US v. William Glover

UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 24-4387

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

WILLIAM KEVIN GLOVER,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of West Virginia, at
Clarksburg. Thomas S. Kleeh, Chief District Judge. (1:22-cr-00066-TSK-MJA-1)

Submitted: November 3, 2025 Decided: August 6, 2026

Before WYNN, RUSHING, and BERNER, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

ON BRIEF: Barry P. Beck, POWER, BECK & MATZUREFF, Martinsburg, West
Virginia, for Appellant. Eleanor F. Hurney, Martinsburg, West Virginia, Christie Sue Utt,
Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY,
Gainesville, Florida, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

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PER CURIAM:
After a four-day trial in March 2024, a jury convicted William Kevin Glover of
conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute and distribute fentanyl, in violation of 21
U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(C), 846 (“Count One”); three counts of distribution of fentanyl,
in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(C); distribution of methamphetamine, in
violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(C); possession with intent to distribute 50 grams
or more of methamphetamine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A)(viii) (“Count
Nine”); possession with intent to distribute fentanyl, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1),
(b)(1)(C); and maintaining a drug-involved premises, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 856(a)(1),
(b). The district court sentenced Glover to an aggregate 327-month prison term, which
consisted of a 327-month sentence on Count Nine, and 240-month sentences for the
remaining counts, all terms to be served concurrently.
Counsel has filed a brief in accordance with Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738
(1967), explaining that he has reviewed the record and found no meritorious issues for
appeal. Counsel nonetheless identifies five issues for the court’s consideration.
Specifically, counsel asks this court to determine whether the district court erroneously
(1) denied Glover’s motion to suppress; (2) denied Glover’s pro se motion for self-
representation; (3) refused to instruct the jury that Glover could not conspire with a
Government agent; and (4) denied Glover’s motion for a new trial based on comments
made by a potential juror during voir dire. Counsel also asks that we determine whether

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Glover’s sentence is reasonable. Glover has filed a pro se supplemental brief,
1
and the
Government declined to file a response brief. Finding no error, we affirm.
I. Motion to Suppress
“When the district court denies a motion to suppress, we review its legal
conclusions de novo and factual findings for clear error, considering the evidence in the
light most favorable to the government.” United States v. Henderson, 136 F.4th 527, 531
(4th Cir. 2025) (internal quotation marks omitted). However, the district court here
referred Glover’s motion to suppress to a magistrate judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 636(b)(1). And, after a hearing, the magistrate judge recommended that relief be denied
and advised Glover that failure to file timely objections to the recommendation would
waive appellate review of any district court order based on the recommendation. Despite
this warning, Glover did not object to the magistrate judge’s recommendation.
The timely filing of specific objections to a magistrate judge’s recommendation is
necessary to preserve appellate review of the substance of that recommendation when the
parties have been warned of the consequences of noncompliance. Wright v. Collins, 766
F.2d 841, 845-46 (4th Cir. 1985); see also Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 148-49 (1985).

1
We have considered the arguments Glover raises in his pro se supplemental brief
and find them to be meritless. We also conclude that the district court did not erroneously
deny Glover’s motion for self-representation. See United States v. Frazier-El, 204 F.3d
553, 558-60 (4th Cir. 2000) (affirming district court’s order denying defendant’s motion to
represent himself so defendant could argue “that, as an ‘officer in the Moorish Science
Temple,’ he was not subject to the jurisdiction of a United States district court” because
defendant’s attempt “to proceed pro se represented efforts to argue matters which would
not be permitted by the court” (internal quotation marks omitted)).

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We conclude that Glover has forfeited his right to challenge the district court’s order
denying his motion to suppress by failing to object to the magistrate judge’s
recommendation. See United States v. Midgette, 478 F.3d 616, 622 (4th Cir. 2007)
(holding “that to preserve for appeal an issue in a magistrate judge’s report, a party must
object to the finding or recommendation on that issue with sufficient specificity so as
reasonably to alert the district court of the true ground for the objection”).
II. Jury Instruction
“We review both the decision to give (or not to give) a jury instruction and the
content of an instruction for abuse of discretion.” United States v. Savage, 885 F.3d 212,
222 (4th Cir. 2018) (internal quotation marks and ellipses omitted). A district court’s
refusal to give a requested instruction is “reversible error only if the instruction: (1) was
correct; (2) was not substantially covered by the court’s charge to the jury; and (3) dealt
with some point in the trial so important, that failure to give the requested instruction
seriously impaired the defendant's ability to conduct his defense.” United States v. Lewis,
53 F.3d 29, 32 (4th Cir. 1995) (internal quotation marks omitted). Additionally, the
defendant must “show that the record as a whole demonstrates prejudice.” United States
v. Bartko, 728 F.3d 327, 343 (4th Cir. 2013). “A party challenging instructions faces a
heavy burden, for we accord the district court much discretion to fashion the charge.”
Henderson, 136 F.4th at 533 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Counsel suggests that the district court reversibly erred when it rejected the
Government’s proposed jury instruction explaining that Glover could not conspire with a
government agent. In Lewis, this court held that the district court’s failure to provide a

