. Travis Jarrod Turnage

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 05-4800
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
versus
TRAVIS JARROD TURNAGE,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western
District of Virginia, at Roanoke. Glen E. Conrad, District Judge.
(CR-05-18)
Submitted: July 26, 2006 Decided: March 22, 2007
Before WILKINSON, NIEMEYER, and MOTZ, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. Judge Motz dissents.
Michelle C. F. Derrico, COPENHAVER, ELLETT & DERRICO, Roanoke,
Virginia, for Appellant. John L. Brownlee, United States Attorney,
R. Andrew Bassford, Assistant United States Attorney, Roanoke,
Virginia, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

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PER CURIAM:
Travis Jarrod Turnage entered a conditional guilty plea
to one count of possession of cocaine with intent to distribute, in
violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (2000), and one count of
possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking
offense, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (2000). The guilty
plea was entered pursuant to a plea agreement that reserved
Turnage’s right to appeal the denial of the motion to suppress.
The court sentenced Turnage to seventy-five months’ imprisonment.
Finding no error, we affirm.
Turnage argues that the district court erred in denying
his motion to suppress based on the alleged illegality of his
detention and subsequent search. This court reviews the factual
findings underlying a motion to suppress for clear error, and the
district court’s legal determinations de novo. See Ornelas v.
United States, 517 U.S. 690, 699 (1996). When a suppression motion
has been denied, this court reviews the evidence in the light most
favorable to the Government. See United States v. Seidman, 156
F.3d 542, 547 (4th Cir. 1998). “[A]n officer may, consistent with
the Fourth Amendment, conduct a brief, investigatory stop when the
officer has a reasonable, articulable suspicion that criminal
activity is afoot.” Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 123 (2000);
see Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968). To conduct a Terry stop,
there must be “at least a minimal level of objective justification

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for making the stop.” Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 123; see also United
States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 232 (1985). Reasonable suspicion
requires more than a hunch but less than probable cause, and it may
be based on the collective knowledge of officers involved in an
investigation. Id. In assessing police conduct in a Terry stop,
courts must look to the totality of the circumstances. United
States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 8 (1989). Finally, officers are
permitted to draw on their experience and specialized training to
make inferences from and deductions about the cumulative evidence.
United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273 (2002).
In February 2005, police responded to a call from a
convenience store clerk who reported a suspicious person lurking
about. They saw Turnage, who matched the description given by the
clerk, standing beside the store. Although the clerk later stated
Turnage was not the person who prompted the call to police, Turnage
acted suspiciously when police arrived. Specifically, when Turnage
saw the officers arrive, he left the place he had been standing,
got into the passenger seat of a car, checked the mirrors, lifted
himself off his seat, and made a motion like he was stuffing
something in the front of his pants. Two officers also saw Turnage
place something under his car seat before he exited the vehicle in
response to an officer’s request. Finally, the incident took place
in a high-crime area. In view of the totality of the
circumstances, we conclude the district court did not clearly err

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in determining that the seizure was reasonable and that the motion
to suppress should therefore be denied. See Wardlow, 528 U.S. at
123; United States v. Perkins, 363 F.3d 317, 320-21 (4th Cir.
2004).
Accordingly, we affirm Turnage's conviction and sentence.
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the
court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED

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