United States of America v. Christopher Alfred

NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
_____________
No. 11-4343
_____________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
CHRISTOPHER ALFRED,
Appellant
___________
On Appeal from the District Court
of the Virgin Islands
(D.C. No. 1-07-cr-00042-004)
District Judge: Honorable Anne E. Thompson
___________
Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)
April 24, 2013
Before: McKEE, Chief Judge, SCIRICA, and VANASKIE, Circuit Judges.
(Filed: September 5, 2013)
___________
OPINION
___________
VANASKIE, Circuit Judge.
Christopher Alfred appeals his conviction of one count of conspiracy to commit
money laundering, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1956(h), and three counts of money
laundering, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1). Alfred contends that the District

-- 1 of 6 --

2
Court committed reversible error by admitting as evidence a statement he made to
authorities indicating that he had been a distributor of marijuana. Concluding that the
District Court acted within its discretion under Rule 404(b) of the Federal Rules of
Evidence, we will affirm the judgment of conviction.
I.
We write principally for the parties, and thus set forth only the facts essential to
our analysis. Around 2001, Myron Punter began selling cocaine and crack cocaine in
Alaska. He received the drugs via mail from the Virgin Islands, sent by one of Alfred’s
codefendants, Isaiah Fawkes, who grew up with Punter in the Virgin Islands. Initially,
Punter wired money or sent money orders directly to Fawkes, but later, in an attempt to
avoid suspicion, Punter employed others to wire the money to other individuals in the
Virgin Islands identified by Fawkes. Two such people employed by Punter were Leigh
Bennett and Tanisha Wade. Alfred received six wire transfers from both Punter and
Bennett, totaling $15,500. In addition, Alfred’s girlfriend at the time, Carolyn Urgent,
also received a total of $38,000 from Bennett and Wade in four wire transfers. Urgent
testified that Alfred told her from whom the money was to be sent and how much was to
be received, and that she delivered to Alfred the money wired to her.
In June of 2007, a grand jury indicted Alfred and seven other defendants on a
number of counts. Alfred was charged with one count of conspiracy to commit money
laundering and three counts of money laundering. After their indictment, Alfred and six
other defendants proceeded to trial, which, due to appeals concerning double jeopardy

-- 2 of 6 --

3
implications based on similar charges from a 2005 indictment that ended in a mistrial, did
not begin until March of 2011.1
Prior to trial, the Government filed notice, under Rule 404(b), of its intent to
introduce evidence of other wrongs and acts committed by Alfred. The Government
followed up its notice with a motion in limine seeking to allow introduction of Alfred’s
admission that he had been a distributor of marijuana. Alfred then filed a motion in
limine seeking to exclude as evidence those statements about having been a marijuana
distributer. The District Court concluded that reference to Alfred’s marijuana distribution
should not be excluded. The District Court explained that the statements fit within Rule
404(b)’s exceptions to show a defendant’s knowledge or absence of mistake—in this
case, regarding money laundering of drug proceeds—and the statement’s probative value
was not substantially outweighed by any unfair prejudicial effect.
At trial, a government agent testified that Alfred told him that “he was a dealer of
marijuana.” (App. 97.) The jury returned a guilty verdict on all counts against Alfred.
II.
The District Court had jurisdiction under 48 U.S.C. § 1612(a) and 18 U.S.C. §
3231. We have appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review the district
court’s admission of evidence under Rule 404(b) for abuse of discretion, and we will only
1 Five of the other codefendants’ appeals of the judgments based on the 2007
indictment were joined: United States v. Garcia, No. 11-1999; United States v. Maragh,
No. 11-2036; United States v. Allick, No. 11-4305; United States v. Young, No. 11-4344;
and United States v. Clouden, No. 11-4522. A panel of this Court has already affirmed
the judgment of conviction and sentence of Fawkes. See United States v. Fawkes, 510 F.
App’x 183 (3d Cir. 2013).

-- 3 of 6 --

4
reverse the district court if its decision was “clearly contrary to reason and not justified
by the evidence.” United States v. Butch, 256 F.3d 171, 175 (3d Cir. 2001) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
Rule 404(b) prohibits the admission of “[e]vidence of a crime, wrong, or other act
. . . to prove a person’s character in order to show that on a particular occasion the person
acted in accordance with the character.” Fed. R. Evid. 404(b)(1). Rule 404(b), however,
does permit evidence of crimes, wrongs, and other acts to be admitted to prove, among
other things, knowledge or absence of mistake. See Fed. R. Evid. 404(b)(2). “To be
admissible under Rule 404(b), evidence of uncharged crimes or wrongs must (1) have a
proper evidentiary purpose; (2) be relevant; (3) satisfy Rule 403; and (4) be accompanied
by a limiting instruction (where requested) about the purpose for which the jury may
consider it.” United States v. Green, 617 F.3d 233, 249 (3d Cir. 2010).
Each of the four prongs is satisfied here. First, Alfred’s admission of prior
trafficking involvement served a proper evidentiary purpose and was relevant in that it
made it more probable than not that Alfred understood that the money transfers he
facilitated constituted proceeds of unlawful activity, an essential element of the crime of
money laundering. See United States v. Richardson, 658 F.3d 333, 337-38 (3d Cir.
2011). The Government plainly articulated this rationale in support of its motion in
limine, and the District Court adequately explained that Alfred’s admission was relevant
to knowledge and absence of mistake, two of the proper purposes for allowing
introduction of evidence of prior bad acts under Rule 404(b)(2).

-- 4 of 6 --

5
Second, the District Court did not act arbitrarily or irrationally in weighing the
probative value of this evidence against the danger of unfair prejudice. See United States
v. Universal Rehab. Servs. (PA), Inc., 205 F.3d 657, 669 (3d Cir. 2000) (“[W]e cannot
reverse a District Court’s conclusion under Federal Rule 403 unless such a conclusion is
. . . arbitrary or irrational.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). Alfred was not charged
with drug trafficking crimes, but with conducting and conspiring to conduct financial
transactions in an attempt to conceal the nature and source of proceeds from unlawful
activity conducted by others. His prior drug trafficking was relevant only to the key
questions of knowledge and absence of mistake. It is neither arbitrary nor irrational to
find that the prejudicial effect of this evidence did not substantially outweigh its
probative value.2
Finally, although not directly challenged by Alfred, we note that the District Court
gave a limiting instruction to the jury concerning the proper purpose of Alfred’s
statement regarding his marijuana distribution. The District Court cautioned the jury that
some other illegal act by a defendant is not proof that he or she committed the offenses
charged in the indictment. The District Court further instructed the jury that it could
consider Alfred’s statement “only with respect to Alfred’s knowledge as to the way drug
payments are made, and/or camouflaged and concealed. That is the only relevance that
the statement he allegedly made about marijuana would have in this case.” (Dist. Ct.
2 Contrary to Alfred’s assertion that the Government did not give reasonable
pretrial notice of its intention to introduce such evidence, as required by Rule 404(b)(2),
the Government’s motion in limine provided ample notification, as evidenced by Alfred’s
own motion in limine to exclude the admission of prior drug dealing.

-- 5 of 6 --

6
Doc. #441, at 117.) We find the District Court’s limiting instruction adequate for the
purposes of Rule 404(b).
III.
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.

-- 6 of 6 --