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“government-agent instruction”—explaining that one cannot be convicted of conspiring
with a government agent—was reversible error because a “strong possibility” existed that
the defendant was convicted for conspiring with government agents: the “bulk of the
evidence” consisted of the defendant’s interactions with the government agent, and only
“conflicting” evidence supported the defendant’s conspiracy with another individual. 53
F.3d at 35. Thus, this court was left with “no doubt” that the district court’s failure to
provide the “government-agent instruction seriously impaired . . . [the] defense.” Id.
By contrast, we find that there is little, if any, possibility that Glover was convicted
of Count One based solely on the testimony regarding the government agents’ controlled
buys. Indeed, the Government presented substantial evidence that Glover had agreements
to sell fentanyl with numerous individuals, and that he was fully aware of—and fully and
voluntarily engaged in—the conspiracy to sell the fentanyl. See United States v. Green,
599 F.3d 360, 367 (4th Cir. 2010). Moreover, the district court’s jury instruction regarding
Count One explained that Count One charged Glover and his three coconspirators with
conspiracy. We thus conclude that the jury was adequately informed that they were to
focus on the conduct of Glover and that of his coconspirators, rather than on the
government agents’ involvement in any of the drug transactions about which the jury was
informed. We therefore conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion when it
declined the Government’s belated request to provide the government-agent instruction.

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III. Motion for New Trial
The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure provide that a district court may, “upon
the defendant’s motion, . . . vacate any judgment and grant a new trial if the interest of
justice so requires.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 33(a). “A district court may grant a new trial only if
the verdict: (1) is against the clear weight of the evidence; (2) is based upon false evidence;
or (3) will result in a miscarriage of justice.” Hicks v. Ferreyra, 64 F.4th 156, 171 (4th Cir.
2023) (internal quotation marks omitted).
“When a district court denies a motion for a new trial, we employ a deferential
abuse-of-discretion standard, reversing the court’s judgment only in exceptional
circumstances.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). A “court abuses its discretion
when it acts arbitrarily or irrationally, fails to consider judicially recognized factors
constraining its exercise of discretion, relies on erroneous factual or legal premises, or
commits an error of law.” United States v. Dillard, 891 F.3d 151, 158 (4th Cir. 2018)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
We conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion when it denied
Glover’s Rule 33 motion premised on a potential juror’s statements regarding her inability
to remain impartial.
2
First, we observe that, after the district court sua sponte dismissed
the potential juror, defense counsel raised no objection regarding her dismissal or the
statements she made in front of the venire panel. See United States v. LaRouche, 896 F.2d

2
When the district court inquired whether any potential jurors could think of any
reason why they could not remain impartial in Glover’s case, a potential juror indicated
that she had a young relative pass away from a heroin and fentanyl overdose.

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815, 829 (4th Cir. 1990) (“[A] specific objection or request during the voir dire process is
required to preserve the objection for appeal.”). We find counsel’s failure to be especially
relevant because the district court expressly gave defense counsel an opportunity to raise
any concerns during the bench conference, and counsel indicated that no follow-up with
any of the jurors was necessary.
Additionally, we find no evidence that the prospective juror’s statements prejudiced
the jury. The Sixth Amendment guarantees defendants a right to an impartial jury. “Jurors
are presumed to be impartial, however, absent indications to the contrary.” United States
v. Powell, 850 F.3d 145, 149 (4th Cir. 2017) (internal quotation marks omitted). Further,
“the requirement of impartiality does not mean that jurors need to be totally ignorant of the
facts and issues involved,” and a district court must merely determine “whether . . . juror[s]
can lay aside [their] impression[s] or opinion[s] and render a verdict based on the evidence
presented in court.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
Here, the district court immediately sua sponte dismissed the prospective juror,
which prevented any further prejudicial discussion in front of the other prospective jurors.
Moreover, the potential juror’s statements did not include an opinion regarding Glover’s
guilt or imply any knowledge about the case, parties, or witnesses. We thus find no
evidence that the potential juror’s statement created actual prejudice among any of the
remaining potential jurors. See United States v. Tegzes, 715 F.2d 505, 508 (11th Cir. 1983)
(finding no district court error after a potential juror advised the court, in the presence of
the other jurors, that her son died of a drug overdose because “Appellants’ suggestion that
mere awareness of the adverse consequences of crime induces bias toward the defendant

