Lurlie Ramey, on behalf of Charles Ramey (deceased) v. Director, Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs, United States Department of Labor

PUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
 LURLIE RAMEY, on behalf of Charles
Ramey (deceased); TRIPLE R COAL
COMPANY; OLD REPUBLIC INSURANCE
COMPANY,
Petitioners,
No. 02-1630 v.
DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF WORKERS’
COMPENSATION PROGRAMS, UNITED
STATES DEPARTMENT OF LABOR,
Respondent. 
On Petition for Review of an Order
of the Benefits Review Board.
(01-817-BLA, 01-817-BLA-A, 01-817-BLA-B)
Argued: February 25, 2003
Decided: April 14, 2003
Before GREGORY and SHEDD, Circuit Judges, and
C. Arlen BEAM, Senior Circuit Judge of the
United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit,
sitting by designation.
Affirmed by published opinion. Judge Shedd wrote the opinion, in
which Judge Gregory and Senior Judge Beam joined.
COUNSEL
ARGUED: Martin Douglas Wegbreit, SOUTHWEST VIRGINIA
LEGAL AID SOCIETY, INC., Castlewood, Virginia; Mark Elliott

-- 1 of 7 --

Solomons, GREENBERG TRAURIG, L.L.P., Washington, D.C., for
Petitioners. Edward Waldman, Counsel for Enforcement, UNITED
STATES DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, Washington, D.C., for
Respondent. ON BRIEF: Laura Metcoff Klaus, GREENBERG
TRAURIG, L.L.P., Washington, D.C., for Petitioners. Eugene Scalia,
Solicitor of Labor, Donald S. Shire, Associate Solicitor, Christian P.
Barber, Counsel for Appellate Litigation, UNITED STATES
DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, Washington, D.C., for Respondent.
OPINION
SHEDD, Circuit Judge:
Charles Ramey entered into a settlement with his former employer,
Triple R Coal Company, to resolve his decades-old claim for black
lung benefits. This petition for review arises from the decision of the
Benefits Review Board invalidating that settlement. We affirm the
Board’s decision because the Black Lung Benefits Act, 30 U.S.C.
§ 901 et seq., in plain and unmistakable terms, forbids the settlement
of claims for black lung benefits.
I.
This litigation is almost twenty-two years old. Charles Ramey filed
his claim for black lung benefits with the United States Department
of Labor in June 1981. The first administrative law judge ("ALJ")
denied the claim. Ramey appealed, and the Benefits Review Board
(the "Board") remanded the case for reconsideration. A second ALJ
denied the claim, but the Board remanded the case again. The third
ALJ awarded Ramey benefits, and the Black Lung Disability Trust
Fund paid Ramey approximately $100,771 in benefits before the
Board reversed the ALJ’s decision and vacated the award. On
remand, a fourth ALJ denied Ramey’s claim. The Board affirmed that
ruling, and Ramey petitioned this Court for review. While that peti-
tion was pending, the parties agreed to settle Ramey’s claim.1
1By order dated October 31, 2000, this Court remanded the case to the
Board for consideration of the proposed settlement.
2 RAMEY v. DIRECTOR, OWCP

-- 2 of 7 --

The settlement called for Triple R Coal Company ("Triple R") to
pay Ramey $12,000 in exchange for Ramey’s agreement (1) to dis-
miss his claim with prejudice, (2) not to seek modification of his
claim, (3) not to file a new claim, and (4) not to authorize anyone else
to file a claim on his behalf. In addition, the settlement provided that
any attempt by the Department of Labor to recover the $100,771 in
benefits that it had earlier paid to Ramey would void the settlement,
restoring the parties to the status quo ante.
The parties presented their settlement to an ALJ. Although he
determined that the settlement was reasonable and that Ramey’s inter-
ests were well represented by counsel, the ALJ ruled that the Black
Lung Benefits Act ("BLBA") did not permit such a compromise of
Ramey’s claim. The Board affirmed the ALJ’s conclusion on that issue.2
This appeal followed.
II.
The question whether the BLBA recognizes settlement agreements
such as the one entered into by Ramey and Triple R is a question of
statutory construction that we review de novo. See Holland v. Pardee
Coal Co., 269 F.3d 424, 430 (4th Cir. 2001). "In a statutory construc-
tion case, the beginning point must be the language of the statute, and
when a statute speaks with clarity to an issue[,] judicial inquiry into
the statute’s meaning, in all but the most extraordinary circumstance,
is finished." Estate of Cowart v. Nicklos Drilling Co., 505 U.S. 469,
475 (1992). Because the BLBA speaks clearly and unmistakably to
the issue presented in this appeal, our analysis begins — and ends —
with the plain language of the statute.
The BLBA incorporates some, but not all, of the provisions of the
Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act ("LHWCA"). 30
U.S.C. § 932(a). Sections 15 and 16 of the LHWCA are incorporated
into the BLBA. Id. Section 15 provides that "[n]o agreement by an
employee to waive his rights to compensation under this chapter shall
be valid." 33 U.S.C. § 915(b). Similarly, § 16 provides that "[n]o
assignment, release, or commutation of compensation or benefits due
2Ramey died while his appeal to the Board was still pending. Lurlie
Ramey, his widow, was substituted as claimant and petitioner.
3 RAMEY v. DIRECTOR, OWCP

-- 3 of 7 --

or payable under this chapter, except as provided by this chapter, shall
be valid." 33 U.S.C. § 916. These provisions operate as a general bar
to settlements. S.H. DuPuy Co. v. Director, OWCP, 519 F.2d 536,
538 (7th Cir. 1975). Not only does the BLBA include these anti-
settlement provisions, but it also specifically excludes § 8 of the
LHWCA, which provides a procedure governing settlements of
claims for benefits under the LHWCA. 30 U.S.C. § 932(a). Thus, the
BLBA, on its face, prohibits settlement.3
Ramey and Triple R contend that § 16 — which is incorporated
into the BLBA — implicitly incorporates § 8, which the BLBA other-
wise excludes. At the outset, the BLBA’s clear exclusion of § 8 in its
entirety trumps this tenuous "double incorporation" theory, or else the
exclusion would be meaningless. See 2A Norman J. Singer, Statutes
and Statutory Construction § 46.06, at 181-90 (6th ed. 2000).
In any event, the double incorporation theory fails of its own
accord. Ramey and Triple R insist that the phrase contained in § 16
— "except as provided by this chapter" — refers to the LHWCA,
even after § 16 is incorporated into the BLBA. "In a statute of spe-
cific reference [such as the BLBA]," however, "only the appropriate
parts of the statute referred to are considered. When the reference is
made to a specific section of a statute, that part of the statute is
applied as though written into the reference statute." 2B Singer,
supra, § 51.08, at 273-74. Thus, "this chapter" must refer to the
BLBA, not the LHWCA, a conclusion confirmed by the fact that the
BLBA does not incorporate the title provision of the LHWCA. 30
U.S.C. § 932(a); 33 U.S.C. § 901. Ramey and Triple R would have
the word "chapter" refer to two distinct statutes in a single sentence.
3The Board itself has consistently recognized that the BLBA does not
permit settlement. See Gerzarowski v. Lehigh Valley Anthracite, Inc.,
1988 WL 232653, at *2 (DOL Ben. Rev. Bd.); Myers v. Director,
OWCP, 1988 WL 232700, at *3 (DOL Ben. Rev. Bd.) (en banc); Estate
of Blake v. Director, OWCP, 1987 WL 107350, at *3 (DOL Ben. Rev.
Bd.) (en banc); Grieco v. Director, OWCP, 1987 WL 107343, at *3
(DOL Ben. Rev. Bd.) (en banc). These decisions rest upon the fact that
"the settlement provisions of the [LHWCA] were expressly excluded
from incorporation into the [BLBA]." Gerzarowski, 1988 WL 232653, at
*2.
4 RAMEY v. DIRECTOR, OWCP

-- 4 of 7 --

We do not adopt such a strained construction. See Gustafson v. Alloyd
Co., 513 U.S. 561, 570 (1995) (noting the general rule of statutory
construction that "identical words used in different parts of the same
act are intended to have the same meaning").
By unambiguous terms, the BLBA forbids employees "to waive
[their] rights to compensation" and to "release . . . compensation or
benefits due or payable." We presume that Congress "says in a statute
what it means and means in a statute what it says there." Connecticut
Nat’l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253-54 (1992). Accordingly,
we conclude that the BLBA does not permit parties to settle a claim
for black lung benefits.4
III.
The settlement proposed by Ramey and Triple R falls within the
categories of agreements forbidden by the statute. In exchange for a
payment of $12,000, Ramey agreed (1) to dismiss his claim with prej-
udice, (2) not to seek modification of his claim, (3) not to file a new
claim, and (4) not to authorize anyone else to file a claim on his
behalf.
Ramey and Triple R contend that Ramey neither waived a right to
compensation nor released compensation or benefits due or payable
because his claim had been denied by an ALJ. This argument is fore-
closed by the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Estate of
Cowart v. Nicklos Drilling Co., 505 U.S. 469 (1992). The question in
that case was whether the injured employee was a "person entitled to
compensation" under the LHWCA. Id. at 475. The employee argued
that he was not entitled to compensation because he was neither
receiving compensation payments from his employer nor had an order
been entered awarding him compensation. Id. The Supreme Court
4Because we find no ambiguity in the relevant statutory provisions, we
need not rely upon the Secretary of Labor’s interpretation of those provi-
sions. We note, however, that the Secretary’s regulation on this subject
comports with the plain meaning of the statute. See 20 C.F.R.
§ 725.515(a) (stating that "[e]xcept as provided by the Act and this part,
no assignment, release, or commutation of benefits due or payable under
this part by a responsible operator shall be valid").
5 RAMEY v. DIRECTOR, OWCP

-- 5 of 7 --

rejected that argument, concluding instead that "the normal meaning
of entitlement includes a right or benefit for which a person qualifies,
and it does not depend upon whether the right has been acknowledged
or adjudicated." 505 U.S. at 476. Thus, the employee "became a per-
son entitled to compensation at the moment his right to recover
vested, not when his employer admitted liability." Id. at 477.
In an analogous context, this Court held that an applicant whose
claims for statutory disability benefits had been preliminarily denied
nevertheless had a property interest in those benefits that called for
protection under the Due Process Clause. Mallette v. Arlington
County Employees’ Supplemental Retirement Sys. II, 91 F.3d 630,
640-41 (4th Cir. 1996). The defendant in Mallette argued that the
plaintiff could not have a property interest in disability benefits for
which she had merely applied. Id. at 637. This Court rejected that
argument, declining to give effect to "the mechanical and simplistic
applicant/recipient distinction where a statute mandates the payment
of benefits to eligible applicants based on objective, particularized
criteria." Id. at 639-40.
Under Estate of Cowart and Mallette, Ramey’s right to compensa-
tion vested when he became eligible for benefits under the BLBA.
The parties stipulated in their settlement agreement that Ramey was
a former miner who had "simple occupational coal worker’s pneumo-
coniosis" and "severe obstructive lung disease." Those conditions
qualified Ramey for compensation. Contrary to Ramey’s and Triple
R’s assertion, this right to compensation was not extinguished once
the claim was denied by an ALJ and the Board. The claim was still
pending, having been appealed to this Court but not finally decided.
Because the settlement purported to compromise an existing claim
and waive Ramey’s right to compensation, it is not enforceable under
the BLBA.
IV.
Ramey and Triple R attempted to put an end to this litigation by
6 RAMEY v. DIRECTOR, OWCP

-- 6 of 7 --

settling Ramey’s claim for black lung benefits. The BLBA does not
permit such a result.5 Accordingly, the decision of the Benefits
Review Board is
AFFIRMED.
5We recognize, of course, that settlement is a generally accepted —
and often preferred — means of dispute resolution. We also recognize
that the litigation of this single claim for benefits has spanned more than
two decades. Nevertheless, the statute means what it says, and it is for
Congress to change the statute if Congress intends a different result.
7 RAMEY v. DIRECTOR, OWCP

-- 7 of 7 --