Kermit Ceasar v. J. Grondolsky

BLD-080 NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 09-4172
___________
KERMIT CEASAR,
Appellant
v.
J. GRONDOLSKY
____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of New Jersey
(D. N.J. Civil No. 09-cv-03324)
District Judge: Honorable Jerome B. Simandle
____________________________________
Submitted for Possible Summary Action Pursuant to
Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6
December 23, 2009
Before: MCKEE, RENDELL and CHAGARES, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: March 16, 2010)
_________
OPINION
_________
PER CURIAM
Kermit Ceasar appeals from the District Court’s order dismissing his habeas
petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. We will
summarily affirm because we agree that Ceasar cannot challenge his conviction by means

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The sentence later was reduced to 262 months pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2).1
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of a petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241.
I.
In December 2002, the United States District Court for the District of New
Hampshire imposed a 324-month sentence based on Ceasar’s guilty plea to distribution of
crack cocaine and conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute crack
cocaine. The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed. In July 2009,1
Ceasar filed this petition, his third collateral attack on his conviction, but his first attempt
at proceeding under § 2241, claiming that he was denied the right to counsel during plea
negotiations, that he is actually innocent of the conspiracy charge, and that the trial court
lacked subject matter jurisdiction. After determining that the sentencing court could have
entertained Ceasar’s claims, the District Court concluded that § 2255 was not
“inadequate” or “ineffective.” See § 2255; In re Dorsainvil, 119 F.3d 245, 251 (3d Cir.
1997). Therefore, the District Court dismissed the § 2241 petition for lack of jurisdiction.
Ceasar appealed.
II.
We have jurisdiction over the appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 28 U.S.C. §
2253(a). A certificate of appealability is not required to appeal from the denial of this §
2241 petition. See Burkey v. Marberry, 556 F.3d 142, 146 (3d Cir. 2009). We exercise
plenary review over the District Court’s legal conclusions, and review its factual findings

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for clear error. See Vega v. United States, 493 F.3d 310, 314 (3d Cir. 2007).
III.
The District Court properly dismissed Ceasar’s petition. A federal prisoner can
seek relief under § 2241 only if the remedy provided by § 2255 is inadequate or
ineffective to test the legality of his detention. Cradle v. U.S. ex rel. Miner, 290 F.3d 536,
538 (3d Cir. 2002); Okereke v. United States, 307 F.3d 117, 120 (3d Cir. 2002). Lack of
success in a previous § 2255 motion, without more, does not render § 2255 inadequate or
ineffective; nor do AEDPA’s restrictions on filing successive § 2255 motions. See
Cradle, 290 F.3d at 539. We agree with the District Court that Ceasar’s case does not fit
within the narrow class of circumstances in which a § 2255 motion would be inadequate
or ineffective to challenge a conviction. Accordingly, the District Court’s dismissal of
the petition on jurisdictional grounds was proper. Because no “substantial question” is
presented by this appeal, we will affirm the order of the District Court.

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