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is highly speculative and falls far short of the potential actual prejudice which would
mandate additional voir dire”).
Furthermore, we observe that the district court instructed the jury during voir dire
of its duty to reach a verdict based solely on the evidence presented at trial and on the
court’s instructions regarding the relevant law. Such instructions are curative in nature and
alleviated any concerns of prejudice here. See United States v. Hines, 943 F.2d 348, 353
(4th Cir. 1991) (finding it pertinent to the question of juror impartiality that the trial court
expressly instructed all jurors that it was their “duty to judge the case solely on the evidence
presented in court”). We therefore find that the “interest of justice” did not require a new
trial, and thus conclude that the district court committed no error when it denied Glover’s
motion for a new trial.
IV. Reasonableness of the Imposed Sentence
We review Glover’s “sentence for reasonableness ‘under a deferential abuse-of-
discretion standard[,]’” United States v. McCoy, 804 F.3d 349, 351 (4th Cir. 2015) (quoting
Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 41 (2007)), and we review unpreserved, non-structural
sentencing errors for plain error, see United States v. Lynn, 592 F.3d 572, 575-76 (4th Cir.
2010). When reviewing a sentence for reasonableness, we must consider both the
procedural and substantive reasonableness of the sentence. See Gall, 552 U.S. at 51.
The court must “review [a] sentence for procedural reasonableness before
addressing whether it is substantively reasonable.” United States v. Provance, 944 F.3d
213, 215 (4th Cir. 2019) (emphasis omitted). In reviewing a sentence for procedural
reasonableness, we must assess whether the district court properly calculated the advisory

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Sentencing Guidelines range, considered the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors, analyzed any
arguments presented by the parties, and sufficiently explained the selected sentence. See
Gall, 552 U.S. at 49-51; Lynn, 592 F.3d at 575-76.
“If, and only if, we find the sentence procedurally reasonable can we consider the
substantive reasonableness of the sentence imposed under an abuse-of-discretion
standard.” Provance, 944 F.3d at 218 (internal quotation marks and alteration omitted). In
considering the substantive reasonableness of a sentence, this court “takes into account the
totality of the circumstances to determine whether the sentencing court abused its
discretion in concluding that the sentence it chose satisfied the standards set forth in
§ 3553(a).” United States v. Nance, 957 F.3d 204, 212 (4th Cir. 2020) (internal quotation
marks omitted). “[A]ny sentence that is within or below a properly calculated Guidelines
range is presumptively reasonable.” United States v. Gillespie, 27 F.4th 934, 945 (4th Cir.
2022) (internal quotation marks omitted). A defendant can only rebut that presumption
“by showing that the sentence is unreasonable when measured against the
. . . § 3553(a)
factors.” United States v. Bennett, 986 F.3d 389, 401 (4th Cir. 2021) (internal quotation
marks omitted). Plenary review of the district court record reveals no procedural
sentencing error. Furthermore, we discern no basis on which to question the substantive
reasonableness of Glover’s within-Guidelines range sentence and, thus, affirm the 327-
month sentence.
In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the entire record and have found no
meritorious issues for appeal. We therefore affirm the district court’s judgment.

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We stress, however, the importance of adequate Anders briefing even where counsel
believes there are no meritorious issues for appeal. The Anders brief serves dual purposes:
it assists in deciding whether counsel adequately examined the record and whether there
are meritorious arguments for appeal. Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 81–82 (1988). To
fulfill these functions, an Anders brief must sufficiently address both the record of the case
and the applicable legal authorities. Anders, 386 U.S. at 745.
This court requires that counsel inform Glover, in writing, of the right to petition
the Supreme Court of the United States for further review. If Glover requests that a petition
be filed, but counsel believes that such a petition would be frivolous, then counsel may
move in this court for leave to withdraw from representation. Counsel’s motion must state
that a copy thereof was served on Glover. We dispense with oral argument because the
facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and
argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED